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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

Legal texts like the Constitution can be understood as a source of authority and
structure that participate in shaping the contours of a nation’s boundaries.

Constitution has played an important role in defining the

ways

in

The

which the boundaries of

the United States have expanded as the result of the acquisition and integration of new
territories after initial

formation of the nation.

One way

participated in the nation building process, has been

for the

governance of acquired

territories

and

in

which the Constitution has

by providing

a source of authority

subsequent admission as States on an

their

equal footing with that of the original thirteen. This dissertation seeks to understand the

ways

in

which the Constitution has been constructed or

United States imperialist nation-building project.

I

am

interpreted to legitimate the

especially interested in a

discussion of the interpretations that were adopted between 1789 and 1900 to legitimate
the acquisition of new territories and their governance during the period anteceding their

formal annexation as States of the Union.

There have been

at least

two prevailing

interpretations of the relationship

between

the Constitution and the nation building history of the United States. This relationship

can be understood as a result of the impact of macro-historical events
Revolutionary War, the

War with Mexico,

like the

the Civil War, and the Spanish

on the nation-building process. Proponents of this view, such

as

American War,

Bruce Ackerman,

suggest that American constitutional history can be understood within jurisgenerative
1

eras.

Between

the

embrace of popular opinion and the

aid of the legal

community, these

constitutional

moments could

argument also suggests

that

potentially give birth to constitutional regimes

each constitutional

moment can be understood

founding of the nation and the re-conceptualization of a new national

2
.

This

as a re-

identity.

Alternatively, this relationship can be understood as a result of the interaction

between individuals and the
has been a

nation. This interpretation suggests that the Bill of Rights

site for contestation

and social struggles that has ultimately resulted

conceptualization of a national identity.

To be

sure, scholars like

in the re-

Rogers M. Smith

suggest that struggles over the ascription of citizenship can provide important insights

about the nature of the relationship between the Constitution and nation building
legal scholars

who

Race Theory

identify with the Critical

tradition in the legal

3
.

Other

academy

further contend that the rights and entitlements mediate relations of power and

membership between

the individual and the nation

4
.

Presumably, the recognition and

implementation of equal rights would result in a more democratic and egalitarian nation.

I

will label this approach as “micro-historical” to the extent that

its

concern

is

mostly

with the relationship of individual or group identities to the nation and the State.

My contention is that while the “macro” approach has a tendency to
centrality of citizenship

alternative generally

and membership

assumes

in constituting the nation, the

that the citizen

with the nation. In this project, however,

I

ignore the

“micro”

can have a reciprocal and direct relationship

will argue that the citizen’s relationship to the

nation has been mediated by the status of the space in which she has resided. Drawing on
the important insights and scholarship provided

by

the latter interpretive traditions,

I

will

suggest an alternative understanding that considers the constitutional status of the

territory in

which the individual resides

as a

way

2

to

understand the historical relationship

between constitutional

interpretation and U.S. nation building

5
.

Rather than simply

focusing on “national” events or on the relationship between individuals
and the nation,
this

approach focuses on the ways

in

which the acquisition and governance of territories

mediated the constitutional relationship between citizens and the nation.
is

that both

macro and micro approaches

to the study

My contention

of U.S. nation building have a

tendency to obscure important instances of subordination and oppression

that cannot

be

understood within these paradigms, but that simultaneously result from these types of
events and relationships of power.

Constitutional nation building can be understood as the result of the process of

acquiring and governing territories, and subsequently admitting them as States on an

equal footing with the original thirteen. The Constitution

whether the U.S. can acquire new

is silent

on the question of

territories after the initial establishment

In other words, this text does not provide

of the nation.

any clause authorizing the Federal government

to acquire

new

territories

with the purpose of annexing them has been polarized between two traditions

territories.

The debates over

of constitutional interpretation, namely a

the government’s authority to acquire

strict

and a loose construction

constructionists have generally argued that the Constitution

original States and

that

was not meant

to authorize the

could become States. In some cases,

territories that

government

6
.

Strict

drafted for thirteen

to acquire

new

territories

constructionists have argued that the only

could be annexed were those that belonged to the Confederacy before the

adoption of the Constitution

(i.e.

original land grants).

have legitimated the acquisition of new
the nation. In

strict

was

new

some

territories as

In contrast, loose constructionists

an expression of the political will of

cases, loose constructionists have argued that the Constitution does

3

not deny the government the power to acquire

of the national domain. In

anomalous

this project

legal status as a result

Notwithstanding

I

of the

new

territories

and

to

govern them as part

will argue that the territories acquired an

latter legal tension.

this textual silence, the

United States has acquired vast

territorial

possessions that have resulted in the creation of thirty-seven States, and over 2000 islands

through various means. Although the U.S. has acquired these

territories

through a variety

of different means, namely conquest, claims of discovery, purchase, war, cession, and
annexation,

its territorial

policy has generally been contingent on the amount of U.S.

citizenfsettlers residing in the acquired lands.

For the most

part, the

U.S. has justified the

acquisition of territories on shared principles of international law, and on the President’s

authority to conduct military campaigns and sign treaties.

It is

interesting to note that

despite the implications of the various forms of acquisition, until the acquisition of

Spanish colonies

once a

territory

in 1898, the U.S. territorial policy

was acquired

it

became

was

fairly consistent to the extent that

a part of the nation and

was placed on

a path to

eventual admission as a State.

Over

passed through a

thirty States initially

admitted into the polity as States.

7

The Hawaiian

Islands,

phase before they were

There are some exceptions, however such as the

Republic of Texas and the California occupied
altogether.

territorial

which

at

territory,

the time

which bypassed these stages

were recognized as a sovereign

nation, underwent a five-year period of occupation before being annexed, and

fifty

years before being admitted as a State.

the territories and to subsequently admit

8

The power

them

4

into the

to organize, enable,

more than

and govern

Union on an equal footing

is

located in Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution. This
Section

clauses

namely the Admissions Clause

New

States

(Art. IV, §3, cl. 1 )

is

divided into two

which reads

as follows:

may be

admitted by Congress into Union; but no new State shall be
formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of two or more States, or Parts of States,

without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as
Congress.

And

the Territorial Clause (Art. IV, §3, cl.2),

which

states:

The Congress

shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or Property belonging to the United States;
and nothing in the Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims
of the United States, or any particular States.

Neither of these clauses provides any clear guidance or criteria for the governance of
territories or their

subsequent admission as States of the Union.

have traditionally argued

that the Article IV, §3

was

limited to the Northwest territories

or rather those territories that belonged to the United States

contrast, loose constructionists

have generally interpreted

congressional plenary authority over the

can be read together
acquired and

made

in a

territories.

Strict constructionists

at its original inception.

this

Section as a source of

My contention

is

that these clauses

sub mode relationship. In other words, once a

a part of the nation, the Territorial Clause

congressional authority that enabled

precondition for their admission as

it

to organize

new

States.

became

and govern the

Thus,

I

In

will rely

territory

was

a source of

territories as a

on a conception of

nation building as an expression of the acquisition and governance of new territories, and

their

subsequent admission as States.

“territory” in a very

I

should further add that

I

am

narrow sense, namely within the context of the

In this dissertation,

I

will explore the

ways

in

which various

using the word

Territorial Clause.

legal actors, such as

Congress, the Supreme Court, and legal scholars, have interpreted the Territorial Clause

5

after the formation

1900.

of the United States in 1789 and the enactment of the Foraker Act
of

will argue that

I

United States during

between

this period

1

789 and 1900, every

was made

territory that

was acquired by

a part of the nation, annexed and eventually

admitted as a State on an equal footing. In 1900, however, Congress adopted for
the

time the practice of acquiring

The Foraker Act, developed
Puerto Rico, was the

the

ways

first

territories

and maintaining them

for the establishment

of a

civil

first

in a colonial condition.

government

territorial/organic act to codify this ideology.

that a distinct type

the

in the island

I

am

of

interested in

of imperialism that emerged as a result of the Spanish-

American War of 1 898 provided

the basis for a

new

interpretation

of the constitutional

relationship between the territories and the United States nation-building project. This

new

interpretation gave legitimacy to the acquisition of territories that remained foreign

for constitutional purposes, yet domestic for international concerns.

the

first

time that the U.S. constituted

itself as

It

also represented

an imperial nation entitled to possess

colonies.

My contention is that this departure can be explained as an expression of

dominant

racist ideologies,

economic

interests like the pursuit

of new markets, and

resources, and a concern with inexpensive labor. This departure

marked a

shift

from an

expansionist territorial practice to a distinct type of legally sanctioned imperialism and

colonialism.

This

10

is

not to say that the case of Puerto Rico provides us with the

first

example

of legally sanctioned U.S. imperialism. Unfortunately the indigenous communities of

what we presently

call the

United States were the

first

victims and survivors of this

hideous practice. However, the imperialism that American Indians experienced was
different than the type of legal imperialism that

6

I

am

1

exploring in this project.

Rather

than a form of imperialism that sought to annex indigenous
territories as part of an
expansionist nation-building project, the imperialism that Indians experienced
resulted
their isolation

Indians

and containment. This

is

not useful to this project. In

is

in

not to say that the experience of American

fact,

I

will argue that the experience of American

Indians does in fact provide important insights about the anomalous nature of the
Puerto

Rican legal status and
It

appears to

its

relationship to U.S. nation building.

me that there

at least

two ways

to understand the type

of legal U.S.

imperialism and American Indians. United States imperialism can be understood as the
violent disregard of treaties signed between

states like

American Indian nations and other nation-

England, France, Canada, and the United States. 12 Following

interpretation,

American Indians should be conceptualized

nations governed

as

this

members of sovereign

by norms of comity and other forms of international

law. While

I

believe that the international law dimension would enrich this project and provide a more

complete understanding of the ways

in

which the U.S. acquired sovereign nations

complete disregard of “international” norms, and eventually
international law, this discussion

is

presently

One of the problems of using
at

the time of acquisition.

To

colonized by the U.S. in 1898
important because

this

in

complete violation of

beyond the scope of this

paradigm

is

that Puerto

13

project.

Rico was a part of Spain

represent Puerto Rico as a sovereign nation that

is

my argument

in

was

both misleading and historically inaccurate. This

is

suggests that understanding the constitutional

relationship of Puerto Rico to the United States within the territorial narrative and the

nation-building project can provide us with distinct insights about the nature of this
14

relationship.

To

this extent, this project will focus

7

on a

distinct reading

of U.S.

imperialism as a form of territorial expansion for purposes of
nation building, rather than

mere occupation.
Part of the difficulty present in any discussion of American Indians
and their
constitutional relationship to the U.S.

American Indian communities

is that

while the Courts have often treated

as sovereign nations, they

communities as domestic dependent nations whenever
Marshall Court introduced
series

this alternative legal

it

have also treated these
has been convenient

15

The

.

conception of American Indians in a

of opinions known as the “Marshall Trilogy .” 16 In these opinions, the Court

suggested that American Indian communities were comprised of “savage” and
“uncivilized” heathens; that they were domestic dependent nations and the inhabitants of
these political entities were wards of the Federal government; and that they were

sovereign nations. Subsequently the court reified these cases in a
creation of a distinct legal status that

was often

way that

led to the

foreign for constitutional and State

purposes, yet domestic for Federal interests. In other words, the Constitution was

supreme under

this rationale,

entitled to the rights

but the government decided

and protections of this

Puerto Rico has not governed Indian

The

text.

when

Territorial

Indians were going to be

Clause unlike the case of

The type of imperialism

territories.

Indians experienced, and continue to experience,

is

containment, and genocide, not one that has aimed

that

American

one of territorial displacement,
at the

organization and annexation of

Indian territories as potential States.

The imperialism experienced by Mexico
from the type of imperialism

that

I

am

17

and the Hawaiian Islands while

discussing in this project, also provides

distinct

some

important precedents. In the case of Mexico, the United States usurped vast pieces of the

8

Mexican nation and annexed them

as States of the Union.

Inhabitants of Spanish

heritage also populated these territories. In the case of Hawaii,
both the U.S. and the rest

of the world had recognized the sovereignty and authority of the Hawaiian
monarchy.
Notwithstanding
the U.S.

this recognition, several U.S.

businessmen, with the military support of

Navy, orchestrated a takeover and occupied the Hawaiian

Mexican

territories, the

nation. Like the

Hawaiian Islands were eventually annexed and admitted

as a

State of the Union. Their experiences are different than that of Puerto Rico to the extent

were annexed. Yet, the

that they

legal debates surrounding their occupation prior to the

enactment of annexationist legislation provide important precedents

that

can help us

explain the rationale informing the invention of a legal status ascribed to Puerto Rico, the

“unincorporated territory.”
Historians have addressed

example,

Lyman

gobierno

civil

y

J.

la

Gould’s La Ley Foraker

political

and Carmen

I.

of ways. For

Rafucci de Garcia’s El

19

to the U.S. territorial history.

this question

territorial doctrine.

8

in a variety

Ley Foraker provide important discussions of the Foraker Act of 1900

paying close attention

approach

some of these questions

by paying

In like

attention to the historical

However, unlike

this historical

and constitutional implications of this

manner

to these texts

I

will

development of the U.S.

approach,

I

am

interested in the

history. This project,

while emphasizing

the importance of the Puerto Rican anomaly, will discuss the political implications of the

historical interpretations

territories in general.

this

of the Territorial Clause and the constitutional

status

Rather than focusing on a critique of the Foraker Act,

Act as a critique of the constitutional project of nation building.

9

I

of the
will deploy

This dissertation accidentally resembles the Jose Lopez Baralt’s text The
Policy of
the United States

fact,

I

Towards

its

Territories with Special Reference to Puerto Rico

adopt a similar historical narrative. To be sure, while

I

20

employ some of the same

sources that Lopez Baralt relies upon,

my approach

reading of the law and

of U.S. constitutionalism. This distinction

is

more

important because unlike his

critical

text,

I

am

is

less

In

anchored

in a formalistic

is

interested in a denunciation of the subordination

and oppression of marginalized groups and the anti-democratic ideologies informing U.S.
constitutionalism.

My reading of the relationship between law and society is

further

informed by a concern with questions of democracy, egalitarianism, and justice. In
addition,

I

am

not only concerned with the territories, but also with the anomalous

conceptions of space that emerge as an alternative to the

territorial status like the

domestic dependent nation. Yet, perhaps the most important distinction between

work and Lopez

Baralt’s can be found in

dimension of the questions raised by

my lack of emphasis

my

on the international

this history.

This project will begin with a discussion of the colonial antecedents for the
acquisition and governance of new territories informing the Territorial Clause. In this

chapter

I

am

interested in exploring these questions with reference to Joseph Story’s

history of the “colonial” antecedents of the United States as presented in his

Commentaries of the Constitution of the United States
United States

territorial

My contention is that the

policy departed from the British colonial project in more

dramatic ways than Justice Story claims. Taking this text as a point of departure,
chapter will explore

project,

some of the

continuities and departures

and the Anglo-American

territorial vision.

10

this

between the British colonial

This chapter will include a discussion

of the colonial/settler conception of American exceptionalism, the Indian
Boundary Line,
the territorial policy of the Confederacy, and the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787. This

discussion

is

especially important given that the Northwest Ordinance provided the

blueprints for the U.S. territorial policy during the nineteenth century. 22 Moreover,

believe that the U.S. territorial policy

Congress has been the key
policy. Legislators

was informed by

I

a politics of colonial settlement.

legal actor in charge

of developing a U.S.

have generally relied on the enactments of organic or

territorial

territorial acts

as legal vehicles for the organization and governance of the territories during the stages

anteceding formal admission as States on an equal footing. For the most

part, these

organic acts have been modeled after the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. The second
chapter will discuss the debates surrounding the organic acts over the acquisition of
territories after the

Act of 1900.

adoption of the Constitution and before the enactment of the Foraker

My contention is that every organic/territorial

Act treated the acquired

More

territory as a part

act anteceding the Foraker

of the nation and as a State

in the

making.

importantly Congress extended the Constitution to every acquired territory prior to

the enactment of this act. This chapter will also explore

Congress institutionalized

its

plenary authority over the

While Congress has been responsible

some of the ways

in

which

territories.

for developing a territorial structure of

governance, the Supreme Court has generally been charged with interpreting the
constitutional parameters of the U.S. territorial policy/

4

In the third chapter

I

interpretation of the Territorial Clause

that the Court’s territorial doctrine, or rather

its

was informed by two

of the constitutional status of the

distinct interpretations

Chief Justice John Marshall established the

first

11

will argue

territories.

and most enduring interpretation

in a

series

of cases that arose out of disputes

in the territories

the tenets of the Marshall doctrine, once the territories
the nation and

were considered States

in the

making.

of Orleans and Florida. Under

were acquired, they became
It

part of

followed that the Territorial

Clause gave Congress plenary authority over the organization and governance of the
territories.

In contrast,

Chief Justice Roger B. Taney introduced an alternative

interpretation that departed

territories, as

territories.

territory

authorized by the Territorial Clause, to the

According

and

sovereignty.

its

to Justice

it

The general focus of this

would be governed by

a

form of local or popular

on the Court’s

territories as authorized

by

the

Clause during the nineteenth century.

I

and ideological context of the

will discuss the historical

acquisition of Puerto Rico. This chapter begins with

American War of 1898. The second section
its

organization of the

chapter, however, will be

powers of Congress over the

In the following chapter

and

initial

Taney, during the period between the organization of a

admission as a State,

interpretation of the

Territorial

from Marshall’s by limiting congressional authority over the

some

will focus

reflections

on the Spanish-

on the Treaty of Peace of 1898,

implications for the constitutional status of Puerto Rico. This

is

especially

important because legal authorities have agreed that Puerto Rico became a part of the

United States as a result of the tenets of this treaty and

Act of 1900. Legal commentators

26

26

historians,

until

Congress enacted the Foraker
7

and scholars' generally agree

that the

debates occurring in the legal academy over the constitutional implications of the
acquisition of new possessions during the

War of 1898

provided the ideological

foundation for the development of the legal status of the Puerto Rican space. Traditional

reflections

on these debates suggest

that legal scholars

12

were

split

between three

ideological positions,

namely an

These ideological positions were

imperialist, an anti-imperialist,

in turn

and the Third View.

premised on three interpretations of the

constitutional authority of Congress over the territories.

It is

generally agreed that the

imperialist position ascribed Congress absolute and plenary authority over
the territories

without constitutional limitations. The second construction, generally associated with
the
anti-imperialist view, suggested that Congress

Constitution in

its

it

limited

treatment of the territories. In turn, proponents of the “Third

contended that Congress could choose
Constitution as

was bound by precedent and

saw

fit

in the

to

by the

View”

apply the particular provisions of the

governance of the

new

possessions.

After the United States conquered Puerto Rico, the President established a two-

year military government. The
that served as the

the social,

last

of these military governors drafted a series of reports

main source of information

economic and

political conditions

available to U.S. policymakers regarding

of Puerto Rico. The reports of Brigadier-

General George V. Davis further provided the blueprints for the Foraker Act of 1900.

28

Chapter six will begin with a discussion of the legal basis of the military regimes and a
discussion of the preliminary project proposed by Davis. The introductory section will be

followed by a discussion of the Foraker Act paying particular attention to four distinct
provisions that are representative of the act’s uniqueness.

My contention is that this act

sought to codify a political status that can best be described in the words of the author of
the bill bearing his

name, a colonial dependency.^

In other words, the Foraker Act

was

drafted as an official imperialist text that sought to bring a certain degree of legitimacy to

the U.S. imperialist/colonial project.

13

While the Foraker Act codified U.S. imperialism, the Insular Cases 30
institutionalized this

contention

created

by

is that

new

status

by dressing

the term coined

the Foraker Act,

an effort by the Court

by

namely

the

it

with a constitutional language.

Supreme Court

to describe the legal status

the unincorporated territory,

to give constitutional

My

was nothing more than

legitimacy to the reigning imperialist

ideology. Moreover, the Court’s interpretation of the constitutional status of
Puerto Rico

not only departed from

territorial

all

prior precedent, to the extent that Puerto Rico

became

the

first

possession to be treated as a foreign country for constitutional purposes and

domestic for international
also demonstrate the

ways

interests, but also established a

in

which

racist

and

new

territorial

racialist narratives

policy

31
.

I

will

informed these

interpretations. Thus, chapter seven will conclude with a brief discussion

of the Insular

Cases and the institutionalization of the Foraker Act. This discussion will be followed by

some

final

remarks on

my overall

project.

14

CHAPTER 2
COLONIAL ANTECEDENTS

Jurists

have made many claims regarding the origins of the United

States.

Joseph

Story situates the origins of the United States in the ambitions of Henry the Seventh’s

commissions

for discovery of

to Story, that the

new

Christian lands to John Cabot.

United States was the

lands unoccupied

by any

result

Christian power.

3

It

followed, according

of the British Crown’s desire to

“

settle

“any

Taking Story’s argument as a point of

departure, this chapter will discuss four legal narratives of space anteceding the adoption

of the Constitution and the formation of the United
of Justice Story’s reflections on the rights

States.

I

will begin with a discussion

to discovery, conquest,

My contention is that Story’s narrative can

basis for the formation of the United States.

be read as another narrative of Anglo-American exceptionalism

on the meanings

that the

earliest

that

can shed some

Court ascribed to the constitutional status of the

discussion will be followed by

one of the

and settlement as the

some

examples of U.S.

reflections

territorial

on the

shifting Indian

nation building.

I

territories.

Boundary

will then

move

light

This

line as

to a brief

discussion of some of the debates over territorial expansion present during the

Confederate period and as articulated
chapter will conclude with

in the text

some preliminary

of the Articles of Confederation. This

reflections

on the Northwest Ordinance of

1787. This text provided the blueprints for virtually every territorial organic act enacted

by Congress between 1789 and 1900.

The main

objective of this chapter

is to

provide the reader with an introduction

to

the ideological conceptions of the relationship between law and territorial formation that

15

prevailed during the “colonial” period. This chapter seeks
to highlight the continuities

and discontinuities between the British colonial and American narratives
of the
relationship

trace

some

between law and inhabited spaces.

continuities with British

common

I

will argue that

law principles

conquest, and imperialist expansionism, there are also

whereas

like the

it

is

possible to

concept of discovery,

some important

departures that are

exemplified in the re-conceptualization of the Indian Territory. To be sure, the legal

conception of Indian

territories

provides us with the clearest expression of the tension

present in the latter narratives of law and space.

am

I

also of the opinion that these four

sections are representative of the key ideological narratives of acquisition and governance

of populated
to

territories,

and provide the reader with another

judge legitimacy of the U.S.

More

territorial policy.

historical

importantly,

gauge from which

it is

possible to

discern the presence of racialist narratives and their relationship to the U.S. nation-

building project during this period.

2.1

Legal Conceptions of Space

in Colonial

North America

Story began his Commentaries with a chapter

Territory’

of the Colonies

to the territories that

his reflections

on

”

where he addressed the

titled “ Origin

legality

of the

of the

title

Title to

of the British crown

were already inhabited and occupied by indigenous people. Taking

this issue as a starting point, this section will explore three issues that

are relevant to the overall aims of this project.

I

will begin with

some

reflections

on

Story’s discussion of the various rights to acquire territory, which according to Story,

were the

rights of discovery, conquest

and cession.

It is

important to note that Story

framed his discussion with an eye towards the problem of the “Indian,” or rather the

16

owner and

rightful

inhabitant of the

European countries and

their

American

territories,

competing claims

and an eye towards the

to territorial

ownership. This section will

be followed by a brief discussion of Story’s writings on the governance
of the colonies,

paying particular attention

to the status

of settlers, the incorporation of colonies as part of

the monarchy, the extension of British law, the question of birthright, and
the problem of
political

ways

in

and

civil rights.

The

section will be concluded with

which Story’s Commentaries can be read

constitutionalism from the

common

law

some remarks about

the

as an effort to distinguish U.S.

tradition.

Story argued that the acquisition of territories could be understood in terms of
three rights,

namely the

rights to discovery, conquest,

British over the territories

right

composing the United

of discovery. However,

this right

and or cession. The

title

of the

States, Story argued, originated

had a dual

effect.

On

one

from the

level, Story wrote:

was probably adopted by the European nations as a convenient and flexible
rule, by which to regulate their respective claims. For it was obvious, that in the
mutual contests for dominion in newly discovered lands, there would soon arise
violent and sanguinary struggles for exclusive possession, unless some common
principle should be recognized by all maritime nations for the benefit of all.
It
became the basis of European polity, and regulated the exercise of the rights of
It

.

sovereignty and settlement in

all

the cis-Atlantic Plantations.

In other words, the right of discovery served as an international

regulation of European imperialist claims

or territories to the discovering empire.

European

It

by granting

33

mechanism

legal title

..

for the

of the discovered lands

should be noted that this right was limited to

“polities.”

Story’s discussions of these rights were also framed in direct reference to

American Indians and

their rights to

ownership of the American

noted that there was “no doubt, that the Indian

17

territory.

To be

sure,

tribes, inhabiting this continent at the

he

time

of its discovery, maintained a claim

to the exclusive possession

territory within their respective limits, as sovereigns
soil .”

soil,

34

Elsewhere he added

with a

to their

and absolute proprietors of the
to

be the rightful occupants of the

well as a just claim to retain possession of it, and to use

legal, as

own

“were admitted

that they

and occupancy of the

discretion .”

35

So how did the

British acquire

title to

the

it

according

American lands?

Story wrote that the Indians lost their lands “by the superior force of conquest” or
by
voluntarily ceding the land

the belief that “Indians

heathenism.

36
.

This conquest was ultimately justified, Story suggested, by

were a savage

race,

sunk

in the depths

of ignorance and

This perception further justified the erosion of the distinction between

discovery and conquest to the extent that Indians, the conquered native inhabitants of the

American

territory,

of the discoverer .”

were

left in

a subordinate condition subject to the “ultimate

dominion

38

Story’s reasoning, however,

was contingent on

a racialized conception of the

inhabitants of the conquered territory. For Story, the savage character of the Indian

result

of his ignorance of Christianity. In other words, race was equated

extent that the savage character of the inhabitant

was determined by

was

a

to religion to the

his adoption of

Christian institutions. Whereas Indians could be conquered and subordinated, European

Christians could not. This

becomes evident

definition of the right to conquest in

colonies. In his

own

text titled

Blackstone argued that under

common

is

law and

its

on Blackstone’s

application to the

American

Commentaries on the Laws of England, William

common

law, the conquest of territories could result in the

creation of two distinct types of colonies

But there

in Story’s reflections

39
.

To be

a difference between these

laws by which they are bound. For

it

he wrote:

two species of colonies, with respect

is

18

sure,

to the

held, that if an uninhabited country be

discovered and planted by the English subjects,

all the English laws are
immediately there in force. For as the law is the birthright of every
subject, for
wherever they go they carry their laws with them. But in conquered or
ceded
countries, that have already laws of their own, the king may
indeed alter and
change those laws; but till he does actually change them, the antient [sic]
laws of
the country remain, unless such as are against the law of God, as in
the case of an
40
infidel country
.

Blackstone concluded that the American colonies were of the

latter sort,

and by extension

they were not a part of the dominion, but were subject to the plenary powers of the
British parliament; the local governor or proprietor

the laws of England

were supreme and plenary

argument created an irreconcilable tension

would be chosen by

the king; and that

41
.

It is

interesting to note that this

that placed the colonies in an untenable

position of subjection. Following Blackstone’s argument, the local laws of the conquered
territory

would be

drafted a

new

set

that the British

in use instead

of the laws of England,

at least until

the Parliament

of laws for the governance of the colonies. The problem, of course, was

crown did not accept

the Indian or “infidel” “legal” system to begin with.

So following Blackstone, the Americans colonists would have been subject
authority of a

monarchy

that

was not willing

to recognize the colonies or

to the plenary

its

subjects as

equals.

Justice Story noted that this had not

establishing the

American

been the case

in the actual practice

colonies. In fact, with the exception of one colony,

colonies were originally treated as part of the British Empire,

birthright entitlements,

law

42
.

by

subjects

argument suggested

that a

conquered

a foreign race, could be treated as a part of the empire,

birthright status,

and

it

all

common

territory, originally

its

subjects afforded

could be governed by the same legal system as that of the

19

of the

were extended

and the local colonial legal system was founded on

In other words, Story’s

inhabited

its

of

conquering power. This was important because according

to Story, the

system had become the basis upon which the colonial charters
were

meant

that the

rights,

it

common

has expanded with our wants;
the

it

difficulties

alternative description of the

engaged

it

offered a

in the depiction

new

spirit

colonies as a

civil

growth;

it

of independence, which checked

political existence .”

law

tradition,

American colonial

43

and his

effort to offer

of a form of innovation of the

common

an

legal status suggests that Story

common

law

tradition.

common

was
In other

law tradition

law that represented the American experience

European experience. This argument conceptualized the American

new experiment

that

was

different,

and

which was described by Blackstone. Perhaps

prelude to the revolution to the extent that

American

[sic]

and

has enabled us to triumph in the midst of this

common

interpretation of the

political

has watched over our maturer

followed that the American colonies’ experience with the

as a rupture with the

that

it

and dangers threatening our

This interpretation of the

it

has nurtured the

approaches of arbitrary power;

first

words,

liberties;

law

built upon. This

law tradition “has become the guardian of our

has protected our infant

common

it

to a certain extent

this interpretation

more just, than

can be read as

represented the special character of the

colonies, a character that possessed the necessary criteria for the establishment

of a new nation.
Story partially described the principles of colonial governance in the following

passage:

were established, one branch of which
consisted of representatives of the people freely chosen, to represent and defend
their interests, and possessing a negative upon all laws. We have seen, that in the
original structure of the charters of the early colonies, no provision was made for
In all the colonies local legislatures

such a legislative body. But accustomed as the colonists had been to possess the
rights and privileges of Englishmen, and valuing as they did, above all others, the

20

right

of representation

in Parliament, as the

only real security for their political
would not long endure the
exercise of any arbitrary power; and that they would insist
upon some share in
framing the laws, by which they were governed. 44

Again,

and

civil liberties,

this

passage can be read as a form of innovation, to the extent that the character
of

it

was easy

to foresee, that they

the colonial settler improved the colonies

by claiming a voice and representation

in their

governance. The American colonists, according to Story, participated and consented
their

own governance

was premised on
local

autonomy.

in the colonies.

Presumably, the colonial structure of governance

certain control over local affairs,

Ironically,

to

and

to a certain

once the United States was founded

it

degree on a form of

abandoned these

principles of territorial acquisition and governance and adopted a modified version of

Blackstone’s interpretation of the conquered

2.2

territory.

The Indian Boundary Lines
Although

it

is

not clear

when

the

first

Indian boundary line

was drawn,

the

concept of a boundary line separating the white European colonizer/settler and the
indigenous populations of what eventually became the United States, should be
4s

understood as an effort to occupy and conquer the Indian

territories.

More

importantly,

the practice of occupying Indian lands led to the continuous expulsion of the local Indian

inhabitants that had been residing in these lands prior to the arrival of the Americans, a

tradition

of genocidal wars against Indians, and a tradition of institutionally sanctioned

atrocities against indigenous people as a condition

M. Osborn suggests
Virginia

that the earliest expression

Company of London and

Virginia in 1607.

46

of territorial expansionism. William

of these practices can be traced

to the

the wars resulting from the settlement in Jamestown,

In discussing the

Jamestown colony massacre, Osborn

21

cites

an early

example

that captures the

and Indians

By

in the

enduring premises informing the relationship between whites

treaty-making politics:

1622, Indian hunting grounds and even the Indian

way of life had been
Governor Wyatt called a peace conference.
Opechancanough and several hundred Indians attended, and Wyatt tried to poison
all of them. Some 200 became violently ill, and “many, helpless,
were
slaughtered,” but Opechancanough escaped. 47
impaired by

settlers

Over 150 Indians died
Indian boundary lines

—

as a direct result of this treaty-making initiative. 48 In a sense the

became an attempt

to regulate these

forms of violence, as well as

the wars ensuing from European occupation and colonization of what has

become known

as the United States of America.

Max

Farrand argued that the legal and institutional development of the British-

Indian boundary line was a direct result of the American phase of the Seven Years War,

which “resulted

in giving Great Britain a clear title in

the Mississippi river.”

local

boundary

49

lines, this

America

However, unlike prior colonial

new

territorial

to all the

initiatives that

demarcation created a

map

separate the British, French, and Indian territories in “America.”

that representatives

was

intrusted, [sic]”

of the “Lords of Trade,

to

whom

were strongly advocating

the

for the creation

territories, the British

sought to draw

that

promised

51

of an

Once

to

Farrand further noted

management of Indian

separating the British colonies from the Indian territories.

had surveyed and marked the

50

country east of

official

the

affairs

boundary

line

American agents

government became responsible

for

the approval and development of the appropriate protocols for any resulting treaties with

the Indians. Farrand wrote that:

Toward

the close of 1767 the Lords of Trade reported to the earl of Shelburne

what had been done, and in March, 1768, a more detailed report was made to the
crown with the formal recommendation that the line be ratified. Shortly afterward
instructions were given to the superintendents in America to ratify and confirm

22

the lines agreed
south.

However,

upon

5~

in

such manner as to form a continuous line from north

as Farrand further noted,

it

was not

until 1770, after several years

treaty negotiations with various Indian “nations,” that the

Indian affairs

managed

which

became recognized

in turn

to

draw a

of local

American superintendents of

“definite line separating the Indians from the whites,”
as an official feature

While the Indian boundary

American colonial

to

of the British Indian policy. 53

were clear expressions of the

lines

British and

desires to create separate territorial spaces for whites and Indians, 54

should also be noted that these lines were contingent on

of colonial sovereignty over the American

settler

it

expansion and the growth

After the separation of the colonies

territories.

from Britain and the creation of the Continental Congress, the United States continued

to

redefine the Indian boundary line as a result of settler expansion to the Northwest

territories,

and subsequent

For example, when the U.S. acquired

territorial acquisition.

the Louisiana territory in 1803, policy makers sought to redraw the Indian boundary line

west of the Mississippi.

55

Farrand also suggested, that unlike the British

who

at least

sought to negotiate treaties with the Indian nations in an attempt to draw boundary
the United States sought to engage in the unilateral re-mapping of the
56

territory.

Farrand concluded that

this practice

lines,

American

marked the “beginning of the end,”

because:

The expansion of the population

to the Pacific, the

adoption of regular routes of

guarding with the United States troops of those routes and the
settlements that were established, hemmed in the Indians first on one side and

travel, the

then on the other.
reservation

More

And when

was only

the Indians

a question

were completely surrounded, the

of time.'

importantly, unlike the treaties between British

Indians,

which

relied

on the boundary

5

*

and other European countries with

lines to separate the Indian territories

23

from white

settlements, and

by extension recognized these

as separate

and sovereign nations the U.S.

eventually adopted a policy of displacement and segregation
of Indian communities.

Coupled with a desire

to

expand

to the

western territories as well as to lay claim over the

Indian territories, the U.S. territorial policy began to consider
Indian territories as part of
the nation s domestic territory.'

As

I

will suggest below, this policy

was eventually

institutionalized with the Marshall Trilogy.

This

is

especially important, because subsequent U.S. treaties that sought to create

separate Indian territorial spaces also sought to eradicate the Indian “race” through a

process of Americanization. U.S. treaties often sought to accomplish this in a plethora of

ways beginning with

the very use of alien U.S. legal texts, and various efforts to impose

“civilizing” institutions like schools and “white

ways of subsistence .”

60

Eventually,

by

including provisions that sought to regulate the lives of the inhabitants of the Indian
territories, treaties

legislating a

would

good

“became
life for

social

documents as well

the reservation Indians .”

61

as political ones, a catch-all for

This was an important ideology that

also inform the legislative initiatives to develop organic acts for settlers residing in

the conquered territories after the Revolutionary War.

This

and the land can further be understood as
informed by

of the relationship between the white

shift in the conceptualization

racialist

and

of a tradition of exceptionalism

part

racist narratives.

The

tradition

settler

that

was

of American exceptionalism was

generally premised on a conception of the American landscape as a sort of New World

promised land where Europeans could escape the oppressive

and where they could create a new
Crevecoeur description of the

ideal nation.

effect

Take

for

traditions of the

example

J.

Hector

Old World

St.

of America on the marginalized European:

24

John de

Formerly they were not numbered in any civil lists of their country,
except
those of the poor; here they rank as citizens. By what
invisible

in

power hath this
surprising metamorphosis been performed? By that of the
laws and of their
industry. The laws, the indulgent laws, protect them as
they

arrive, stamping on
them the symbol of adoption; they receive ample rewards for their
labours; these
accumulated rewards procure them lands; those lands confer on them
the title of

freemen, and to that
acquire.

More
that

title

every benefit

importantly, this narrative of exceptionalism

promised the land

called

which men can possibly

affixed

is

62

to a

Americans” was the

Germans, and Swedes.” 6

'

new European
result

race.

was premised on

De Crevecoeur

noted that

of a “mixture of English, Scotch,

America, following

a racist argument

Irish,

was promised

this vision,

this “race

now

French, Dutch,

to the white

European.

The

2.3

Articles of Confederation and Western Expansionism

On July 4,

1776 the Continental Congress approved the Declaration of

Independence as a response

to the failure

of the British monarchy

to redress the colonial

grievances and to vindicate the rights of the colonies. Perhaps the most relevant issue
stake

that

was

the participation of the

impacted

American

their social conditions.

governance. Five years

colonist in

The colonies lacked

later the revolutionary

Confederation and adopted the

title

economic and

political decisions

the right to consent in their

government adopted the Articles of

of the United

States.

Between the period beginning

with the Articles of Confederation and the adoption of the Constitution

United States grappled with a series of laws

governance of new

The

last

territories

beyond

that

in 1789, the

provided for the acquisition and

the boundaries of the original thirteen colonies.

of these laws, namely the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, provided the

and ideological basis

at

for the Constitutional acquisition

25

structural

and governance of territories as

framed

in the Congressional organic or territorial acts. 64
This final section will focus

brief discussion of the

I

main

legal initiatives

and the

political implications

will suggest that these legal initiatives sought to secure

growing white population of the

States,

new western

on a

of their scope.

territories for the

while simultaneously seeking to consolidate the

Union through commercial expansion. To be

sure,

it

is

possible to argue that race and

economics informed the ideological premises of U.S. national expansion since

its

inception.

While the Articles of Confederation were prepared by 1777, they were not
adopted

until 1781.

British.

Perhaps as a strategic measure, the Articles of Confederation provided for the

At the time, the United States was

still

engaged

in

war with

the

annexation of Canada. Article XI read:

Canada acceding
United States,

At

shall

be admitted

Union; but no other colony

shall

be agreed to by nine

65

two things were

least

stage and

with the

States.

to this confederation,
into,

of the

Taken

together,

it

measures of the
advantages of this

States.

evident. First,

States.

in the

to all the

be admitted into the same, unless such admission

Canada would presumably bypass a

would be immediately admitted

rest

and adjoining

and entitled

as a State of the

territorial

Union on an equal

footing

Second, the United States could expand beyond the thirteen

would appear

that the territorial policy implications

require that an acquired territory, presumably populated

by European

immediately admitted as a State on an equal footing without having

settlers,

to

would
would be

undergo a

territorial stage.

The war with
treaty, the British

Britain ended with the Treaty of Paris of 1783. In Article

government relinquished

territories that

it

had sought

of the Appalachian Mountains. The acquisition of these western

26

to

II

of this

conquer west

territories,

populated by

vanous Indigenous nations but scarcely

settled

of the United States. The acquisition of these

by Europeans,

territories

effectively doubled the size

prompted a

Congressional debates over the future of these lands. Peter

S.

of

series

Onuf notes

that:

The challenge was to regulate the westward thrust of settlement in ways that
would strengthen the union, preserve peace with the Indians and neighboring
imperial powers, and pay off the public debt while permitting enterprising settlers
to

pursue their

own

goals. Congress’ solution, embodied in the western land and
government ordinances of 1 784-1787, was to attempt to create a legal and
political framework conducive to both regional and national economic

development. Promoters of western expansion believed that the commercial
development of the frontier would increase the population and wealth of the entire
union; most important,

it

without which the union

The debates surrounding

would produce a harmony of interlocking
66
was inconceivable.

the public debt and the relations with other empires and

sovereign nations are self-evident. The issue of preserving the Union

complex.

Some of the

interests

itself

is

a bit

more

tensions arose out of debates over the expansion of slavery, the

regulation of land and property, the protection of settlers, the criteria for admission of

new
to

States,

me

and the general effects on the balance of power

that the U.S. territorial policy not only

consolidate

its

unity

by

creating an

at

identity

It

appears

expanded the nation, but also helped

ambiguous and

to

shifting frontier. This ambiguity

the result of both expansionism and the process of settlement.

frontier,

a Federal level.

was

The establishment of the

understood to be a malleable and shifting borderland, informed the nation’s

by projecting back

a plethora of possibilities.

A committee headed by Thomas Jefferson proposed the first of these ordinances
in

1

784.
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Onuf contends
and

that this ordinance

lasting significance

was

was

essentially “a bill of rights for

to establish a

new

state

new

of equality.”

western

states,

Thomas

Jefferson summarized the key features of this proposal in the following passage

its

taken from one of his committee reports:

27

That such a temporary government shall only continue in force
in any
shall have acquired 20,000 free inhabitants, when giving
due proof

state until

it

thereof to

Congress, they shall receive from them authority with appointment
of time
place to call a convention of representatives to establish a permanent

& Government

&

Constitution

for themselves.

Provided that both the temporary

& permanent

governments be established on these principles as their basis. 1 That they shall
forever remain a part of this confederacy of the United States of America.
2. That
in their own persons, property & territory they shall be subject
to the Government
of the United States in Congress assembled, & to the articles of Confederation in
all those cases in which the original states shall be so subject.
3. That they shall
be subject to pay a part of the federal debts contracted or to be contracted, to be
appointed on them by Congress, according to the same common rule & measure,
by which apportionments thereof shall be made on the other states. 4. That their
.

respective Governments shall be in republican form and shall admit no person to
be citizen who holds any hereditary title. 5. That after the year 1800 of the

Christian era, there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the
s [ai] d states, otherwise than in punishment of crimes whereof the party shall

have been convicted

to

have been personally

69

guilty.

While the proposal was never implemented, a modified version
latter principles

was adopted

in

1

787. In light of Jefferson’s

that incorporated the

summary,

it

is

clear that

all

acquired territories would have been considered States in the making. In other words,

following this model, an acquired territory became a part of the nation while retaining a

temporary status contingent on the settlement or number of U.S. citizen
it

had attained the same number of citizen

of the Union, then

it

settlers as

could petition the Congress to grant

it

the

power
It is

conception of a temporary status was not equivalent to a tutelary

a status contingent on the

was premised on

number of U.S.

Once

contained by the less populated State

and begin the procedure towards admission on an equal footing.
this

residents.

to organize itself

critical to

note that

status, but rather to

citizens inhabiting the territory. This proposal

the treatment of the territories as part of the nation, and a promise to

eventual admission as a State.

28

its

Onuf further adds

that:

The expansion and

perfection of the union-and of American nationhood-depended
on fostering republican government on the western frontier, on not
recapitulating
the tragic errors of the British by establishing a despotic, colonial
regime....
Significantly, in Jefferson’s

scheme a “state” existed as a self-constituted political
community before it claimed admission. There would be no confusion then as
there was in the case of Missouri
about Congress’ role in state constitution

—

—

writing or in determining a state’s “republican” character. For as Jefferson
clearly
intended in 1 784, a state could only be a republic if it constituted itself, without
outside interference, and if it was received into the union “on an equal footing.” 70
It

seems

to

me

that this republican vision

citizens living in

community and committed

not readily evident

how

governed by citizens

Who would

was premised on

the nation

that

to the success

would deal with

the

membership of virtuous

of the

territory.

However,

the possibility of a territory that

were not virtuous or invested

in the well

being of the

it is

was

polity.

aid and interfere in favor of the economically and socially dispossessed? If

anything, the history of the United States can teach us that there have been plenty of
instances

where the Federal government’s intervention has saved

the lives of traditionally

subordinated populations that have been oppressed by “virtuous” and patriotic citizens.
In addition, this vision of republicanism

was unable

to regulate

what Onuf has

described as the “ dangerous excesses of unrestrained privatism,” or the uncontrolled
settlement of the western territories

speculators, and other privateers.

of the western

territories,

71

the poor, immigrants, outlaws, squatters,

In response to the increasingly unregulated settlement

Congress enacted the Ordinance of 1785, which among other

things authorized a geographer and

territories into

by

townships and

some surveyors

to

map and

divide the western

to further coordinate the public sale

Ordinance can also be understood as both an

effort to establish a

of lands. This

“system of controlled

development, and compact settlement in the Northwest” as well as an

29

effort to prevent

settlers

from provoking the indigenous communities

importantly,

by regulating

73

Company, stood

The Ordinance of 1 785, however, should be understood

Northwest Ordinance of 1787, particularly
of the Northwest

72

More

the settlement of the western territories, Congress, working
in

collusion with private “corporations” like the Ohio
projects.

into potentially costly wars.

in the

ways

that

it

to profit

from these

in relation to the

facilitated the colonization

Territories.

After significant debates concerning the impact of territorial acquisition and the
threat to state sovereignty, the Confederation

Congress adopted the Northwest Ordinance

of 1 787, which according

and Belz established “a

to Kelly, Harbison,

territorial

policy

based on the principle of national supervision of state making with guaranteed admission
to the

Union.”

74

The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 became

the

first

legal text to provide

a comprehensive plan for the colonization, organization, and governance of the

territories, as

well as their subsequent admission as States on an equal footing. Although

the Northwest Ordinance

was

initially

developed for the western

territories north

Ohio River, the Ordinance of 1787 was adopted by the U.S. Congress
ratification

of the

after the

of the Constitution, and further served as the basis for the development of

most of thirty-two organic or

territorial acts.

Lopez Baralt contends

that the “land question

harmonious relations which the
Confederation.”

75

states

was

the

first

found when they attempted

The Land Ordinance of 1785 and

its

obstacle on the road of

to

draw up

Articles of

companion Ordinance of 1787

sought to address this problem by providing some guidelines for the governance of the

“western” lands and

territories

and by providing some regulations

populations that were migrating to these

76

territories.

30

In fact,

for the settler

Onuf argues

that:

The

—

real issue

for settlers and policy makers alike
was land. The enjoyment
and productive use of the land depended on clear title, protection from
“savage”
neighbors
Indian or white
and access to markets. These conditions required
the effective exercise of Congressional power during the territorial
period. Local
autonomy and frontier democracy were not vital issues to potential settlers at

—

—

least to those

Congress hoped to recruit. The settlers’ concern with political rights
was prospective: once their new communities were successfully founded, could
they look forward to joining the union on an equal footing? In the meantime,
provisions for “colonial” government were not only an administrative necessity:
they were a necessary inducement to potential settlers. 77

The Ordinance of 1787 was

especially important because

institutional structures that sought to expand, strengthen

through the economic and political development of the
that the Constitution

displaced

by

was

in place, the prospects

it

provided legal and

and consolidate the Union
78

frontier.

However, by the time

of profits from land sales had been

the development of more effective trade and tariff regulations for imports

and exports.
For Willoughby, the Ordinance of 1787, next
important organic act of the Federal Government.”

have suggested

80

to the Constitution,

“the most

Other legal historians like Onuf

that this text achieved a constitutional stature

provided legal guidelines for the admission of new

was

states.

because

this

Ordinance

This was especially

important because whereas the Admissions Clause (Article IV, §3,

cl. 1)

of the

Constitution permitted the admission of new states into the Union, the Ordinance of

promised eventual admission.
text

82

Duffy contends

that this

was an important

because of its reproductive function, which can be understood

1

787

constitutional

in the following

two

respects:

First,

it

initially

the Union, and

defined the process by which the majority of the states

it

therefore played a crucial role in creating

the nation. All territorial legislation

is

came

much of what

is

into

now

constitutional in this respect, but the

an example for later law. Second, the
reproductive activity of the Ordinance served a constitutional purpose in helping

Ordinance

is

preeminent because

it

set

31

the nation survive threats to
legislation

always aims

to

its

existence. In other words, while reproductive

expand and perpetuate the

political life of a nation over
the long term, additional constitutional authority is due to
reproductive legislation
83
that enables the political entity to avoid specific threats of
destruction.

The Ordinance of 1787, Duffy

expansionism and the guarantor of the perennial rebirth of the thirteen

territorial

colonies.

further argues, is the foundational legal text of U.S.

84

With an argument reminiscent of Niccolo Machiavelli description of the
expansion of republics

.

.

8

",

Onuf suggests

Ordinance:

that the

.permitted the identification of new states with old: the American colonies in the

West would

recapitulate the colonial experience of the original states and then be

recognized as their equals. The original states had been colonies-and as colonies
had been “states”-whose constitutional claims had justified the revolution.
Similarly, statehood

was immanent

because of the Ordinance, the

vindicate their constitutional rights.

American concept of territory. But
would not have to resort to revolution

in the

territories

to

86

Presumably, the Ordinance’s provisions for the creation of States reproduced the
founding principles in each individual process of territorial and

assuming

that the

state formation. Thus,

admission of new States was perceived as the regeneration and

re-

founding of the nation after the “original” thirteen colonies, the Ordinance became
especially important because

it

guaranteed the

territorial

expansion of the nation while

maintaining a continuity with the past.

As

I

will suggest, both of these interpretations are misleading. First, the

expansionist project did not seek to regenerate the nation, but simply to expand

its

borders and to obtain access to resources. Second, the logic of this argument suggests

that citizens

who had

to a territory,

already experienced a colonial government and decided to migrate

would have

to re-live this process.

More

importantly, the

American

Revolution was precisely premised on the injustices of the colonial condition. To

32

this

extent, exposing citizens to an unjust political condition

seems

to

undermine the very

principles for

which the Americans fought. Again since the “founders” of the

were

of the

citizens

character

by

States, unless

one would argue

relocating to a frontier settlement,

undergo a process of initiation. Finally,

it

it

territories

that they lost their “virtuous”

is

not clear

why they were

required to

not evident that alluding to the original

is

founding of the nation was useful or for that matter practical. The nation and the world

were changing. Clearly national events

Amendments were
In

like the Civil

the Reconstruction

inconsistent with the principles of the original Constitution.

1789 Congress reauthorized the Ordinance with two minor modifications

regarding the appointment of territorial

87

officials.

structural guidelines for the establishment

throughout the 19

of virtually every

that

•

its

territorial

the

government

Congress stopped adhering to the Ordinance during the mid

830s, as a result of the Michigan debacle, which

statehood on

The Ordinance of 1787 provided

century, including the districts and other territorial arrangements.

However, Onuf contends

1

War and

own

stemmed from

....

oo

initiative

this claim, a textual analysis

decision to declare

its

and without the consent of Congress.

Notwithstanding

of the organic acts authorizing the organization of territories

during the nineteenth century reveals that the Ordinance of 1787 provided a

governmental model for every organic or
This

fact

is

during the nineteenth century.

territorial act

not to say that every organic act copied the original Northwest Ordinance, for in

Congress regularly modified the provisions of these

the Ordinance of 1787

was designed

for the regulation

development of land, the acquisition of territories
people of European heritage, with European

that

acts.

More

of settler expansion and the

were already inhabited by other

institutions, forced

33

importantly, whereas

Congress

to adapt

its

acts.

Moreover, national and local

Congress perceived the

political events further

informed the ways

territories, thus requiring significant variations

in

which

and adaptations

to

different historical contexts.

As

already noted, the territories were conceptualized in temporal terms as

underdeveloped spaces destined

to

mature into statehood.

89

The Ordinance of 1787 was

originally designed for the “Territory Northwest of the River Ohio,” and

was

limited to

the creation of three to five states. This demarcation eventually resulted in the creation
of

four states,

namely Ohio,

Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan.

)0

The Ordinance

established a

three-stage process that began with the creation of a territorial government. During the

first

phase, Congress appointed a governor and a judicial department consisting of three

judges, which together

composed

the legislative department.

91

In turn the legislative

department was charged with adopting appropriate laws from the existing
Baralt argues that this

initial

scheme was “simple and

extent of land with few inhabitants.”

92

He

states.

particularly suited to govern a large

also recognized that this initial

scheme was

anti-democratic to the extent that the local population was not consulted “at

purpose.”

93

Moreover, as Willoughby noted,

inhabitants to elect

separation of powers

because the

initial

nor did

its officials,

among

it

all for

any

this initial stage did not authorize the local

recognize the constitutional premise of the

the governing departments.

94

This

is

especially important

stage of territorial organization did not recognize popular sovereignty

or any form of local autonomy,

95

and was not designed

were already inhabited by other Europeans,

which

Lopez

also possessed

European

legal

and

to

govern acquired

like the Louisiana

political institutions

34

territories that

and Mexican

territories,

of government.

The

territory

would be organized during

which began once the

local population

its

second stage or phase of development,

had reached 5,000

citizens.

While the executive

and judicial offices remained the same, the second phase of territorial
government
allowed for the election of the lower house of the
free-white property

owning male

citizens

were

entitled to participate in

elections. Presumably, the enterprising citizen possessed a

was ultimately

more

a

desirable settler.

The people were

legislature, also

known

as the legislative council,

any

more virtuous

entitled to elect

representative for every five hundred citizens residing in the territory.

of the

However, only

territorial legislature.

was

local

character and

one

The upper house

further appointed

by

the

Federal Congress continuing the pattern of federal paternalism. In addition, the property

owning

qualifications for holding office, as well as the required qualifications for

participation in local elections,

were extremely discriminatory.

continue to exercise absolute veto power over the

The

third

and

final stage

Congress would

territorial legislatures

during this phase.

of territorial development began once the

territory

had

acquired a population of 60,000 citizens. This phase would entitle the territory to be
“enabled,” and placed on a track towards eventual statehood. Moreover, the territories

were also

entitled to elect a territorial delegate that could represent their interests in the

U.S. Congress. However, though
voting power.

territories

It is

It

had a voice, he did not have

interesting to note, that unlike the Jefferson plan

were expected

of the union.

this territorial delegate

to draft local constitutions after they

of 1 784 the

had been admitted

as states

followed that states were required to draft a constitution that was not

inconsistent with the Ordinance and later with the Constitution.

35

The Grupo keenly notes

that the “Ordinance, anteceding the first ten

of the Federal Constitution by four years, provided

for the protection

amendments

of many

civil rights

including the right of all descendants to inherit in equal parts intestate
deaths without
distinctions of degree

The Ordinance’s

bill

between kindred of ‘half blood’ and kindred of ‘whole’ blood.” 97

of rights was composed of six “articles of compact.” The preamble

to these stated:

That the following

articles shall

be considered as

articles

of compact between the
and forever remain

original States, and the people and States in the said territory,

unalterable, unless

This preamble

is

by common consent.

98

especially interesting because any changes to the bill of rights required

the local approval of the inhabitants of the territories. Perhaps

to locate the legal fragmentation

it

is

here that

we

can begin

of citizenship in the U.S. To be sure, under the tenets of

the Ordinance, citizens residing in the territories lost

some of their

political rights to the

extent that their residency in a non-state constrained their legal ability to participate in the
national polity. However, as

between the

civil

and national

Territorial Clause.

the

I

I

will demonstrate in the following chapters, the separation

political rights

of the citizen was institutionalized

will argue that this clause created a territorial space that

compact notion upon which the Constitution

rested,

which

justification for the creation of a hierarchy of rights contingent

in the

was

outside

in turn served as a

on the

citizen’s residence.

This separation marked a clear departure from the original principles of the revolution

to

the extent that the colonists claimed equal rights regardless of the status of their colonies

within the British Empire.

The Ordinance of 1787 recognized
civil rights,

a form of equal citizenship for the purpose of

while making political rights contingent upon the status of the

36

territory.

The

civil

nghts recognized by the Ordinance’s

corpus,

trial

by jury, compensation

bill

of rights included the right

for property lawfully seized

rights, local proportional representation in the legislature

passage of ex post facto laws, the right

punishment.

It

to bail,

to

habeas

and general property

and protection against the

and a protection against cruel and unusual

should be noted that the subsequent organic

acts,

enacted prior to the

Foraker Act of 1900, recognized the extension of “fundamental” rights
(Ordinance), and
later

personal and civil rights (Constitutional) to the citizens inhabiting the

The Foraker Act became

the

organic act to depart from this practice by not including

first

of rights or any entitlement

a bill

The Ordinance of 1787
salient

to the protections

of the Constitution.

codified at least three narratives of race. Perhaps the most

of these was the equalization of whiteness

“the vast western hinterland

was

to

be held

to citizenship rights.

in trust for future

white

own

constitutions and claim admission to the union

males were entitled
territories

became

jurisdiction. This

to citizenship

settlers

Following

who,

as the

entitled to draft

on equal terms.”

and the rights accompanying

99

Only white

this legal status.

The

a sort of promised land for those white citizens that settled within

is

not to say that

all

on the

this line

frontier as ‘a

citizen residing in Puerto Rico,

settler.

Duffy suggests

that,

“Easterners saw

mongrel breed, half civilized, half savage.’”

of reasoning, the

its

whites would be recognized as citizens or for that

matter as entitled to the rights of a citizen

white

As Onuf notes

settlers

Northwest Ordinance of 13 July 1787 promised, eventually would be
their

territories.

settler, like the

was perceived

later the U.S.

as an inferior white. This racial condition

helped rationalize instances where inhabitants of the

37

Spanish Creole, and

100

territories

were treated as subjects of

colonial dependencies rather than citizens

upon the

territorial acquisition

101

Full citizenship, in turn,

.

was contingent

of statehood.

A second racialist narrative could be discerned from the language of Article III of
the Ordinance. This article sought to codify the social
relationships between the Federal

government,

and Indians. The relevant part of this

its settlers,

The utmost good

article states:

always be observed towards Indians; their lands and
property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and, in their
property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in
faith shall

and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded injustice an
humanity, shall from time to time be made for preventing wrongs being done
them, and preserving peace and friendship with them 102

just

to

.

Duffy further

interprets the intent

of this

article as

an expression of the Continental

Congress fear “that uncontrolled settlement of the West would provoke resistance from
Native American communities

However,

this did not

mean

in the region,

that the settler

drawing the nation back

was encouraged

to

into

war .”

103

develop a democratic

relationship with Indians, nor for that matter were the territories encouraged to recognize

Indian communities on equal terms. Duffy suggests, perhaps in agreement with Reginald

Horsman’s arguments
that Indians

order to

104
,

that

behind

this legal initiative there

would eventually be removed and evicted from

make room

for the

growing and expanding

was a shared understanding

the adjacent territories in

settler population.

10 ^

It

followed that

the elimination of the Indian could be achieved through both the displacement of their

communities as well as

their isolation into vulnerable spaces.

In

some ways

the

Ordinance codified U.S. imperialism and continued the practice of conquest,
colonization, and isolation and marginalization of the Indian.

The

relationship of black

slavery. Article

VI prohibited

Americans

to the

Ordinance was reduced

to the issue

the extension of slavery to the territories, while

38

of

simultaneously reaffirming fugitive slave laws in the

Fehrenbacher notes,
at a

national level.

was

the

first

Article

VI

stated:

this

107

territories.
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As Don

E.

time that these two controversial issues were joined

There

shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the
said territory,
otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have
been
dully convicted: Provided, always, that any person escaping into
the same, from

whom

labor or service

lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such
lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the person claiming his or
her labor or services as aforesaid. 108
fugitive

Of course,

is

may be

as Fehrenbacher further suggests, this provision did not extend to slaves

already living in the territories, nor did
in the territories.

interests.

1

10

in the territories

At a Federal

the development of a frontier

depleted coffers.

address the prevalence of indentured servitude

109

The question of slavery
and sectional

it

level,

economy

was

initially

informed by both Federal

Congressional policymakers sought

that could help replenish the

This focus, however, needed

to

to foster

government’s

consider the impact on the regional

economy. Thus, the prohibition of slavery would presumably discourage both the
adoption of slavery in northern

initiatives that

territories as well as the

were typical of the South, such as tobacco and indigo farms. Presumably

the prohibition of slavery in the northern territories

competition with southern fanners.

territories

development of agricultural

were seen

1

1

would discourage any possible

This reading suggests that as early as 1787, the

as contested terrains

where ideological

battles could

be waged over

the financial contributions to the national debt, and over the expansion of a slave labor

that

could threaten southern economic interests within the nation. To be sure, as early as

1787, national policymakers were engaged in debates over the relationship between the

39

status

of an acquired territory and the race of the labor forces,
understood as means of

production, inhabiting the territories.

The

fugitive slave provision could enable the slave

extend their jurisdiction to the

over these spaces. In

owning southern

states to

without having to assume any responsibilities

territories

fact the fugitive slave provision

of the Northwest Ordinance

continued the practice of enabling bounty hunters to kidnap blacks regardless of
whether
there

was evidence of their previous condition of servitude, and without any requirement
11

of due process.

"

It is

also evident that the fugitive slave provision further contributed to

the belief that white slave masters

were

entitled to

own

black people as well as to

conceptualize blacks as property, while perpetuating the development of racialized and

segregated spaces.

1

13

Stephen Middleton contends

that:

Although the majority of white Americans in the Northwest never owned
enslavement of Africans reinforced the color prejudice of whites.

slaves, the

Slavery

made

racial discrimination inevitable.

The American

legal culture did not

who had a natural right to life, liberty, and
The Ordinance of 1787 made such an interpretation possible. Although

recognize Africans as Americans
property.

a few black males enjoyed suffrage until the turn of the century,
liberty to African

Americans disappeared

recognized blacks as slaves.

as whites

all

prospects for

matured in a culture

that

114

Thus, while the official expansion of slavery

may have been prohibited,

racism and

segregation nurtured. This was aggravated by the official recognition of the right of slave

owners

to

sure,

is

it

have

their property returned to

possible to identify

relationship of Article

VI

some of the

them

if

it

was found

early antecedents of Jim

1

to the formation

Lopez Baralt concluded

of territories.

his reflections

Ordinance and the understanding of the

in the territories.

'
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in the

'

on the relationship between the Northwest

territorial doctrine’s

with the following statement:

Crow laws

To be

treatment of Puerto Rico

Two

things must be borne in mind while considering
these provisions of the
Ordinance; the fact that the territory was contiguous,
and that the population
belonged to the same racial stock and spoke the same language
and had the same
ideals as the rest of the nation. The departure from
some of these principles
during the acquisitions of 1 898 can be explained to a
large extent by the lack of
these conditions of contiguity and similarity of race. 116
It

follows that the legal conception of territorial expansionism
perpetuated by the

Northwest Ordinance was premised on a white

citizen-settler population that

reproduce the same ideological principles of the thirteen colonies.
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would

CHAPTER 3
CONGRESS AND THE ORGANIC ACTS

On August

7,

1789, the First Congress of the United States passed a

allowed the Northwest Ordinance
modifications that would

United States.

117

make

it

to “continue to

consistent with the

The modifications gave more

governance of the

territories.

have

What

is

bill that

effect” with certain

full

newly adopted Constitution of the

control to the President over the

important about this act of Congress

constitutional legitimacy to the Northwest Ordinance through

its

is that

it

gave

re-enactment after the

Constitution had been adopted. However, the question remained as to whether the

Ordinance of 1 787 was limited

in application to the territories acquired before the

adoption of the Constitution, or whether

of new

territories.

namely whether

This question

in turn

it

could be used in the future for the acquisition

was premised on two

the United States could acquire

new

territories,

could be admitted into the Union. The Constitution was
the second question, in a letter to

Gouvemeur
I

additional questions,

silent

and whether new States

on the

first

Henry W. Livingston dated December

On

question.

4, 1803,

Morris, the author of the Territorial Clause, wrote:

perceive now, that

I

mistook the

drift

whether Congress can admit, as a new

of your inquiry, which
State, territory,

United States when the Constitution was made. In

is

substantially

which did not belong

to the

my opinion they cannot.

Notwithstanding the original intent of the author of this part of the Constitution, the

United States has acquired more than
seven

new

States.

1

00 populated

territories,

With some important exceptions, which

Congress has generally been responsible

for the
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will

and has admitted

thirty-

be discussed below,

governance of the

territories.

More

importantly, Congress has relied on the Northwest
Ordinance as a sort of road

guide for the governance of the

territories.

map

or

In fact, virtually every organic act adopted for

the governance of a territory prior to the enactment
of the Foraker Act of 1900, adopted
the structural guidelines of the Ordinance of 1787 as
a

model

for the territorial

governments.

The
have been

legal debates over the

at the heart

power of Congress

to

govern the acquired

territories

of some of the most important historical debates over the character

and nature of the Union. To be

sure, the acquisition

of new

territories, either

through

discovery, conquest, cession, or purchase, had profound implications that often

threatened the capacity of the Union to retain political national unity.

From an economic

point of view, the acquisition of new territories could threaten State economies by

introducing

new

discriminatory

labor forces as well as

tariffs, duties

new

competitors

who were

protected from

and taxes. One example of this argument can be traced

to

the already mentioned debates over the prohibition of slavery in the acquired territories.

On

a political scale, the acquisition of new territories could

potentially acquire a large

number of new

citizens

States that could unbalance sectional or party

is

mean

that the nation could

of a different “race” as well as new

power

divisions in the Senate and House.

possible to argue that the authority of Congress to govern the territories

was

It

quite

important to the extent that Congress’ impact on the political and economic formation of

a territory mattered.

In an article published in 1896,

Guam, and

the Philippines,

two years before the U.S. acquired Puerto Rico,

James Lowndes wrote

that:

scope of Congressional power over annexed territory, there is an
irreconcilable difference between the views of the legislature and of the judiciary.

As

to the

43

From the cases cited it is clear that the supreme court has
uniformly
power of Congress is subject to the limitations on its powers

held that the

imposed by the

But from the several territorial acts above cited
Congress has assumed to exercise unlimited power. 119

constitution.
that

Lowndes went on

make

events could

relationship

misleading.

territorial

it

conclude that while the Court
“politically inconvenient” to

between the Constitution and the

Lowndes

is

may have

have

In

equally clear

settled its position, future

settled the question

1 "'

territories.

0

of the

These claims, however, are

correct to the extent that Congress has not adopted a uniform

its territorial

territories.

Even

policies to the individual

and regional exigencies of the

the adoption of the Ordinance of

1

787 has not guaranteed

uniformity in the time lapsed between the acquisition of a territory and
State.

is

policy than could be applied to every territory indiscriminately. Congress
has

generally catered

acquired

to

it

some

its

admission as a

cases, such as that Puerto Rico, Congress has retained a “territorial”

possession in a legal and political limbo for more than one hundred years. In other cases,

such as the case of California, Congress bypassed the

territorial

admitted this possession as a State within two years. As

I

will demonstrate in the next

chapter, the Court has generally validated this practice despite

Taking

this discussion as a point

of departure,

phase altogether and

Lowndes’ claims.

this chapter will focus

on a

discussion of Congress’ territorial policy after the adoption of the Constitution and before
the enactment of the Foraker Act of 1900.

policy

is

by looking

at the

One way

to

understand Congress’

territorial

organic or territorial acts and the provisions contained within

these that address the questions arising out of the acquisition and governance of new

territories.

By treating

policy,

possible to discern the continuities and departures from both traditional

it

is

the organic or territorial acts as legal expressions of Congressional

Congressional policies as well as to contrast these with the relevant interpretations of

44

other branches of the government. In order to
situate this discussion within the relevant
constitutional context, the chapter will begin with

nature of congressional power.

proceed
to

Once

this

some remarks about

background has been

the constitutional

laid out, the chapter will

analyze the organic acts enacted during the period in question. 121
In an effort

to

provide some didactic consistency with the overall project, the
following sections will

focus on several basic questions, namely: what was the governmental
“model” informing
the organic governmental institutions?

territorial institutions

territories

of government?

through the organic acts?

I

regarding race and membership in the

What was

And

in

the

power of Congress over

the

what ways did the constitution extend

will also

pay some

to the

attention to the debates

territories.

Congress and the Constitution

3.1

David O’Brien argues

that the Constitution recognizes four legislative

powers of

Congress, namely the enumerated implied, constitutional amendments, and inherent
,

powers.

"

O’Brien contends

that the

enumerated powers are those

listed in Article

the Constitution. These are specific powers authorizing Congress to exercise

governance. These powers sought

to

its

1

of

duties of

both correct the defects of the Articles of

Confederation, and to enable the creation of a national government with expansive

powers

to curtail the potential

initiatives, particularly

some

limits

of national fragmentation that could result from local

state

with regards to commerce and trade. They also helped to place

on the Federal powers of the national government.

45

In addition,

power of enacting

O’Brien writes, “Congress was given an important residual

role

laws “necessary and proper” to the execution of its authority.” 123

all

These powers enabled Congress

to enact four types

of laws, namely:

.those that

provide substantive or procedural rules of general application
( 1
)
governing, for example, interstate commerce;
(2) govern the collection of
revenues for the national government;
(3) appropriate revenues for expenditure of
revenues by the government; and (4) confer benefits on or adjust claims
of
.

.

individuals against the government. 124

These powers also enabled Congress

government

to assist the

in its execution

of its duties

and responsibilities.

The

latter

amendments

two powers could

to the constitution

also be

complemented or modified through

which could be proposed by

either a “two-thirds vote of

both houses of Congress;” or by “a national convention called by Congress

of two-thirds of the

1

state legislatures.”

"'

These amendments can be

“state legislatures in three-fourths of the states;” or

fourth of the states.”

since 1791.

political,

1

"6

by

to

ratified

by

request

either

“ratifying conventions in three-

There have been twenty-seven amendments

Most of these amendments sought

at the

respond

to the

to the Constitution

changing

social,

and economic conditions of the nation.

Citing Chief Justice Marshall’s remarks on the Territorial Clause as articulated in

American Insurance Company

power of Congress
that flows

to

v.

govern the

Canter (1828)
territories

can be understood as an inherent power of

“from the concept of sovereignty.”

Article IV, §3,

cl.

O’Brien argues that the authority or

128

As noted above,

the Territorial Clause or

2 of the Constitution reads as follows:

The Congress

shall

have the Power

to

dispose of and

make

all

needful Rules and

Regulations respecting the Territory or Property belonging to the United States;

and nothing

in the Constitution shall

of the United

States, or

be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims

any particular

States.

46

O

Brien

original

s

argument

Northwest

power

to

premised on a reading of this clause

territories,

Congress the power
the

is

to

it

to

territories

territories

sovereign domain. While
chapter, suffice

because “the Constitution does not specifically confer on

govern

govern the

I

that limits its extension to the

acquired by a acquisition or treaties.” 129 Thus,

becomes an inherent

will discuss the merits

result

of the power

to

govern the

of this reading in the subsequent

say that the concept of inherent powers was wedded to the

territorial

expansion and nation-building as an expression of the idea of sovereignty.

The

historical record

is

a bit clearer on the nature of the

power of the

Clause than what O’Brien suggests. Fehrenbacher unambiguously argued

The

territory clause

and

it

Territorial

that:

was approved by

the Convention, probably without dissent,
appears to have attracted no criticism during the process of ratification.
Madison in Federalist 43 called it “a power of very great importance” and

emphasized

its

governmental aspect by associating

the admission of new states. In August 1789, the

it

with the clause providing for

first

Congress under the

Constitution reenacted the Northwest Ordinance with the anti-slavery provision
intact.

No member of either house

questioned

its

authority to do so.

130

Kelly, Harbison, and Belz add that during the early years of the national “founding” the

“Union consisted of organized
Territories,

states in

which

federal and state authority coexisted.”

131

however, were not States of the Union and therefore occupied an anomalous

space within the polity. This meant that while States possessed local self-governing

powers, these powers were not extended to the unorganized parts of the national

Moreover, “in the Confederation period the creation of national

on the denial of state claims
and O’Brien’s

to the area.”

The

lies in the fact that the Territorial

central difference

47

was contingent

between

this

argument

Clause has been interpreted as a source

of constitutional authority granting Congress the power
“founding.”

territory

territory.

to

govern the

territories since the

These two issues are further

tied to the question

be admitted into the Union. The power
cl. 1,

which

of how and when a

admit new States

to

territory could

located in Article IV, §3,

is

states:

New

States

may be

admitted by Congress into Union; but no new State shall be
formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of two or more States,
or Parts of States,
without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned
as well as

Congress.

However,

as Peter B. Sheridan notes, the Constitution does not provide

define the procedure

by which

a territory

becomes a

133

state.

any guidelines, or

Sheridan’s argument

suggests that the traditional procedure for the admission of new states followed the

Northwest Ordinance guidelines. Other than guaranteeing a “republican” form of

government

(Art. IV, §4), the Constitution is silent

on any other requirement

for

admission.

Notwithstanding these arguments, a survey of the relevant organic or
acts enacted

by Congress during

territorial

the nineteenth century demonstrates that with the

exception of the Kansas-Nebraska Acts debates over popular sovereignty and local
territorial

territories.

autonomy, Congress retained plenary authority over the governance of the
In virtually every case, with the temporary exception of the Hawaii islands.

Congress treated every acquired

territory as part

of the nation with constitutional

entitlements. Congress also extended citizenship to the eligible inhabitants of all of the

acquired territories, including inhabitants

European

who were deemed

to

race, including but not limited to Spanish, French,

the territories acquired before Puerto Rico

was ceded

1898 have become States of the Union.
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to the

be of a different white or

Mexicans and

others. All of

United States by Spain

in

3.2

The Southwest
The

Territories

Territory South of the River Ohio,” 134

became

the

first set

of territories

to

be

acquired and admitted to the Union after the establishment
of the Constitution. The

formation of these territories led to the eventual creation of the
states of Kentucky and

Tennessee. For the most

part, the

Southwest

territorial charters

Ordinance, excepting the provision prohibiting slavery. 13

'^

It is

followed the Northwest
important to note that

these charters began delineating the north-south slavery lines, and that
Congress

generally opted for a non-interventionist stance. Fehrenbacher argued that
this resulted in
the adoption of:

.a

national policy of having two-policies, with the

Ohio as the dividing line
was forbidden by federal law; south of
the river it was silently permitted though not mandated by federal law. The
practical effect, soon accentuated by the admission of Kentucky and Tennessee as
slaveholding states, was to extend the Mason and Dixon line westward to the
.

.

between them. North of the

Mississippi.

river slavery

136

In addition, the right to suffrage

was only extended

to free

white

men who owned

property. For the most part, these two territories were considered extensions of the state

of North Carolina. This meant

and institutions

after those

that they

their laws,

such as the

of the

presents an interesting

anomaly

1

states,

as the

of Rights,

to the extent

territory actually drafted a State constitution,

presented Congress with two Senators and several Representatives.

known

Bill

of North Carolina.

The case of Tennessee, however,
that the local inhabitants

modeled

T*7

and

,

This procedure,

“Tennessee Plan,” provided the basis for the admission of six additional

including Michigan, Iowa, California, Oregon, Kansas, and Alaska.

an important precedent to the extent that

the territories as

autonomous

it

States in the

~

This was

legitimated the possibility of conceptualizing

making

49

that could

assume

local sovereignty

over their governmental
informal

policy that recognized that once Congress organized
the territories

not interfere in

Union

This procedure provided the basis for the adoption
of an

affairs.

as a

new

its

affairs until

State.

In

it

had

to render a decision regarding its

some ways

this

was

it

would

admission into the

a reaffirmation of the Jeffersonian plan of

1784. Additionally, this model suggested that citizens
could assume political
responsibilities in both the States

and

in the territories.

This was an example of a form of

non-intervention that provided the basis for the adoption of the
popular-sovereignty
doctrine.

After the enabling of the Southwest Territories, Congress enacted organic
acts for
the Mississippi (1798)

and Indiana

1

( 1

800)

40

territories.

Whereas the organic

act for

the Mississippi territory followed the Southwest territories precedent, the Indiana
territory

simply re-enacted the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance. For the most

the basic difference

between both organic

part,

acts lied in the containment of provisions

regarding slavery. This practice of adopting two models continued to affirm sectional
divides along ideological lines informed

by

the politics of slavery. Notwithstanding,

these difference, both organic acts adopted the basic Northwest Ordinance structure of

territorial

3.3

government, including the extension of a

bill

of rights to the

territories.

The Louisiana Purchase
Willoughby argued

that the “Louisiana

step” in U.S. expansionism.

141

Purchase” of 1803 became “the

first

The Louisiana Purchase, which would eventually

great

result in

the creation of the “Territory of Orleans,” and the “District of Louisiana” not only

doubled the size of the nation,

142

but also redefined the Indian Boundary line beyond the

50

Mississippi river without the consent of the Indian
inhabitants of these territories. The

Orleans territory eventually became the state of Louisiana,
and the District of Louisiana

was

partitioned into a

states

number of territories, which eventually

led to the creation of the

of Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, and Minnesota and the Dakotas.

The Louisiana Purchase not only expanded
question

its

the nation, but also brought into

founding principles. To be sure, the United States was founded on
an

The

colonial legacy.

acquisition of this inhabited tract of land, and

its

anti-

subsequent

organization into both a territory (Orleans) and a District (Louisiana)
institutionalized the
practice of purchasing colonies.

example of this

practice.

The case of Alaska was probably

There were

at least five central

governance of the Louisiana Purchase lands

that merit

the

most notable

debates over the acquisition and

some

discussion. These included

the disputes over the interpretation of the Constitution regarding the acquisition and

subsequent admission of these

territories; their legal status; the

extension of the

Constitution; the naturalization and extension of suffrage to a non- Anglo-Saxon

population; and the implications of the status afforded to the District of Louisiana for the

theory of plenary powers. The debates surrounding these issues were especially

important because they represented a re-conceptualization of the nation as something
other than a compact of States.

Kelly, Harbison, and Belz’ discussion of the legal history of the Louisiana

Purchase

on

this

is

useful in understanding the debates over the interpretation of the constitution

matter

143
.

They argue

namely whether the U.S. had
territory

that the

the

purchase raised two constitutional questions,

power

to acquire foreign territories,

“and

such as Louisiana be governed and admitted to the Union as a

51

if so,

state

could

on the basis

of equality with the original
lines,

namely between

states ?”

144

While there was an

initial

consensus across party

Federalists and Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans,
that the

Constitution did not grant the U.S. government the power
to acquire

new

territories, the

resolution of these debates led to the reversal of traditional
party roles and the adoption of
a

new

interpretation of the nation.

The

Federalists, at

one time champions of the revolutionary

spirit,

argued

that the

Constitution did not provide for the acquisition of new territories
because this text was

considered a compact

among

the States. Thus, if any

new

territory

were acquired,

it

should be treated as a colony. This view was most clearly articulated in the words
of

Gouvemeur

Morris, the author of the Territorial Clause,

who

in

1803 wrote

that:

I always thought that, when we should acquire
Canada and Louisiana it would be
proper to govern them as provinces, and allow them no voice in our councils. In
wording the third section of the fourth article, I went as far as circumstances

would permit to establish the exclusion. Candor obliges me to add my belief,
that, had it been more pointedly expressed, a strong opposition would have been
145
made.
It

followed that the Constitution was

because there was no intention

was

to

silent

on the question of acquiring new

expand the

nation. Accordingly, the Territorial Clause

limited in scope to the original Northwest territories.

British Federalists

became

the

American

letter to

More

importantly, the anti-

imperialists.

Initially President Jefferson disagreed

Purchase. In a classic

with the acquisition of the Louisiana

Wilson Carey Nicholas dated September

Jefferson proposed a “strict construction” of the Constitution informed

text’s “original intent,”

territories

7,

by

1803, where

his

view of the

he wrote:

of the force of the observations you make on the power given by the
Constitution to Congress, to admit new States into the Union, without restraining
I

am aware

the subject to the territory then constituting the United States. But

52

when

I

consider the limits of the United States are precisely
fixed by the treaty of 1783,
that the Constitution expressly declares
itself to be made for the

United States, I
cannot help believing the intention was not to permit
Congress to admit into the
Union new States, which should be formed out of the territory
for which, and
under whose authority alone, they were then acting. I do
not believe

might receive England, Ireland, Holland, &c. into
case on your construction [i.e. interpretation]. 146
that they

He continued

to argue that a

it was meant
which would be the

“broad construction” of the Constitution could threaten the

unity and stability of the nation. In

of enumerated powers

it

some ways

was based on

this interpretation

that limited congressional authority to those

articulated in the Constitution. This

meant

that

powers

clearly

because the Constitution did not

possesses an admissions provision, the Territorial Clause only applied to those
that

were part of the nation

western

territories.

As an

adding a new provision

at

the time that the Constitution

alternative, Jefferson

that

would permit

a theory

proposed

territories

was adopted, namely

to

amend

the

the Constitution

the acquisition of new territories.

by

It is

interesting to note that Jefferson’s initial constitutional definition of the United States did

not include

new

territories,

but was rather limited to the landscape comprising the United

States at the time that the Constitution

was adopted. This argument would

adopted by both imperialists and anti-imperialists alike
Spanish colonies as a result of the

later

be

to challenge the acquisition

War of 1 898.

Perhaps because of the economic exigencies of the nation, namely the need

develop a national economy and

to find a

place for the increasing

farmer/settlers, Jefferson eventually reversed his position

of 1803 with Napoleon

to

of the

purchase the Louisiana

In the process, Jefferson

proposed an alternative interpretation of the Constitution. To be
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number of

and signed the Treaty of Paris

territories.

inaugural address to the nation, Jefferson stated that:

to

sure, in his

second

have said fellow

I

citizens, that the

income reserved had enabled us

to extend our

imits, but that extension

may possibly pay for itself before we are called on, and
in the meantime, may keep down the
accruing interest; in all events, it will repay
the advances we have made. I know that the
acquisition of Louisiana has been
disapproved by some, from a candid apprehension that the
enlargement of our
territory would endanger its union. But who can
limit the extent to which the
federative principle

may operate

effectively? The larger our association, the
be shaken by local passions; and in any view, is it not better
that the
opposite bank of the Mississippi should be settled by our own
brethren and

will

by strangers of another family? With which
harmony and friendly intercourse ? 147

children, than
to live in

Following

this

ways from

by developing and
valve to relocate

that citizens

territorial

expansion.

integrating the local

settlers.

would challenge

the

Union

opposed

to

it

First,

it

we be most

likely

could benefit economically both

economy, and by using the

Politically, Jefferson

a foreign affairs point of view,

territories as

shall

view, the nation was conceptualized as a Federal empire that could
benefit

in at least three

From

less

it

if

territories as a safety

reasoned that there was less likelihood

they were scattered throughout the

made more

territories.

sense to colonize the adjacent

allowing other European empires to colonize these lands and

establish potentially threatening borders. In a sense, this argument suggested that

Congress had an implied power

power

to

govern them as a

to acquire the territories

result

of its national

comprising the United States

territories

148
.

interest

and perhaps an enumerated

and sovereign domain over the

Ultimately Republicans agreed to acquire the

Louisiana lands and organize Orleans as a territory and the

a District

of Louisiana leaving the question of statehood

Congress decided
distinct legal

Louisiana.

and

The

to divide the lands

political spaces,

namely

of the “unsettled” lands as

to a future

Congress

149
.

comprising the Louisiana Purchase into two

the Territory of Orleans, and the District of

Territory of Orleans, which eventually

was organized and governed following

rest

became

the State of Louisiana,

the Southwest Territories version of the

54

Ordinance of 1 787. 150 The remaining “part” of the
purchases, however, was

initially

organized as a District until

151

this phase, the District

it

was

sufficiently settled

by white U.S.

officials

him. The President

s

During

of Louisiana, which became a territory the following
year, would

be under the direct supervision of the President. According
to

government

citizens.

would be appointed by
control

the President and

was so pervasive,

of the governor and three judges,

all

this

arrangement

would

that the legislative

all

of the

report directly to

power was comprised

appointed by the White House.

1

'

2

The

“autocratic”

nature of the District of Louisiana, which relied on this Presidential
appointment system,
resulted in significant condemnation

noted that

in the

by

the local inhabitants.

153

Moreover, Willoughby

case of the Northwest Territory the governor and judges had only the

modified legislative power of adopting and promulgating such laws of the original States
as they

deemed

appear.”

advisable; in the case of the district of Louisiana this limitation did not
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This distinct legal and political status of space was especially important because

it

served as a precedent for the District of Alaska and the reaffirmation that both Congress

and the President retained plenary authority over the acquired
to note that the District could

Notwithstanding

this

lower

be situated one rung below the

status,

which continued

territories.

It is

interesting

territorial status.

to retain constitutional standing, the

Louisiana District was treated as a part of the United States and eventually as a
This

territorial status,

territory.

again following the Northwest Ordinance precedent, promised

eventual statehood. In addition,

it is

important to note that this distinct legal status was

also in direct contradiction to Jefferson’s 1784 plan, and to his general republican

principles.
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Another important

was whether

legal question raised

the acquisition of Louisiana territories

the Constitution extended ex propio vigore
(on

the extension of the Constitution to Louisiana
territory, as

by

well as

its

meant

own

To be

force).

Congress recognized

that

inhabitants, as part of the nation.

its

The organic

Territory of Orleans and the District of Louisiana
contained a

sure,

this

acts for the

number of provisions

establishing that no laws existing in the territories, or
developed subsequently, could be
inconsistent with the Constitution. For example, Chapter

laws that

territorial legislature

could enact, stated

XXXI,

Section

3,

regulating the

that:

no law shall be valid which is inconsistent with the constitution and laws
of the
United States, or shall lay any person under restraint or disability on account
of
•

•

his religious opinions, profession, or worship, in all

maintain his

own and

Lopez Baralt argued

of which he shall be free

to

not be burdened with those of another. 155

that these provisions:

.might be interpreted reasonably to mean that in the opinion of Congress the
Constitution did not extend ex propio vigore to the territories immediately upon
annexation, but had to be legislated in order to bind them; it would seem that if
.

.

Congress thought the Constitution was in force in the territories there was no need
of incorporating such prohibition in the territorial charters. It would have been

mere

Lopez

surplus.

Baralt’ s

156

argument suggests

that

Congress had the power to acquire

territories

without making them a part of the nation and having to promise them eventual statehood.
This

is

especially important because according to this argument,

that unless

Congress extended the Constitution

foreign for constitutional purposes.

As

I

it is

possible to suggest

to the territories, these

will demonstrate below, this

could remain

was

the

most

notable feature of the Foraker Act of 1900.

The extension of the Constitution

to the

Orleans territory and the District of

Louisiana also meant that Congress was willing to acquire

56

territories

populated by

foreign

’

inhabitants or residents of non- Anglo-Saxon
heritage. In fact, Frederic L.

Paxson noted

that the “inhabitants

of the ceded

territory

were

to

be incorporated

United States, under the Constitution, “as soon as possible .” 157
The
this

question

is

racial

in the

dimension of

perhaps best captured in the text of Jefferson’s proposed
constitutional

amendment, which reads

as follows:

Louisiana, as ceded by France to the U.S. is made a part of the
U.S. Its white
inhabitants shall be citizens, and stand, as to their rights
obligations, on the
same footing with other citizens of the U.S. in analogous situations. Save only

&

North of an East & West line drawn through
no new State shall be established, nor any grants
Indians in exchange for equivalent portions of land

that as to the portion thereof lying

the

mouth of Arkansa

[sic] river

of land made, other than to
occupied by them, until authorized by further subsequent amendment
Constitution shall be made for these purposes 158 (Emphasis added)

to the

.

This would suggest that “whiteness” became the racial standard for the extension of
citizenship across ethnic and national boundaries.

U.S. was willing to acquire

new

territories

The case of Louisiana suggests

that the

and new citizens so long as the they were

white and of European stock. This was important because only citizens could participate
in the polity.

Willoughby contends
Ordinance consisted

in

that the

most important departure from the Northwest

expanding the right

to suffrage in the territories

above, the Ordinance had a provision that required

be eligible

to participate in local elections.

all

voters to

In contrast,

own

who

represented a

paid taxes

160
.

move towards

As noted

property in order to

Willoughby further notes, the

organic act for the Orleans territory extended the right to suffrage to

inhabitants

159
.

all

free-white-male

Thus, while the organic act for the Orleans territory

the democratization of suffrage, this policy change

limited to white men.
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was only

Early views of American exceptionalism were
premised on the argument that the
in

order to

become an American

some ways,

the individual had to give up his European identity.
In

the codification of whiteness as a precondition for
citizenship can be read as

an effort to dispel the European colonial character of the
inhabitants of French and

Spanish heritage living
evident, however,

is

Orleans and Louisiana

in the

whether

this

territories.

What

is

not readily

conception of whiteness was premised on an Anglo-

American conception of whiteness. To be

sure,

it

is

possible to argue that after the

adoption of the Constitution proponents of American exceptionalism like Bishop
James

Madison represented
of British heritage.

161

the

American nation

To

as a providential

this extent narratives

from narratives of Anglo-American

culture.

I

and promised land

for settlers

of U.S. citizenship were indistinguishable

suspect that the naturalization of the

French and Spanish Creole inhabitants of the Louisiana

territory

form of integration

the Americanization, and

into the polity that

was premised on

was conceptualized

as a

assimilation of the local Creole populations.

The establishment of the Michigan (18 05), 162
164

(1812),

Alabama (181 7),

1

05

and Arkansas (1819),

organization of the Orleans territory.

It is

163

Illinois (1809),

166

territories

Missouri

followed the

interesting to note that the Southern territories

generally followed the Southwest and Orleans precedent, which did not prohibit slavery,

whereas the northern

territories

developed for the Indiana

followed the precedent established by the organic act

territory,

namely

a modified version of the Ordinance of 1787.

58

3.4

The Florida

Territory

Shendan notes
the

that

Adams-Onis Treaty of

Spain ceded the Florida territory to the U.S. under the
terms of
67
18 19.'
Florida

was formally organized

as a territory in 1822

following the Orleans Territory model, which as noted
above, did not prohibit slavery.
is

important to point out that the citizens of Florida, like those
of the Orleans Territory,

were accustomed

to

European

legal

and

and therefore presented U.S.

political institutions

policy makers with the problem of admitting
to

It

new

citizens that

had not been acculturated

U.S. institutions.

The question of race

in Florida

appears to have centered around the wars between

the invading settlers and the Seminoles, as well as on the status of slaves
and free

Negroes and mulattoes. To be

sure, the

Seminole Indians had historically resisted the

occupying forces and waged war against the colonizers. These wars represented a
significant threat to the settler

territory.

communities

Sheridan also notes that

when

that sought to

expand

Florida applied for admission, a

Senators raised objections against various provisions in the
prohibited the emancipation and emigration of free blacks.

whether the debates over the

status

into the Florida

of free blacks in the

as those that resulted from the acquisition of Oregon,

it

territorial constitution that

168

While

territories

is

number of U.S.

it

is

not clear

were as controversial

evident that they reproduced

the principle that no black person could aspire to equal citizenship in the nation.

other words, while the inhabitants of Florida

emancipation of slaves, they could attempt

may have been

unable to prevent the

to prohibit the recognition

mulattoes as citizens.
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169

of black and

In

3.5

The Texas Republic
In 1821

Mexico declared

its

independence from Spain and assumed jurisdiction

over the Texas temtory. Both the Spanish and
Mexican governments had encouraged

Anglo-American homesteaders

to settle in Texas,

sizeable population inhabiting these lands.
dissatisfaction with the

By

Mexican regime, the

and by the early 1820s there was a

1835, as a result of increasing

local settlers

had organized a provisional

government, and by 1836 they had declared the independence of Texas.
The following
year the Texan government had unsuccessfully sought to annex itself
to the U.S.

would not be

until

March

1,

It

1845 that the Republic of Texas was annexed by a joint

resolution of the

House and

Texas as the 28

State of the Union, and almost doubling the U.S. territorial landscape.

On December of that

Senate.

Texas, like California, bypassed the

territorial stage

without undergoing any transitional

territorial

The case of Texas
alternative

is

Congress admitted
171

and became a State of the Union

process or stage whatsoever.

especially interesting because

form of annexation

year, the

that is not contingent

it

is

representative of an

on a colonial or

territorial phase.

In

other words, the case of Texas established a precedent that granted Congress the plenary

power
status.

to

admit “any type of political entity,” regardless of its domestic or foreign

More

importantly, however, this precedent suggests that annexed spaces need

not go through a territorial stage in the event that they have an organized system of

government

that is republican in character

Federal system of governance. This

been sufficiently populated, and

Texas

is

and capable of being integrated

into the

especially interesting given that Texas had not

that U.S.

lawmakers considered partitioning the State of

into four territories.

60

Aside from the
political,

is

it

strategic implications

of acquiring Texas, both economic and

possible to argue that the acquisition of Texas

was an expression of

Manifest Destiny. This form of American exceptionalism
sought the acquisition of all
the continental territory as a

way to

consolidate the U.S. Empire.

It is

also evident that

the racial composition of U.S. settlers further informed
the decision to annex the Texas

Republic. In other words, the annexation of Texas was contingent
on the predominance

of a white
building,

3.6

settler

namely

population that would carry forward the values of the U.S. nation
to help the

The Oregon

empire expand from shore

to shore.

Territory

Sheridan documents that the U.S. acquired the Oregon territory from Great
Britain in 1846 following several land disputes and joint occupation. 173

organized as a territory in 1848.

174

The organization of this

enabling of the territories of Wisconsin (1836),

177

territory followed the

and Iowa (1838)

carved out of Wisconsin. Congress adopted the Wisconsin organic

subsequent

Wisconsin

.

.

including Oregon’s.

territorial acts

act

.it

177

Oregon was

According

to

176
,

the latter being

act, as a

Lopez

model

for

Baralt, the

was important because:

embodied

at different

all

the provisions

which Congress had

times and which had proven valuable.

territorial legislation in a unit.

From

that

—

codified

all

dispersed

time on the Wisconsin charter was to

serve as a model. However, in several instances

and Oregon

It

legislated for the territories

—Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin

the articles of compact constituting the bill of rights of the

Northwest Ordinance were expressly enacted, probably with the intention of
forbidding slavery.

178

61

Willoughby also pointed out

that the

Wisconsin model introduced two important

principles that modified the Northwest Ordinance,

namely popular

elections of both

houses of the legislative assembly, and universal white male
suffrage

The provision

for popular elections

was

179
.

especially important because

it

represented a reaffirmation of the principles that would inform the
popular sovereignty
ideology. This provision

local

marked a

shift

from a Presidential appointment system

the principle of property ownership and taxation.

this shift represented

It

by abandoning both

should be noted, however, that while

an innovation within the existing conception of suffrage in the U.S.,

continued to be representative of the anti-democratic, patriarchal, and atavistic

ideologies that informed U.S. lawmaking.

women

To be

sure, the British

the right to local suffrage during the colonial period

The
in

one of

autonomy. More importantly, the universal male suffrage principle, which
was

generally limited to U.S. citizens, expanded the electoral franchise

it

to

acquisition of the

Congress with regards

Oregon

territory

had granted tax-paying

180
.

prompted a number of important debates

to the organic act’s provisions prohibiting the

expansion of

slavery while simultaneously excluding free blacks, mulattoes, Chinese, and Hawaiians

from residing
the

Oregon

arguments

in

Oregon. The relationship between these debates and the formation of

territory

that

have suggested

provides important and interesting insights about the racialist

informed Congress’s

territorial

earlier, prior to the civil

war

policy during the nineteenth century.

territories

As

I

were generally organized, and

subsequently admitted, on the basis of sectional interests along the lines of the expansion

of slavery. Thus while organic

acts

of northern

territories generally

included a provision

forbidding the extension of slavery, southern territories generally excluded this provision.
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However,

as the case of

Oregon demonstrates,

this did

mean

not

that advocates against

slavery were willing to recognize former slaves
as equals, or for that matter as citizens
entitled to the protection of the

established, one of its

its

temtory.

first

law

182
.

As soon

as the

Oregon

acts sought to exclude slavery

territorial legislature

was

and involuntary servitude from

1

'

According

to

W. Sherman Savage,

this

meant

that:

Persons might bring slaves into the country, however, but had
to remove them
would become free. Free Negroes coming into the country

in

three years or they

would have

to leave in two years in the case of males and three
years in the case
of females, or receive upon his or her bare back not less than twenty
nor more

than thirty-nine stripes; and if he refused, then he would receive
the same
punishment every six months until he should leave 184
.

It is

interesting to note that this argument advocating for the “emancipation”
of slaves in

a “free

territory,

simultaneously defended the segregation and exclusion of Negroes and

mulattoes, and later Chinese and Hawaiians, from residing in Oregon.

Negroes, mulattoes, Chinese, and Hawaiians were generally forced
territory

18 '^

To be

to leave the

sure,

Oregon

upon the penalty of jail and/or corporal punishment.

In other words, abolitionist and emancipationist policies

were not necessarily

compatible with egalitarian principles of inclusion. From a legal point of view,
abolitionist policies

were just as

racist as pro-slavery policies.

the anti-imperialists, ideological heirs of the abolitionists,

this

As

I

will suggest below,

would eventually reproduce

“Janus Face” ideology. Like the abolitionists, the anti-imperialists believed

in the

emancipation of the non- Anglo-Saxon inhabitants of the Spanish colonies. However,
did not

mean

that

emancipation was compatible with annexation. In

imperialists generally believed that the non- Anglo-Saxon races

not be entitled to U.S. citizenship.

American

They should be

polity.
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freed,

were

this

fact, anti-

inferior

and should

and excluded from the Anglo-

The Mexican

3.7

Territories

and the Doctrine of Ex Propio Vigore

Kelly, Harbison, and Belz argue that the
the 1840s carried

American settlement

“movement

to the Pacific coast,

for continental expansion in

demanded

the annexation of

Texas, and provoked the Mexican War.” 186 The formal war
against Mexico ended
1

848 with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 187 The U.S. again doubled

its

acquiring the “present day California, Nevada, Utah; most of Arizona
and

and part of Oklahoma, Colorado, and Wyoming.” 188 Willoughby argued
used the Wisconsin model

to organize

most of the Mexican

course, bypassed the territorial stage and

its

annexation. Perhaps

it is

became

189

territories.

a state of the

in

territory

New

that

by

Mexico;

Congress

California, of

Union within two years of

possible to attribute this anomaly to the effects of the “gold

rush.”

The
this project.

acquisition of the

The

first

territories, or rather

was

Mexican lands raised

three legal issues that are relevant to

question centered around the extension of the Constitution to the

on whether the Constitution followed the

flag.

A second question

raised regarding the legal status of the inhabitants of the acquired territories. This

question was especially important given that the majority of the inhabitants of the

territories recently

claimed by Mexico did not identify as white Anglo-Americans. The

third legal question raised

was whether an acquired

Anglo-Americans, could by-pass the

The case of California

is

land, clearly populated

territorial stage

by non-

and become a State of the Union.

especially interesting because, unlike the Texas case, California

had not been a republic.
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The main

legal

and

political question centered

extended expropio vigore to the

on whether the Constitution

Lopez Baralt argued

territories.

that the debates

regarding the Wilmot Proviso’s amendment prohibiting
the extension of slavery to the

Mexican
doctrine.

0

1

territories

191

To be

provided the ideological origins for the ex propio vigore

he noted that advocates for slavery such as John C. Calhoun
had

sure,

contended that the Constitution should automatically extend
these were acquired

was

that

by

the U.S. and despite their territorial status. 192

once acquired, the

territories

would become

because the Constitution recognized slavery,

slave-owning
territories

to the territories as

settlers in the west.

its

states

soon as

The assumption

of the Union.

It

followed that

extension to the territories would protect

While the practice of extending the Constitution

to the

had been incorporated since the Louisiana Purchase, these debates provided the

basis for the subsequent institutionalization of this doctrine. Until the Foraker Act
legislative debates in 1899, the Constitution

expressed provisions in the organic

acts, or

the inhabitants of the

territories.

Mexican

to the territories either

through

ex propio vigore.

Reginald Horsman contends that the
conquest of the Mexican

extended

racial ideologies

Horsman argues

that

provided the basis for the

Americans generally perceived

territories “as a degenerate, largely Indian race

control or improve the territories they owned.”

193
It

followed, that

unable to

some expansionists

sought to justify their policies by arguing that the U.S. had a responsibility to bring
civilization to the savage

and inferior inhabitants of the conquered

further suggests, that the expansionist drive

hand, some slave-owners feared that the

of the extension of slavery,

194

was challenged on two

new

territories.

levels.

On

Horsman
the one

acquisitions could result in the prohibition

and by consequence disrupt the fragile sectional balance

65

in

Congress.

Horsman

also suggests that other opponents of the

“expansionists were to be resisted not because this would

mean

war argued

that:

the degradation of other

peoples, but because the presence of other races would
ruin the society created in the

United States.”

196

In other words, anti-expansionists represented
the Indian

and Mexican

races as potential threats to the internal political culture
of the nation.

Horsman

further argues that “(e)ven those

who

in

of Mexico should be annexed gave practically no support

Mexicans

to enter the

1847 and 1848 argued
to the idea

union as equal citizens.” 197 Despite

Guadalupe Hidalgo addressed
of Article VIII provided

that all

of allowing the

this silence, the

Treaty of

concern in Articles VIII and IX. The second provision

this

that:

Those who shall prefer to remain in the said territories, may either retain the title
and rights of Mexican citizens, or acquire those of citizens of the United States.
But they

be under the obligation to make their election within one year from
the date of exchange of ratifications of this treaty; and those who shall remain in
shall

the said territories after the expiration of that year, without having declared their
intention to retain the character of Mexicans, shall be considered to have elected
to

become

citizens of the United States.

In addition, Article

IX provided

198

that:

Mexicans who, in the territories aforesaid, shall not preserve the character of
citizens of the Mexican Republic, conformably with what is stipulated in the
preceding
admitted
to the

article, shall

at the

be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and be

proper time

enjoyment of all the

(to

be judged of by the Congress of the United States)

rights

of citizens of the United States, according

principles of the constitution; and in the

mean time

shall

to the

be maintained and

protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty and property, and secured in the
free exercise

of their religion without

Although the implementation of these

199

restriction.

articles raised a

number of additional

regarding the treatment of U.S. citizens of Mexican and Indian heritage,

be noted

is

that these provisions resulted in the automatic naturalization

Anglo-Saxon populations of these

territories.

66

200

issues

what should

of the non-

This treaty continued the traditional

practice of automatically naturalizing the
inhabitants of an acquired territory prior to

annexation.

It

also extended the applicable constitutional
protections to the inhabitants of

the acquired territories despite their nonAnglo-Saxon heritage.

presents the

first

The case of Puerto Rico

formal departure from this practice to the extent that

its

inhabitants were

neither naturalized nor were they entitled to
constitutional protections.

California

territories

was ceded

to the

United States

made no

area was, for a time, governed

848 as part of the Mexican

by

the

possibilities including the

American Army.”

However,

it

more

been interested

In addition to fulfilling the

opened up new

expansion of commerce and trade.

By controlling

open up new and lucrative economic

appears that the “gold rush” of

the immediate annexation of California.

a

201

the acquisition of California

the pacific ports, U.S. policymakers could

possibilities.

To be

1

849 was the main catalyst

for

sure, while the local inhabitants

effective system of governance, Federal policymakers appear to have

in regulating the

gold discoveries in the area.

Following the “Tennessee Plan,” the Californians adopted a Constitution
In 1850,

that

provisions for a civil government in California, and the

dream of a transcontinental empire,

demanded

1

and under the tenets of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Sheridan
notes

“Congress, however,

economic

in

Congress admitted California as a

on an equal footing.

free State

202

in 1849.

This

precedent further suggested that Congress could admit

new

organized or for that matter incorporated. To be sure,

at the

had taken no steps

In fact, California had been

to enact

any

territorial legislation.

governed by a military regime under the

direct supervision

67

States that had not been

time of admission Congress

of the President.

The

Civil

War and

For the most

Mexican

territories

Aftermath

its

part, all

of the organic acts created after the acquisition of the

followed the Wisconsin model. Willoughby has noted that
“each act

providing for the government of a

new

Territory

was based upon

prior acts, the

modifications introduced being usually only for the purpose of
specifying in greater detail
the

powers of the

territorial legislature.”"

03

However, during the period immediately

preceding the Civil War, Congress developed several organic acts that
incorporated the

popular sovereignty” ideology. In

Nebraska

act

204

became

fact, historians

generally agree that the Kansas-

the fundamental catalyst that led into the Civil

Kelly, Harbison, and Belz contend that Congress

sovereignty ideology in the

New

Mexico"

06

first

and Utah"

War.

205

Yet,

incorporated the popular
07

territorial acts in

consolidate the Democratic Party unity. 208 This reading, however,

is

an effort

to

inconsistent with

the available evidence.

Both the

New Mexico

territorial Legislative

and Utah organic acts contained a provision authorizing the

Assembly

to draft locally applicable laws.

Yet, these laws were

subject to the approval of the U.S. Congress. For example, §7 of the

New Mexico

organic act defined the legislative powers of the territory in the following language:

That the legislative power of the Territory shall extend

to all rightful subjects

legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United States

of this
soil;

act;

no tax

of

and the provisions

but no law shall be passed interfering with the primary disposal of the
shall

be imposed upon the property of the United States; nor

shall

non-residents be taxed higher than the lands or other property of residents. All

laws passed by the legislative assembly and governor shall be submitted

Congress of the United
209
(Emphasis mine)
This section of the

Washington

210

States,

New Mexico

organic

acts.

and

if disapproved, shall

organic act

This

is

was

also reproduced in the

not to say that Congress exercised

68

to the

be null and of no

effect.

Utah and
its

authority over

the local territorial legislatures, for

it

is

clear that the Federal

government lacked the

necessary technology and state apparatus to govern the
territories in an effective and
efficient

manner

consistent with this provision. In fact, as

I

have suggested above.

Congress had generally embraced a non-interventionist policy
the popular sovereignty ideology. Rather

my point

the practice of recognizing Congressional plenary
situated in the

Kansas-Nebraska

These organic

acts

acts resulted

is that

the

that

first

powers over the

was consonant with
formal departure from
territories

can be

of 1854.

from the

initiatives

of Senator Stephen A. Douglas

to

organize the area west and northwest of Missouri as autonomous territories
governed by a

popular sovereignty doctrine/

owning

states

by enabling

1

This ideology would presumably protect the slave-

the possibility of the migration of slave-owners and the

eventual admission of states that were sympathetic to the Southern slave-owning

McPherson notes
efforts

that while this initiative dated

of land-hungry pioneers seeking

enactment of these

bills that the

back

at least

a decade, mostly in the

to usurp Indian territories,

controversy exploded/

12

it

The most

implication of these territorial acts was the dismissal of the Missouri
prohibiting the extension of slavery north of the 36°30

The doctrine of popular sovereignty was
territorial act in §6,

which defined the

legislative

states.

is

not until the

controversial

Compromise

parallel.

inserted into the Kansas-Nebraska

power of the

territorial

government.

This provision read as follows:

That the legislative power of the Territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of
legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions

of this
soil;

act;

no tax

but no law shall be passed interfering with the primary disposal of the
shall

be imposed upon the property of the United States; nor shall the

lands or other property of non-residents be taxed higher than the lands or other

property of residents. Every

bill

which shall have passed the Council and House

69

of Representatives of the said Territory’ shall, before it becomes
a law, be
presented to the Governor of the Territory;
if he approve, he shall sign

it; but if
with his objections to the house in which it
originated, who
shall enter the objections at large on their
journal, and proceed to reconsider it.
If after such reconsideration, two thirds of that house shall
agree to pass the bill,
it shall be sent, together with
the objections, to the other house, by which it
shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two
thirds
that house,

not,

he shall return

it

of

it

shall

become law. But in all such cases the votes of both houses shall
be determined bv
yeas and nays, to be entered on the journal
of each house respectively. If any bill
shall not be returned by the Governor within three
days (Sundays excepted) after
it shall have been presented to
him, the same shall be a law in like manner as
if he
had signed it, unless the Assembly, by adjournment, prevents its return,
case

Unlike

it

shall not be /aw.

213

in

previous provisions outlining the powers of the

all

Kansas-Nebraska

act did not extend to

approval of local laws. In

fact,

which

(Emphasis mine)

territorial legislatures, the

Congress the power of being a

final arbiter in the

Congressional power was circumscribed to the

organization of the territories and the admission of states. The Territorial Clause was
limited to the initial organization of a structure of local government. This interpretation

departed from

all

the previous, both Congressional and jurisprudential, interpretations of

the Territorial Clause. This provision
44

Colorado,*

Nevada,

21:1

and Dakota,

Congress organized three

was

210

further adopted in the organic acts of

Idaho,

territories

217

Montana,

218

and Wyoming.

219

during the Civil War, namely Arizona,

220

Idaho, and Montana. Lopez Baralt suggested that the prohibition of slavery eo instante

was

the

most notable feature present

in these organic acts.

Idaho organic act stated “whereas slavery

is

221

To be

sure, Article 6

prohibited in said Territory

by

act

of the

of

Congress of June nineteenth, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, nothing therein contained
shall

be construed

to authorize or

slavery, however, did not

mean

permit

its

existence therein.”

that freed slaves, Indians,

women,

The

prohibition of

or Asians could be

recognized as equal members of the political community. Virtually every organic act

70

anteceding the enactment of the Fifteenth

Amendment

stipulated that the basic criteria

entitling a citizen to vote and/or participate
in local elections

was

that they

be free-white

males over the age of twenty-one.

The period following
was marked by

the Civil

War, generally known as the Reconstruction

a general concern with the re-building

years,

of the nation and consolidating a

strong central government. Lopez Baralt has suggested
that this period

was marked by

a

general concern with the establishment of national unity through
a consistent territorial
policy.

^ To be

sure,

he noted

that:

After the Civil War, as a general rule, unless special circumstances required
it was the policy of Congress to enact uniform
laws for the
territories. The territorial judiciary was modeled on a single
pattern. The courts

particular legislation,

had the same jurisdiction.

made
two

1868 the sessions of all

In

biennial and in 1869 the

years.

...

War

governmental structure. ... The

autonomy

affairs.

the

in the territories,

more

shaping the details of their

of Congress allowed ample
determine for themselves their own local laws as
conflict with the Constitution or laws of the United
earlier practice

to the territories to

long as these were not in
States.

all

a tendency on the part of Congress to intervene

closely than before the Civil

were

elective for

All these laws were of a general character and applied in

They evidenced

territories.

territorial legislatures

members of both houses were made

Generally speaking, their legislative powers were untrammeled as to local
After the Civil War, however, there was a manifest tendency on the part

of Congress

to curtail this

autonomy.

224

In a sense, the territorial status could be understood as a fragile condition prone to

divisive influences and in need of Federal supervision. Thus, Congress sought to develop

a sense of uniformity that could withstand internal as well as external ideological

influences that could lead to another Civil War.

At present,

it is

unclear to

me to what

extent the Civil

War amendments changed

the character of the organic or territorial acts during the Reconstruction. Clearly, the

Thirteenth

Amendment

abolished slavery, but as Derrick Bell also argues,

resolve the issue of the newly freed slaves’ political status.”

71

it

However, as

“did not

I

demonstrated

earlier, the prohibition

slaves or blacks

fact,

of slavery

would be recognized

as equal

in the territories did not

members of the

slave laws were for the most part replaced

political

by Jim Crow laws

mean

that freed

community.

In

that targeted blacks

throughout the United States and perpetuated a system
of apartheid.

The
territories

relationship of the Fourteenth

was enigmatic

at best.

its

Protection Clause to the

Clearly the language of the statute

Federal government and the States.

made

Amendment’s Equal

To

this extent, the

was

ambiguity of the

limited to the

territorial status

application subject to interpretation. If we take the practice of
extending the

Constitution to the territories as measure of Congress’ willingness to
recognize the
national character of the Equal Protection Clause, then

clause extended to the territories

that unless the territories

nation, the person

citizenship.

this

As

I

bom

at least in spirit.

were considered

in the territory

to

it

is

possible to suggest that this

The problem, however,

lies in the fact

be a part of the sovereign domain of the

would not necessarily be

entitled to birthright

will suggest below, the case of Puerto Rico provides a rich

example of

problem.

There

is

evidence to suggest that the language of the Fifteenth

incorporated into the territorial acts as early as 1868.

To be

sure, §5

Amendment was

of the

Wyoming

organic act"" stated:

That every male citizen of the United States above the age of twenty-one years,

and

who shall have declared their intention to become citizens
who shall have been a resident of said Territory at the time

[including] persons

of the United

States,

of the passage of this

act, shall

elections in the Territory.

And

be entitled

to vote at the first

and

all

the legislative assembly shall not at

subsequent

any time

abridge the right to suffrage, or to hold office, on account of race, color, or

previous condition of servitude of any resident of the Territory: Provided That
,

the right of suffrage and of holding office shall be exercised only

the United States, and those

who

shall

72

have declared

by

citizens of

their intention to

become

such, and shall have taken an
oath to support the Constitution
and government of

the United States. 227

However, Bell contends
birth,”

that the Fifteenth

and “was not effectively enforced

in the history

of Jim

Crow

Amendment was

“politically obsolete at

for almost a century.” 228 This

laws. Moreover, Native

is

its

readily evident

Americans who had been displaced

the Western territories, as well
as those that had been

bom

in the territories

to

were not

recognized as citizens or as persons for the
purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment. More
importantly, as

to

or

become
become

I

will demonstrate below,

even

citizens of the U.S. this did not

citizens.

Amendment

if Native

mean

Americans expressed

that they

were

entitled to the right to vote

Notwithstanding these injustices, as Table

did in fact bring a dejure change that

made

their desire

1

suggests, the Fifteenth

the territories a part of the

United States.

Table

1

:

Racial prerequisites for suffrage rights in the territories.

Legislation

Year

Racial Prerequisite

Additional Criteria

Northwest Ordinance

1787

Free White Male

Property

Orleans Territory

1803

Free White Male

Tax Payer

Wisconsin Territory

1836

Free White Male

“Universal”

1868

Male

“Universal”

Fifteenth

Amendment

The years following

the Civil

War

also initiated a period

Owner

of U.S. international

expansion. For the most part President Johnson’s Secretary of State William H. Seward

was

the driving force behind this policy initiative.

merely commercial and

military.

He

enable the U.S. to put a military base

229

Seward’s

interest,

however, was

sought an island in the West Indies that could
in the

Caribbean, while simultaneously creating a

73

Of these

profitable port.

initiatives the

Congress was the proposal

to

against acquiring this island.

only one that received some
discussion

annex Santo Domingo. 2 " Congress
overwhelmingly voted
It

should be further be noted that

conquer any port and establish a military
base

from doing

in

any

U.S. wanted to

was very

little to

stop

it

in so.

from Russia. This
It is

if the

island, there

During these years, however, Seward
managed

U.S.

in

“territory”

became

the

first

to secure the

purchase of Alaska

non-contiguous District/Territory of the

important to note that Congress created
an organic act that defined Alaska as a

District rather than a territory. 231

This distinction was premised on argument
reminiscent

of Alexis de Tocqueville’s narrative of
American exceptionalism, which was premised on
the lack of white

Anglo-American

settlers,

and the organic character of Indians. 232

In

other words, U.S. policy makers argued that
there were insufficient white settlers residing
in

Alaska

to

organize a

territorial

government, and

that the local populations inhabiting

Alaska were excluded on account of their “Indian” “savage
and “uncivilized”

From an

institutional point

power over

of view,

this

meant

that the President

the governance of the district, and that Alaska

status.

was given plenary

was not allowed

to

send a non-

voting delegate to Congress. 233 This organic act followed the
precedent of the District of
Louisiana. Writing in 1900,

Max

Farrand argued that

this legal

and

political

arrangement

provided a direct precedent for the colonial status of Puerto Rico.' 33 His argument was

premised on the

fact that the District

of Alaska had not been guaranteed statehood on

account of the lack of white Anglo-Saxon
to create

citizen/settlers,

an organic act that incorporated the traditional

74

and on the

territorial

failure

of Congress

powers extending

local

autonomy. However, as

1

will

demonstrate below,

this

Congress and the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the

The Indian

3.9

By
.

.

Territories and

the 1890s, Scott B.

is

inconsistent with both

Territorial Clause.

Oklahoma

Cook argues

the:

.continental expansion had reached

its limit,

immense

f

argument

dramatized by the occupation of the
Ocean and cemented

area bordered by Canada, Mexico,
and the Pacific
tinal elimi nation of American
resistance at

Wounded Knee

(1890). In

893 the historian Frederick Jackson Turner
pronounced the American frontier
c osed. It had he claimed, defined
the American experience but it would no
longer do so
In other

words, the military victory of the Federal forces
over the Cherokees,

Chickasaws, Creeks, Choctaws, and Seminoles
residing

completed the national
territory

was

act

that

territorial

in the

Western

expansion of the U.S. government. The Oklahoma

was carved out of the western

part of the Indian territories in 18 90. 236 In fact
the

especially drafted for the Indian territories. 237

It is

important to highlight the fact

Congress briefly considered the possibility of creating an Indian

Oklahoma

territory.

territories

state out

of the

238

The Oklahoma organic

act followed the

Wisconsin precedent. However,

provided an important precedent for the Foraker Act

to the extent that

it

this act

justified the

systematic disenfranchisement of the Indian inhabitants of the Oklahoma/Indian territory.

To be

sure,

provided

§4 of the

act, the section that

defined the powers of the legislative assembly,

that:

An

apportionment

among

shall

be made by the governor as nearly equal as practicable

the several counties or districts for the election of the council and house of

representatives, giving each section of the Territory representation in the ratio of

the population ( excepting Indians not taxed) as nearly as

75

may be

and the members

f

C

n

di stnct
slrict for

In other

d
Se ° f epr Sentatives sha " resi
de
f
w
hirt ,!r
, ,
which
they may [
be elected, respectively. 239
,

and be inhabitants of the
(Emphasis mine)
in

words, Indians were not considered
legitimate inhabitants of the Indian
Territory,

and would not be counted for
apportionment purposes.
This policy further enabled the
disenfranchisement of Indians despite the act’s
inclusion of a provision that reproduced
the Fifteenth

Amendment

denial of suffrage on account of
race and color. This

is

of §5 of the

which provided

act,

of twenty-one years, and

all

that “all

prohibition of the

especially evident in the language

male citizens of the United States above the age

male persons of foreign

birth over said age

who

shall

have

twelve months pnor thereto declared their
intention to become citizens of the United
States, as

act

now

required by law,

of that portion of said

who

territory

are actual residents at the time of the passage
of this

which was declared by the President

settlement on the twenty-second day of April,
nine,

shall

Anno Domini

to

be open for

eighteen hundred and eighty-

and of that portion of said Territory heretofore known as the
Public Land
be entitled

to vote at the first election in the Territory.” 240
This is

Strip,

an especially

important provision given the Supreme Court’s prior ruling on
the legal status of Indians

and

their entitlement to U.S. citizenship.

In Elk

v.

Wilkins (1884) the Court reified the Marshall Trilogy’s invention of the

domestic dependent nation, and further reasserted
therefore not entitled to birthright citizenship. 24

“whether an Indian,

is,

bom

a

'

member of one of the

that Indians

were “alien citizens” and

The Court addressed

the question of

Indian tribes within the United States,

merely, by reason of his birth within the United States, and of his afterwards

voluntarily separating himself from his tribe and taking up residence

citizens, a citizen

of the United

States, within the

76

meaning of the

first

among white
section of the

fourteenth

amendment of the

constitution.”

242

Speaking for the Court, Justice Gray

further argued that:

Under

the constitution of the United
States, as originally established,
‘Indians not
axed were excluded from the
persons according to whose numbers
representatives and direct taxes were
apportioned among the several statesand
ongress had and exercised the
power to regulate commerce with Indian
tribes

^

6

Wlth ° Ut the boundaries °f °ne of the
states
of Aee Um
nn Th
Union.
The Indian tribes, being within the territorial
limits of the United
States, were not strictly speaking,
foreign states; but they were alien nations,
is met political communities,
with whom the United States might and
habitually

did deal as they thought

fit, either through treaties
made by the president and
senate, or through acts of congress
in the ordinary forms of legislation 243

In other words,

as potential

because the framers of the Constitution
did not intend

members of the

nation,

alien nations,” a legal status

and because Indians lived

in

savage and uncivilized

of space invented by Chief Justice Marshall,
Indians had

request the privilege of naturalization from
the Federal government.
tribes

to include Indians

were simply not considered

territorial

To be

to

sure, Indian

spaces of the United States within the

meaning of the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. 244
Domestic dependent nations
were simply foreign

territories for the

The provisions authorizing

Oklahoma

purposes of the

clause of this amendment.

the collective disenfranchisement of Indians in the

territory provide an important precedent for the

Oklahoma, the

ability to participate in the public sphere

settlers systematically

Amendments. This

practice

would eventually be

Like the Indian precedent, Puerto Ricans had

become U.S.

Foraker Act. In the case of

was

limited to U.S. citizens and

excluding Indians despite the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
institutionalized in the Foraker

the establishment of a Puerto Rican citizenship that

to

st

1

was

distinct

to petition the

citizens despite the fact that once the island

the United States, anyone

bom

in

Puerto Rico was

77

bom

Act with

from U.S. citizenship.

Federal government in order

had become a possession of

inside of the Union.

3.10

The Hawaiian

Cook

Islands

suggests that with “British Canada
and independent

Mexico un-obtainable

without a costly war and international
censure, some Americans turned an
anxious and
hopeful gaze on overseas territories
as the next beneficiaries of America’
great

democratic and capitalist experiment.” 245
In 1893, the a group of wealthy

capitalists,

supported by the U.S. Navy, managed
to carry-out a coup d’etat over the
government of
the Republic of Hawaii effectively
overthrowing the government. 246 Unlike the
case of

Texas, the United States invaded the
Republic of Hawaii, a sovereign nation-state,
against the will and desires of the native
inhabitants and conquered

amidst the Spanish-Cuban-American
successfully pass a

bill

War of

it.

Five years

later,

1898, several legislators were able to

of annexation for the Hawaiian Islands. 247 In
1900, Congress

enacted an organic act extending

territorial status to the

Hawaiian

Islands.

248

However,

unlike prior organic acts, which sought to either
create a territory or organize an existing
territory, the

ironically

Hawaii

act sought to replace existing republican institutions,

had been modeled

after U.S. institutions,

249

which

with U.S. institutions that would

enable the American capitalists to exploit the resources in the islands. 250
The Hawaii
Islands

annexation and

territorial acts

provide an important, albeit problematic,

precedent for understanding the Foraker Act because they provide a

framework designed

to re-organize a nation into a territorial

new governmental

government. The Hawaii

Islands acts provide continuity to the territorial paradigm, while simultaneously

introducing a

new

institutional

arrangement for the organization of the

78

territories.

Alfred

Hartwell argued that Congress intended
to create a “form of colonial

S.

government which, while conforming
Constitution, shall be in
States.”

251

This

is

harmony with

to the

requirements of the United States

the policy, foreign and domestic
of the United

especially important because

were annexed upon

acquisition.

all

of the

territories previously acquired

Hawaii was treated as a conquered foreign country

between 1893 and 1900. To be

sure,

§93 of the organic act provided:

That imports from any of the Hawaiian
Islands, into any State or any other
Territory of the United States, of any
dutiable articles not the growth, production
or manufacture of said islands, and
imported into them from any foreign country’
after July seventh eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight, and before this Act takes
shall pay the same duties that are imposed
on the same articles when
252
imported into the United States from any
foreign country
(Emphasis mine)
ettect,

As

I

will demonstrate below, the Court justified
the right of the Federal

occupy
result

territories

and

treat

them

as

government

to

something other than a part of the U.S. as a direct

of a military campaign. However,

in the

case of Hawaii there

is little

evidence that

the islands represented a military threat to the
U.S. during this period.

As

I

suggested above, the Republic of Hawaii was conquered and
absorbed by

U.S. capitalists with the military backing of the Navy. Both the annexation
and

territorial

acts provide clear guidelines for the “Americanization” of Hawaii’s
institutions through a

re-naming of these

institutions.

For example, relying on language reminiscent of a

Hobbesian conception of naming and

definitions,

253

§9 of the

territorial act

provided

that:

.wherever the words “President of the Republic of Hawaii,” or “Republic of
Hawaii, or “Government of the Republic of Hawaii,” or their equivalents, occur
the laws of Hawaii not repealed by this Act, they are hereby amended to read
.

.

in

“Governor of the Territory of Hawaii,” or “Territory of Hawaii” or “Government
of the Territory of Hawaii, or their equivalents as the context requires. 254

One of the

implications of this policy initiatives

of Hawaiian

institutions with

“American

was

the acceleration of an “assimilation”
255

institutions.”

79

In addition,

§6 of the

territorial

act recognized Congressional
plenary

Constitution.

territory

it

power over

The extension of the Constitution

also implied that once

would only be a matter of time before

The

racial

the territory limited only

it

was admitted

by the

Hawaii became a

as a State.

composition of the inhabitants of the Hawaii
Islands became a central

issue of concern for U.S. lawmakers.
Willoughby argued that U.S. lawmakers were

concerned with the acquisition of a

territory that

was predominantly populated by

Polynesians and Asians of Chinese and
Japanese heritage

256
.

It

followed, that the

naturalization of the inhabitants of
Hawaii could result in the formation of a state

disproportionately

composed of non-Anglo-Saxon people. The organic

concern through a stnct naturalization provision,
which provided

were citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on August
eight, are

of Hawaii
[sic],

hereby declared
,2 ' 7
.

who form

According

to

act addressed this

that “all persons

twelfth, eighteen

who

hundred and ninety-

be citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Territory

to Hartwell, this provision left out “nearly
all

of the Asiatics

a large part of the population .” 258 In addition to being
consistent with the

Chinese Exclusion Acts, 2

'

this

provision further reaffirmed the precedent of the selective

naturalization of the inhabitants of the acquired territories.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TERRITORIAL
CLAUSE

In this chapter

I

will argue that the

Supreme Court

between Article IV, §3 and the constitutional

ways throughout

status

of the

the nineteenth century and until 1901.

interpreted the relationship

territories in three distinct

My contention is that these three

interpretations or doctrines can be understood
within the context of three constitutional

penods. The

first

period

is

(1810-1835) and his efforts

posed by

localist

to consolidate the nation against the
threat

democratic impulses and State

Chief Justice Taney

s

reign in the Court, and

national unity tempered

as the “Gilded

encompassed within the reign of Chief Justice John
Marshall

The second period began with

interests.

was marked by an

by a concern with personal

rights.

The

effort to preserve a

third period, also

Age,” can be situated between the cusp of the Civil

Reconstruction and the

War of 1898. During

of fragmentation

this period, the

War and

known

the

Court’s concern with the

reconstruction of the Union and the consolidation of a strong
national government

informed

its

interpretation of Article IV, §3

on a case by case

basis, simultaneously

upholding the principles established by both Marshall’s and Taney’s interpretations. 260

The Marshall

territorial doctrine

was informed by

a

number of decisions

that

sought to augment the judicial power and shape the Constitution as a charter for

During

nationalism.

acquire

new

Constitution.

it

became a

this period the

Court established that the U.S. had the power to

territories, despite the fact that this authority

More

part

was not

spelled out in the

importantly, the Court noted that once a territory had been acquired,

of the nation and by consequence subject

81

to the jurisdiction

of the

Constitution and the Federal government.
However, Marshall also argued that
despite the
fact that territories

States.

were considered a

This meant that the

territories

part of the Union, they

settled in the territories. This

power granting Congress

inferior in status to the

were conceptualized as States

rather as spaces in state of pupilage
or wardship destined to

This anomalous status resulted

were

in the loss

become

in the

making or

States of the Union.

of political rights for the U.S. citizens

who

Court also interpreted Article IV, §3 as a source
of plenary

the authority to organize, enable, and
govern the territories, as

well as subsequently admit them as States on
an equal footing. Congressional power was

presumably limited only

in favor

of fundamental civic

In addition, to this interpretation

of the

rights.

territory as

an anomalous space within the

nation, the Marshall Court invented a unique
extra-constitutional status of space

known

as the Indian domestic dependent nation.

extra-

The domestic dependent nations were

constitutional to the extent that the Constitution only provided
four legal conceptions of

space,

namely the

term or

State, the District, the territory,

way of conceptualizing

and land property, and

a legal space within the nation

this

geographic

was not encompassed

within any of these definitions. Domestic dependent nations were also a
distinct legal
status

of space

to the extent that they could

be foreign for State and constitutional

purposes, and domestic for Federal interests. This ambiguous fluidity, which was
generally contingent on Federal interests, enabled the U.S. to create a distinct hierarchy

of legal spaces where the Constitution did not
that

limit the

could hinder the domination of Indians. In

anomalous

government’s authority

this chapter

I

in

ways

will suggest that the

status that Marshall ascribed to the territories provided an ideological basis for

the invention of the Indian domestic dependent nations. This

82

is

important because the

domestic dependent nations
unincorporated

in turn

territorial status

provided a key paradigm for the
invention of the

of space.

The Taney Court’s (1836-1864)
territories

marked a

radical departure

Court accepted the principle

become

from the Marshall Court’s doctrine.
While the

that the Federal

stipulated that acquisition did not

did not

interpretation of the constitutional
status of the

government could acquire new

mean automatic

territories,

annexation. In other words, a territory

a part of the nation until Congress
passed an enabling act extending

territorial status to a

conquered, purchased, or acquired

territory.

It

followed that the

Executive branch could occupy a territory and impose
a military government, but
territory

remained a foreign space

for domestic

Congress enacted the appropriate legislation
belong

it

to the U.S.

to

and constitutional purposes

annex the

territory.

Thus

this

until

territories

could

and not necessarily be a part of the nation. More importantly,
the

Constitution did not extend ex propio vigore to an occupied
territory, and that occupation
did not need to result in annexation.

However, once Congress had organized
could not

treat

it

was responsible

a territory, the

as a colony. In fact once a territory

for the expedient annexation

of a

Taney Court argued,

was acquired,

territory

it

the U.S. government

on an equal footing

to the

other States. This also meant that the Bill of Rights extended to the territories
ex propio

vigore and that the second provision of Article IV, §3, which authorized Congress
to
,

govern the

territories,

ceased to be applicable. The Taney Court adopted an interpretation

reminiscent of Jefferson’s early

strict

constructionism, which limited the application of

the Territorial Clause to the original Northwest Territories acquired before the

Constitution

was adopted only and not

to the territories acquired after the ratification

83

of

the Constitution.

To give Congress

the

power

to

govern the

territories, the

Chief Justice

argued, would result in giving
Congress the power to supersede the
Bill of Rights.
Instead of Congressional oversight,
the
local sovereignty.

Congress

Taney Court defended

This doctrine established that the

Bill

the doctrine of popular or

of Rights superseded any

act

that could potentially violate a
U.S. citizen’s civil rights in the territories.

of

In

other words, congressional plenary
power was limited in favor of the protection
of the

personal or civil rights of the U.S. citizens
in the territories.

During the Gilded Age, namely the period
between 1865 and 1901, the Court’s
interpretation of the constitutional status
of the territories

was generally tempered by

a

concern with the potential threat of another Civil
War, the expansion of capitalism, the
conquest and settlement of the West, and

in

general with the unification of the continental

United States. The Court recognized both the Marshall
version of the

Taney

territorial doctrine.

For the most

territorial

part,

doctrine and a modified

however,

it

is

possible to

argue that congressional power over the territories was plenary
and absolute. Even

though the Court generally claimed
rights,

it

that this

power was

limited in favor of individual

did not require the Congress to articulate this interpretation in

Moreover

its

organic acts.

the Court’s interpretation of the Bill of Rights during this period

restrictive that there

was

little

room

The Court progressively sought
“state action” in the territories

was so

to challenge congressional action in the territories.

to limit the possibility

by remarking

that the

of using the

Bill

of Rights against

government would engage

in a self-

monitoring of its actions.
This chapter will explore the cases that shaped the

territorial doctrines

throughout

the nineteenth century and provided the precedents for the Foraker Act and the Insular
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Cases of 1901. The

Supreme Court’s

mam objective is to discuss the historical

ideological positions on the territorial
question.

interested in delineating the contours
status

of the

territories

development of the

am

particularly

of the Court’s interpretation of the
constitutional

territories in relation to its
mterpretation

stemming from

1

Article IV, §3.

of the powers of Congress over the

My contention is that the Foraker Act

represents both a continuation of the
principles of spatial tutelage established
by the

Marshall Court, and a general departure from
the idea that

territories

were States

in the

making.

3.1

Marshall and the Foundations of U.S. Imperialism

Joseph

P. Cotton, Jr. has

argued that the Marshall Court addressed the question
of

the constitutional status of the territories in three
cases,

Loughborough

v.

Blake (1819)“ 63 and American Insurance Co.
,

Of these

decisions, the Canter ruling provides the

constitutional status of the territories and the
to create

opinions,

cases.

governmental

it

is

namely Sere

institutions.

v.

v.

Pitot (1810)

Canter (1828)

262
,

264 265
.

most sustained discussion of the

powers

that Article IV, §3 granted

Congress

Notwithstanding the vagueness of Marshall’s

possible to discern the contours of the Court ’s territorial policy from
these

Furthermore, the Foraker Act and the Insular Cases can be read as a continuation

of the principles established by the Marshall Court

in the cases that will

be discussed

in

the following section.

One of the key

issues of contention arising from the debates surrounding the

constitutional status of the territories has centered on the constitutional

term “United States.” As

I

meaning of the

will demonstrate in the following chapter, advocates for a
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strict

or narrow interrelation of this
term have argued that the
Constitution was des.gned

for the original thirteen
colonies/States only.

Initially this interpretation

was used by the

Federalists to challenge the acquisition
of new lands resulting from the
Louisiana

Purchase. After the acquisition of
these
this

territories,

advocates for a

strict interpretation

of

term have argued that the Constitution
only applied to the States, and therefore
the

territories

could be governed outside of the constraints
of the Constitution. The Marshall

Court rejected both of these interpretations.
To be sure,

in

McCulloch

v.

Maryland

(1819), the Chief Justice incidentally remarked
that:

Throughout

this vast republic, from St. Croix
to the Gulf of Mexico, from the
Atlantic to the Pacific, revenue is to be
collected and expended, armies are to be
marched and supported. The exigencies of the nation
may require, that the
treasure raised in the north should be
transported to the south, that raised in the
east, conveyed to the west, or that this
order should be reversed. 266

In addition, as

I

will demonstrate below, the territories

and placed on a path

to eventual statehood.

a part of the United States and

was

were annexed upon acquisition

This meant that an acquired territory became

also subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal

government and the Constitution. For Marshall the term United
States included the
States, the territories,

and

all

The Marshall Court
Set e

v.

other acquired lands.

first

addressed the constitutional status of the

territories in

Pitot (1810), a case arising out of a dispute over a chose in action
claim brought

by some

citizens of the Orleans territory against “aliens” conducting business
in the

recently acquired territory.

this project,

namely

Congress over the

The case addressed

the legitimacy to acquire

territories

by

three important issues that are relevant to

new

territories, the

powers conferred on

Article IV, §3, and the constitutional nature of legislative

institutions operating in the territories.

These arguments, however, were developed

86

in

ways

clearer

(182 8).

in Marshall's

subsequent ruling

American Insurance Company

Canter

v.

267

For Marshall the power

power

in

to acquire a territory.

govern the

to

In an

territories

was

inextricably linked to the

ambiguous passage, Marshall wrote:

he power of governing and of legislating
for a territory
consequence of the nght to acquire and hold
territory.

is

the inevitable

Could

this position

be

contested the constitution of the United
States declares, “congress shall
have the
power to dispose of and make all needful rules
and regulations respecting the
territory or other property belonging
to the United States.” Accordingly,
we find
congress possessing and exercising the
absolute and undisputed power of

governing and legislating for the territory of
Orleans. Congress has given them a
legislative, and executive, and a
judiciary, with such powers as it has
been their
268
will to assign to those departments
respectively
.

As Gary Lawson
would

exist

even

suggests this “passage implies that the power
to govern territories
in the

absence of the

territories clause,

based on a necessary inference

from the power of territorial acquisition .” 269 In other
words, the constitutional power
govern the

territories

could be located either as a result of the treaty of
acquisition, or

the Territorial Clause. At present

am

I

convinced that

this loose interpretation

to

in

of the

Constitution enabled Marshall to allow policymakers a certain
degree of political
flexibility in the

governance of the

Marshall the power to acquire

new

territories.

territories

govern and preserve the nation. Once

It is

was

also possible to argue that for

inherent in the sovereign

this political right

was

for a

more expansive reading of the

States.

political

87

This

power

acquire other types of spaces beyond the boundaries of the States such as Indian
territories.

to

established, then Marshall

could extend the Constitution beyond the jurisdictional boundaries of the

argument also opened the door

power

to

Notwithstanding the vague allusions
territories, this

power

to

argument also established

govern the

“undisputed.”

territories

to a

power deriving from

that the Constitution granted

under Article IV, §3, and

that this

followed that Congress’ power to govern
the

It

consequence of the acquisition of territories.

the acquisition of

Congress the

power was plenary and

territories

was a sub mode

My contention is that Marshall sought to

reconcile the concept of acquisition as
a constitutional extension of Article
IV. This

meant

that the acquisition

of new

territories

acquired constitutional legitimacy through

its

relationship to other provisions of the
Constitution such as the Territorial Clause
and the

Admissions Clause.

It is

also possible to suggest that Marshall’s
interpretation

informed by a form of American exceptionalism

was

that envisioned all acquired territories,

presumably inhabited by “civilized” men of European
stock, as a part of the American
Empire, and destined to become States of the Union.
It is

likely that Marshall’s statement about Congress’
“absolute”

power was meant

to curtail

any

threats

by

either

and “undisputed”

from individual States or

local

inhabitants to the powers of the Federal government. This
plenary power, however,

tempered by the

civil rights

was

extended to citizens by Bill of Rights. To be sure, while

Marshall recognized Congress’ plenary power to create special legislative
courts for the
territories, the

main objective

local prejudices.”

270

ot these

However,

was

this issue

“to secure aliens and citizens

would ultimately be

of states from

clarified in the

Canter

ruling.

In

Loughborough

direct tax in the District

written in Article

1,

v.

Blake (1820) the Court addressed the constitutionality of a

of Columbia.

271

The Court held

that the

term “United States,” as

§8 of the Constitution, included the District of Columbia and the

88

territories,

and thus Congress could lay a

direct tax for national purposes.

argued that the Constitution was not
limited
rather that

defend

it

extended

this position

to "all places

to

Marshall

any particular place within the nation,
but

over which the government extends.” 272

In order to

Marshall sought to define the legal and
political contours of the

American Empire. He reasoned

that:

The power, then, to lay and collect duties,
imposts, and excises may be exercised
and must be exercised throughout the United
States. Does this term designate the
whole, or any particular portion of the
American empire?
can admit but one answer.

Certainly this question

It is

the

name given

composed of States and territories. The
of the Missouri,

our great republic, which is
of Columbia, or the territory west

to

District

not less within the United States, than
Maryland or
Pennsylvania; and it is not less necessary on the
principles of our constitution, that
uniformity in the imposition of imposts, duties,
and excises should be observed in
the one than in the other. Since, then, the
power to lay and collect taxes, which
includes direct taxes, is obviously coextensive
with the power to lay and collect
duties, imposts, and excises, and since the
latter extends throughout the United
States, it follows, that the power to impose
direct taxes also extends throughout
27
the United States.
(Emphasis mine)
is

'

In other words, the Constitution, or at least the
provisions that

were not

bounded

274

to States,

followed the government, or rather the

However,

in

American Insurance Company

from his position

in

Loughborough and suggested

territories

was informed by

extent that the territory

was not

that

Canter (1828), Marshall retreated
Congress’ plenary power over the

would be recognized

“Congress, under

territories.

territorial court’s ruling

its

the

in the territories.

however, were contingent on the citizen’s relationship

from a Florida

To

a State, only the relevant constitutional provisions

they did not follow the citizen into the
resulting

that

flag.

the constitutional status of the territory in question.

directly applicable to citizens (e.g. civil rights)

Political rights,

v.

specifically

right to

make laws

This case arose out of a dispute

on a salvage claim. Marshall established

for the Territories,

89

to a State therefore

had a

right to confer

admiralty jurisdiction on

territorial courts,

and that the provision of the Constitution

giving to the federal courts jurisdiction of
admiralty cases applied within states.” 275

followed that the

territorial courts

legislative creation with

sure, Marshall

wrote

were neither Federal nor State

It

courts, but rather a

mixed jurisdiction over both Federal and

State issues.

To be

that:

Although admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the States
in those courts only
which are established in pursuance of the 3 rd article of the constitution,
the same
limitation does not extend to the territories. In legislating
for them, congress
276
exercises the combined powers of the general and a state
government.

Furthermore, because the

territorial courts

were not Article

III

courts,

its

judges were not

required to hold office on a ‘good behavior’’ standard. -77 In other
words, “the entire
Constitution

was

inapplicable in Florida.”
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This argument raised an important constitutional problem, namely whether the
Constitution should be interpreted as a “whole” or “unitary” text as opposed to an

aggregate of clauses and sections independent from one another that were selectively

extended to the

territories.

There are

at least

the Constitution should be interpreted as a

two problems with adopting the view

whole

text.

First, the

Constitution

that

was

designed for a Federal “compact” of States. Therefore, there are some provisions

that

only apply to States. This interpretation suggests that the relationship between the citizen

and the nation

is

not a direct relationship, but rather

it is

one mediated by the

States.

Second, a unitary interpretation of the Constitution would have reduced the possibilities
for democratic challenges. This construction suggests that the Constitution can be a site

for contestation that is

open

to a plurality

of democratic challenges. Thus, individuals

could use particular provisions of the Constitution to challenge other interpretations of
different provisions.

90

The danger of a “fragmented” reading of the
Constitution

is

that

judges could

selectively choose to extend certain
provisions of the Constitution to the
territories. This

would mean
that

U

that a Federal

would be guaranteed

S- citizens

who

Court adopted

itself.

This

is

judge could decide

that certain provisions

to U.S. citizens residing in the States

settled in the territories. This

in the Insular Cases.

In

was

my opinion,

of the

Bill

of Rights

would be inapplicable

the interpretation that the

to

Supreme

the problem lies in the Constitution

not a text that can be interpreted in a unitary
manner.

Its

language

is

vague, contradictory, and based on a legal hierarchy
of political participation.

Notwithstanding these critiques, Marshall’s argument regarding
the extraconstitutional status of the territorial judge

was not based on any of the

latter

constructions. In fact his reasoning suggests that certain political
provisions of the

Constitution could either be modified by Congress for the territories, or

at the

very least

Congress could make the choice of selecting which constitutional provisions could be

made

applicable to the territories. This reasoning suggested that the Constitution did not

extend ex propio vigor

to the territories,

and

that

Congress was the arbiter of what

provisions of the Constitution could be extended to these.
political interpretation

of the Constitution that sought

boundaries of the nation and
grant Congress a legal

its

expansion.

power over

I

I

suspect that this

to grant

was a

Congress a power over the

read Marshall’s argument as an effort to

the nation that could limit the

power of the

States in

favor of a national power. Thus, by granting Congress the authority to invent distinct

legislative

judges Marshall could claim that the

state jurisdiction

territorial courts

had both Federal and

and power. More importantly, a fragmented interpretation of the
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Constitution gave Marshall the flexibility
to engage in a nation-building
project that used
clauses and sections of the Constitution
in political ways.
In the process

of legitimating

this

argument, Marshall reaffirmed and clarified
the

principles regarding the constitutional status
of the territories as laid out in the Sere and

Loughborough

rulings.

Marshall began by establishing that the United
States had the

right to acquire territories.

He

argued that the “Constitution confers absolutely
on the

government of the Union the powers of making war and of
making
that

government possesses the power of acquiring

by conquest or by

After a territory was subdued, and a treaty of peace
was signed, Marshall

treaty.

further wrote, “the ceded territory

It

territory, either

consequently

treaties;

followed that

of that clause

until the territory

in the Constitution

and regulations respecting the
States .’”

becomes a

became

part

of the nation

a State of the Union,

which empowers Congress

territory or other property

to

it

‘to

which

it

is

annexed .”

was “governed by

make

all

280

virtue

needful rules

belonging to the United

281

However, annexation did not necessarily mean
propio vigore

to the acquired territories

the status of a territory.

This treaty

is

To be

sure,

It is

extended ex

For Marshall, the treaty agreement defined

Marshall argued

that:

the law of the land, and admits the inhabitants of Florida to the

enjoyment of the privileges,
States.

282
.

that the Constitution

unnecessary

rights

to inquire

and immunities of the citizens of the United
whether this is not their condition,

independent of stipulation. They do not, however participate
they do not share in the government
In other words, while the inhabitants

till

Florida shall

of the acquired

become

in political

a state

.

territory could acquire civic rights,

they were denied political rights to participate in the polity. According to
inhabitants of the territories, including U.S. citizen-settlers,

92

power;

283

became

this

view, the

subjects and/or

second-class citizens as a result of their residency
in a space that was outside of
the
States, but within the

purview or jurisdiction of the Federal government.

This untenable doctnne, which established
that citizens residing in the
temporarily lost their political rights while they
were living within the

undermined the principles of the Declaration
of Independence, the
political participation

sovereignty,"

territories

territory,

rhetoric of democratic

and equality under the law, Federalist ideologies of
popular

and the dominant enlightenment theories

informed the framers of the

that

Constitution such as Lockean liberalism ." 85 The resulting
arguments provided the basis
for the formation

of all of the acquired

States, after the adoption

territories,

and their subsequent admission

as

of the Constitution. More importantly, Marshall’s principle

presently informs the doctrine that gave Congress the

of the Constitution could extend

power

to

determine what provisions

to the territories.

Marshall’s doctrine undermined the basic tenets of The Declaration
of

Independence by denying U.S. citizens residing
to their

in a part

of the nation the right

to consent

governance. The second paragraph of the Declaration reads as follows:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, they are
endowed by

their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that

—

among

these are

and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights,
governments are instituted among them, deriving their just powers from the
286
consent of the governed
life, liberty,

.

But

how

could U.S. citizens be endowed with “unalienable rights” yet lose them as soon

as they decided to settle in the territories?

be governed when they were unable
questions can be answered in

More

importantly,

how

could they consent to

to exercise political rights like voting ?

at least

287

These

two possible ways. Either Marshall was simply

providing a “political” ruling that legitimated his policy agenda namely to expand the

93

Federal power over the nation and to
give

it

constitutional legitimacy; or he

reconcile Article IV, §3 with the
Declaration of Independence. If the latter
is

was unable
is

correct,

to

it

possible to argue that the Constitution
contained provisions that stood in direct

opposition to the principles of the Declaration
of Independence.

Marshall’s

territorial

policy

was

anti-democratic.

Whether democracy

is

understood as direct and participatory or as
representative, the citizens residing
territories

were denied

territorial stage.

catch 22.

It

immunities

political participation so long as their

This arrangement placed the territory and

follows that the Court extended

some

to the inhabitants, while requiring the

same

of the United States from the inhabitants of the

citizens

of the

were denied

political rights,

community remained

its

in a

inhabitants in a sort of

constitutional “privileges, rights, and

citizens

territories

in the

responsibilities and duties of all

territory.

Simultaneously, the

which meant

that they could not

participate in political deliberations that impacted their territory and
their status as
citizens.

For example,

Spanish relatives living

if the residents

in the

of Florida did not wish

Mexican

territories,

to fight against their

they had no institutional power to

challenge the decision of the U.S. to go to war with Mexico. The implication of this
interpretation

is

that the inhabitants

of a

territory could

be treated as subjects

entitled to

fewer rights than citizens, but with the same responsibilities. Congress was also

empowered
territories,

to

both determine which rights could be extended to the inhabitants of the

and when

to

admit the

territories as States into the

equality and the possibility for democratic participation

and

political status

of the

citizen’s

home.

became contingent on

In a sense, legal

determinative of democratic participation in the polity.
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Union. Constitutional

geography became

the legal

Marshall’s doctrine also contradicted the
Federalist principles of popular
sovereignty. According to Joshua Miller,
the Federalist doctrine of popular
sovereignty
rested

on the idea

people.

that the national

government was sanctioned by the name of the

288

Miller further argues that this doctrine
contained four main elements:
(1) the |egitimate

people” means

all

power of all government comes from
citizens

citizens joined in political

the people; (2) “the

of the United States rather than particular
groups of
communities and states; (3) because the national

government acts in the name of all the people, its
legitimacy is superior to that of
the states and towns; and
(4) because of its direct relationship with all the people,
the national government can act directly upon
them without having to go through
intermediary bodies. Each of these four propositions
serves to increase the power
and legitimacy of the national government. 289

The

denial of political nghts to the U.S. citizens residing
in the territories undermined the

claim that popular sovereignty could establish a relationship
between the “local” and the
national,

bypassing State factionalism." 90 To be sure, Marshall’s

even denied the possibility of a

political relationship

between the

territorial doctrine

citizen

and the national

government.
In a recent

biography of John Marshall, R. Kent

was a Lockean because he believed

that liberty

Newmyer writes

and property went hand

that Marshall

in

hand, that the

purpose of government and responsibility of legal institutions was to secure property
against the vagaries of man in a state of nature.”"

1

however, included an element of consent, which as

Locke’s theory of government,

I

have suggested above, was missing

from Marshall’s interpretation of the relationship between the
and the

2

territories."

relationship

"

In the

citizen, the Constitution

Second Treatise of Government, Locke described

between property,

liberty,

and the

following manner:

95

political society or

community

the

in the

Man

being bom, as has been proved, with
a Title to perfect Freedom and
uncontrolled enjoyment of all the Rights and
Privileges of the Law of Nature
equally with any other Man, or Number
of Men in the World, hath by Nature
a
Power not only to preserve his Property, that
is, his life, Liberty and
Estate
against the Injuries and Attempts of
other Men; but to judge of, and
punish the
breaches of the Law
others, as he is perswaded the
Offense deserves, even
eath !t seif, in Crimes where the
heinousness of the Fact, in his opinion,
requires
l. But because no Political
Society can be, nor subsist without having
in it self
t
e P owe r*to preserve the Property,
and in order thereunto punish the Offences
of
a *°se
Society; there and there onl is Political
Society
y
where
every
J
one
of the Members hath quitted this natural Power,
resign’d it up into the hands of
the Community in all cases that exclude
him not from appealing for Protection to

m

’

,

the

Law

established

by

293

it .

Thus, while the political society had a responsibility
to protect the property and liberty
interests

of its members, the

political society itself resulted

the individuals agreed to be governed
political society’s

power resided

Locke argued

to the

Government

government through

individuals to be governed

arrangement.

To be

in

which

sure, the

consent of its members.

of any number of Freemen’’ was the basis or
in the

his consent to

by

this political

in the voluntary

that the consent

“ beginning to any lawful

by

from social contract

World .”

294

be a part of the

The individual chose
political society

a political society without their consent

295
.

would

“submit”

to

For
result in

placing themselves in a “worse condition than the state of Nature, wherein
they had a
liberty to

defend their Right against the Injuries of others, and were on equal terms of

force to maintain

it,

whether invaded by a single man, or many

in

Combination .”

296
It

followed that by accepting the arbitrary governance of a political society, the individual

“disarmed” himself and armed the sovereign power “to make prey” of him when
pleased.

Marshall’s interpretation of the constitutional status of the citizen residing in

the territories denied

rights.

It

it

him

the right to consent to his governance

by denying him

political

followed that the citizen was subject to the arbitrary governance of a political
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society to

which he had no power and

liberty to consent his

membership. More

importantly, the liberal claims that
natural freedom, equality, and
reason were

preconditions for participation in the
political community were undermined
by the
principles established in Marshall’s
territorial doctrine because even
those citizens

met the necessary
process.

criteria to participate in a political
process

Despite what scholars like

Newmyer might

who

were excluded from the

suggest, Marshall’s territorial

doctrine ran counter to Locke’s political
theory.

Marshall also wrote that “(p)erhaps the power
of governing a territory belonging
to the

United States which has not by becoming a

government may
any particular

result necessarily

state,

and

is

from the

state acquired the

facts that

it

is

means of self-

not within the jurisdiction of

within the power and jurisdiction of the United States .” 299

This remark suggested that the

territories

were

in a state

of pupilage and development and

could only mature through admission into the statehood club.
Thus, in validating the
principles of the Northwest Ordinance, Marshall also justified
the plenary powers of

Congress over the

territories that

were outside of the

State’s jurisdiction. This can be

read as another effort to give constitutional legitimacy to the supremacy
of the national

powers of government. As noted before, the implications of this

interpretation resulted in

the disenfranchisement and subordination of the citizen/settler residing in
the territories.

The

citizen

of nature,

would

until

revert to state of tutelage, perhaps inferior to that of the

Congress decided

that his political

membership. The problem, of course, was

Lockean

community would be ready

that generally states

state

for

were admitted on

political

principles like their position of slavery, or their party affiliation, not on any principle
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based on the political maturity or
development of a temtory. Again the
implications of
Marshall’s doctrine were inconsistent
with his

Much

has been

made of a

own

arguments.

statement that followed this argument in
which

Marshall mentioned the possibility of the
existence of another constitutional
provision

empowering congress

The

right to

territory.

govern a

to

govern

territory.

may be

This passage stated

that:

the inevitable consequence of the right
to acquire
the source whence the power is derived
the

Whichever may be

possession of it

is

unquestioned

300

.

This passage has been interpreted to suggest that
Marshall believed that Congress derived
its

to

authority to govern the territories from the right
to acquire

admit

new

States.

However, given the previous discussion,

Marshall conceptualized the

new

territories

and the

right

it

should be evident that

territories in a tutelary condition, in

need of congressional

supervision and the Constitution contained a provision that
authorized Congress to

govern the

territories.

As

I

also suggested earlier, this passage could be read as
a

reaffirmation of the political powers of the Federal government,
and not necessarily as a
constitutional argument

301
.

Marshall’s invention of the Indian domestic dependent nation

because

it

provided a paradigm from which

is

to legitimate the invention

important

of a

status

of

space that could be treated as a possession belonging to the State, but not a part of the
nation, or rather a legal space that

for international concerns.

The

was

foreign for constitutional purposes but domestic

legal conception

of space known as the Indian domestic

dependent nation resulted from the subsequent reification of a
as the Marshall Trilogy.

Read

series

of decisions known

together, the Marshall Trilogy suggests that Indians

“savage” race incapable of developing the necessary character

98

to

become

citizens,

were a

residing in a sovereign nation that

was

in

a “ward” or dependent relationship
to the

Federal government.
In

Johnson

v.

McIntosh (1823), the

first

decision of this Trilogy, Marshall

addressed the question of whether Indians could

sell

land to private parties without the

consent of the Federal government. 302 This
case raised
are relevant to this project. First, Marshall
to

two important

at least

issues that

expanded the theory of territorial acquisition

encompass a doctrine of discovery. To be

sure,

Marshall contended

that:

However extravagant

the pretension of converting the discovery of
an inhabited
country into conquest may appear; if the principle has
been asserted in the first

instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country
has been acquired and held under
it, if the property of the great
mass of the community originates in it, it becomes
the law of the land, and cannot be questioned. So,
too, with respect to the
concomitant principle, that Indian inhabitants are to be considered
merely as

occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession
of their lands,
303
but to be deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to
others.

This

is

important, because unlike the other

modes of acquisition, namely

treaty making,

purchase, and conquest, the doctrine of discovery presupposed that the inhabitants
of the

“discovered” territory were incapable of participating in bi-lateral relations with the
discoverer.

its

To

this extent,

Marshall could justify the acquisition of Indian territory and

treatment as an occupied territory,

at least until

it

could be settled by white citizens.

Marshall further reasoned that the “States, having within their chartered limits
different portions

of the

territory

covered by Indians, ceded that

United States, on conditions expressed

in their

territory, generally, to the

deeds of cession, which demonstrate the

opinion, that they ceded the soil as well as jurisdiction, and that in doing so, they granted

a productive fund to the government of the Union.”
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This cession of land, Marshall

wrote, resulted from the inability of States to “control” and “civilize” the war prone

“savage.” Marshall argued

that:

99

of Indians inhabiting this country were
fierce savages, whose
occupation was war, and whose subsistence
was drawn chiefly from the forest.
I o leave them in
possession of their country, was to leave
the country a
wilderness; to govern them as a distinct
people was impossible, because they
were
brave and as high spirited as they were
fierce, and were ready to repel
by
arms
every attempt on their independence. 305
.

By

.

.the tribes

describing the Indian as a war prone savage,
Marshall was able to invalidate the

in question.

premise that

The implication of this

reasoning, however,

was

the

title

acknowledgement of the

the Indians inferiorly-regarded ‘character
and religion’” legitimated “the

supenor sovereignty of European governments over Indian
land

as an accepted part of

United States law.” 306
Marshall introduced the notion of the domestic dependent
nation in Cherokee

Nation

v.

Georgia (1831).

was outside

307

This notion was meant to describe an Indian territory that

the jurisdiction of the State of Georgia, but within that
of the Federal

government. Ironically,

it

is

possible to argue that this opinion sought to “protect” the

Cherokee from the abuses of the
possibility

of conceptualizing an

State of Georgia.

internal space

nation within the Union’s sovereignty and in

government, and a domestic dependency
nation.

According

to this logic Indians

imperialism, nor could they

become

However,

some sense belonging

that could not

become an

opposed

integral part of the

a State of the Union. This anomalous legal status of

at

the time of this writing.

of whether the Cherokee nation could

be construed as a foreign nation and consequently be able
as

to the Federal

could not emancipate themselves from U.S.

In this case the court addressed the question

Supreme Court

suggested the

of the United States as both a foreign

space continues to be embraced by the Federal courts

the

this case also

to initiating the suit in a

to sue the State

lower court.

308

of Georgia

Marshall invented

an anomalous spatial category by arguing that Indian nations were not foreign states

100

in

because

(i)n all

considered.”

our maps, geographical

treatises, histories,

and laws,

is

so

In addition, Marshall suggested
that because the Indian nations

being progressively reduced to self-sustaining
communities or
status

it

309

of dependence

to the

tribes,

were

they had acquired a

United States. 310 The combination of Marshall’s
cartography

and his justification of the genocidal practices of
American expansionism provided the
ideological premises for the

new

legal status. Marshall’s

argument was evident

in the

following passage:

Though

the Indians are

acknowledged

have an unquestionable, and, heretofore,
occupy, until that right shall be extinguished
by a voluntary cession to our government; yet it may well be doubted
whether
those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries
of the United
States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign
nations. They may, more
correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent
nations. They occupy a
territory to which we assert a title independent of their
will, which must effect in
point of possession when their right of possession ceases.
Meanwhile they are
unquestioned right

to

to the lands they

in

a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles
that of a
31
his guardian.

Read within

the context of the territorial policy the domestic dependent nation

State, a territory, or a possession,

nor could

it

become any of these. Taking

ward

was not

to

a

a middle of

the road position, Marshall situated the Indian outside of the State’s jurisdictional

boundaries, but within the Federal governments’ sovereign domain and jurisdiction. 312

This status was further legitimated through a paternalistic and patriarchal imagining of an
Indian ward. Ironically,

it

was

the

same “Great White Father” who had

initially created

the conditions that led to this dependent status.

The following

year, in Worcester

v.

Georgia (1832) Marshall addressed the

question of whether the State of Georgia could exercise jurisdiction on Indian Territory

by adjudicating criminal
nation.

313

penalties on white missionaries

Marshall ruled

that:

101

working within the Cherokee

.the treaties, subsisting

between the United States, and the Cherokees,
their right as a sovereign nation
to govern themselves and all
persons who have settled within their
territory, free from any right of
legislative
interference by the several states composing
the United States of America. That
act under which the prosecution was
instituted is repugnant to said treaties
and is ’
therefore, unconstitutional and void. That
the said act is, also, unconstitutional’
because it interferes with, and attempts to regulate
and control, the intercourse
.

.

acknowledge

with Cherokee nation, which belongs, exclusively,
to congress; and, because also
it is repugnant to the statute
of the United States, entitled

and intercourse with Indian

Presumably with the stroke of a

’

‘an act to regulate trade

tribes,

feather,

and

to preserve the

peace on the

frontiers.’

and without overruling his position

in

314

Cherokee

Nation, Marshall declared that the Cherokees constituted
a sovereign nation entitled to
the corresponding rights. In

my opinion,

the effect of this case

nations as foreign countries for State purposes. However,
rulings, the Court also left

was

to construe the Indian

by not overruling

the prior

open the possibility of construing the Indian nations as

domestic dependencies. Given the ascribed
possible to maintain the individual

racial inferiority

members of the

of the Indian,

“tribe’’ in a

it

was

suspended legal

further

status

with no constitutional guarantees. This was especially important because Indian
nations

were not guaranteed a
nation. In fact, they

territorial legal status,

were treated

as possessions

exception of the case of Oklahoma

contemplated extending
continues to exert

4.2

its

and therefore were not treated as part of the

it

is

of the Federal government. With the

not readily evident that the U.S. has ever

territorial status to

any Indian

territory.

The Marshall Trilogy

force at present.

Taney’s Colonies
Until the

Supreme Court’s

ruling in

Dred Scott,

the

Taney Court generally upheld

Marshall’s interpretation of the Territorial Clause, which granted Congress plenary

102

powers over the governance of the

territories.

It is

important to note, however, that the

Court made a clear distinction between
“settled” temtories and land or property
general sense. This distinction

is

important because the Court legitimated

over the temtories by arguing that the land
belonged
outside of State jurisdictions. For example,
in U.S.

v.

to the Federal

more

jurisdiction

government and was

Gratiot (1840), a case arising out of

a dispute over licensing and purchasing rights
of lead ore in the

Upper

Court ruled that the Territorial Clause gave Congress
plenary power

make

its

in a

Mississippi, the

to “dispose

and

needful rules and regulations respecting the territories
or other property,

all

belonging

to the

The term

United States.

To be

sure, the

Court established

that:

territory, as here used, is

merely descriptive of one kind of property; and
equivalent to the word lands. And Congress has the same
power over it as over
any other property belonging to the United States; and this power
is vested in
Congress without restriction; and has been considered the foundation upon
which
is

the territorial

It

government

316

rest.

followed that the Territorial Clause authorized Congress to govern the

they

became

States of the Union. This

relevant precedents,

In the case

whereupon

is

territories until

evident in the opinion’s discussion of the

the Court noted that:

M’Culloch

vs. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 422; the Chief Justice,
of the Court, speaking of this article, and the powers of
Congress growing out of it, applies it to territorial governments; and says all
admit their constitutionality. And again, in the case of the American Insurance

in giving the opinion

Company vs.

Canter

(1 Peters,

542;) in speaking of the cession of Florida under

the treaty with Spain; he says, that Florida, until she shall

become a state,
continues to be a territory of the United States government, by that clause of the
Constitution which empowers Congress to make all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory or other property of the United States. 317

In

sum, according

power

to

to the

Taney Court,

the Territorial Clause gave Congress unlimited

govern both land/property and inhabited

103

territories.

This

is

a crucial argument

because the Court’s modification of this
interpretation

in

Dred Scott

represented a radical

departure from this position.

The Court began

to

modify

and the conquest of the Mexican

its territorial

policy as a result of the war with
Mexico

One of the

territories.

earliest expressions

of the Court’s

departure from Marshall’s territorial doctrine
can be discerned from Taney’s opinion in

Fleming

v.

Page

(1849).

318

The case

resulted from a dispute over the collection
of duties

levied on a U.S. merchant attempting to bring
goods from the Port of Tampico,
into the

United States. At the time the U.S. was engaged

military had occupied the Port of Tampico.

become

a part of the United States

remained foreign

for purposes.

If

upon
it

its

in a

Mexico

war with Mexico, and

The question hinged on whether

the

the port had

conquest or whether the occupied port

the port

became

a part of the U.S. then, Fleming

argued, his goods were exempt from paying duties in accordance
with the act of Congress

of July 1846 and U.S. revenue laws. 319 Taney held
the United States, but

was not

that the Port

of Tampico belonged

a part of the nation until Congress chose to integrate

it

to

into

the Union.

Taney argued
war with Mexico, and

that the Port

of Tampico had been conquered as the

that the military

result

of the

government was merely an occupying force

during a time of war. For international purposes, Taney further contended,

this

meant

that:

.other nations were bound to regard the country, while our possession
continued, as the territory of the United States, and to respect it as such. For by
the laws and usages of nations, conquest is a valid title, while the victor maintains
.

.

the exclusive possession of the conquered territory.
nation, therefore, had a right to enter

it

all

other nations,

it

was

citizens of no other

without permission of the American

authorities, nor to hold intercourse with

regarded

The

its

inhabitants, nor to trade with them.

a part of the United States, and belonged to

as exclusively as the territory included in our established boundaries.

104

320

As

them

Yet,

Taney

added

further

noted above,

that for national purposes “it

was not

a part of this Union.”

argument was not inconsistent with Marshall’s
arguments

this

in

As

Canter

to

the extent that the Port of Tampico
remained an occupied territory during a time
of war.
In other

words,

this

ambiguous

status

made sense

if

understood within the context of

military tactics used during the continuation
of hostilities.

However,

citing the cases of Louisiana

conquered or acquired
treaty,

became

annexation.

territory,

a part of the

It

even

after

it

and Florida Taney reasoned

was ceded

to the U.S. as the result

Union only when Congress enacted

a

territories

vigore even after a territory had been acquired through
cession. In fact

Congress decided

so.

this opinion, the Constitution

More

power of Congress over
In Cross

v.

of a

law authorizing

followed that the Constitution did not extend to the

argue that according to

that a

extended to the

it

is

ex propio

possible to

territories

only

when

importantly Taney’s opinion appears to have also upheld the

the territories as authorized

by the

Territorial Clause.

Harrison (1853) the Court had another opportunity to address the

constitutional status of a territory acquired from the

war with Mexico through

a

discussion arising out of a dispute involving the collection of tariffs in California from

goods arriving from a foreign
treaty

port.

322

That Court held that prior to the ratifications of the

of peace, which authorized the cession of California

considered an occupied territory and

its

ports

were foreign

to the U.S., California

for the purposes

laws. But after the ratitication of the treaty, the Court held, “California

the United States.”

was

of revenue

became

a part of

This argument was premised on the position that acquisition was

not the equivalent to annexation. Citing the Canter and Gratiot precedents, the Court

held that the President was responsible for the governance of the territories until

105

Congress intervened. The Court held
govern the

territories.

govern the tern tones,
as a result

of a

treaty.

that the Territorial

While the Court continued
it

also held that a territory

to

Clause empowered Congress to

uphold the authority of Congress

was annexed upon

This was important because

it

its

to

cession to the U.S.

followed that once a treaty of

cession had been signed, the territory was
annexed or rather became a part of the Union.
In

some ways

the Constitution followed the flag.

The Dred Scott opinion has

traditionally

been heralded as one of the worst

opinions emitted by the Supreme Court. Ackerman
has described
stain

to

upon the Court’s checkered

history.’’

324

it

as the “single darkest

Curry emphatically argues

that in addition

being “bad policy and bad judicial politics,” Taney’s
decision was also “bad law.” 325

Cass Sunstein further argues

that the

Dred Scott opinion was bad because

it

sought to

resolve a contentious political question that should have
been resolved through

democratic deliberation. 326 Ironically,

it

is

my contention that

Chief Justice Taney’s

opinion provided the basis for one of the most progressive interpretations
of the

territorial

policy in the U.S. to the extent that his doctrine prohibited the treatment of the
territories
as colonies. Taney’s interpretation tempered the U.S. territorial policy until
the Court

formally repudiated this aspect of this opinion in 1901 with

its

rulings in the Insular

Cases.

Taney’s opinion addressed two general questions, namely whether slaves or rather
“negro of African descent” become a

member

or citizen of the “political

thus be able to sue in Federal Courts, and whether Congress had the

slavery in the territories.

Scott

was not

3~7

With regards

to the first question,

community” and

power

to prohibit

Taney declared

that

Dred

a citizen, and that Negroes of African descent “were not intended to be

106

included, under the

word

the nghts and privileges

United States

.” 328

‘citizens’ in the Constitution,

which

and can therefore claim none of

that instrument provides for

For the most

part,

and secures

to citizens

of the

Taney’s argument rested on two general

conclusions. First, Taney argued, an
interpretation of the onginal intent of
the framers

demonstrated that they did not intend
potential citizens

when

to recognize

Negroes of African “blood”

they drafted the Constitution

329
.

as

Second, slaves were considered

property, and therefore any attempt to deprive
a slave-owner of his property

would be an

egregious violation of the slave-owner’s rights
as guaranteed by the Constitution. The
first

part of this

argument

is

intriguing to the extent that

it

is

not readily evident that the

framers envisioned a nation populated by citizens
of Spanish, French/Creole, and

Mexican heritage
territorial

To

either.

expansion.

It

this extent,

would follow

Anglo-Saxon inhabitants from the

Taney’s argument ignored the history of U.S.

that this

argument would also exclude most non-

possibility of becoming

members of Taney’s

political

community.
In

an unprecedented exercise of judicial review, Taney also declared

Congress did not have the power
Missouri Compromise was void

to prohibit slavery in the territories,

330
.

and

that

that the

This declaration partly rested on a narrow

interpretation of the constitutional status of the territories, and an expansive reading of

the Bill of Rights. In turn, Taney’s arguments departed from Marshall’s territorial policy

by

rejecting the doctrine of congressional plenary powers. Taney’s argument addressed

the constitutional tension arising out of two incompatible parts of the Constitution, the

Territorial

Clause and the

to the Bill

of Rights, and by interpreting the Territorial Clause as a

Bill

of Rights.

It is

interesting to note, that in giving

107

historical

primacy

remnant of

the founding, Taney’s opinion
reaffirmed a national conception of
the Union. In other

words, by limiting the powers of Congress
over the
nghts of citizens Taney attempted
the nation

by re-thinking

Territorial

Clause meant that the

to re-conceptualized the relationship

to treat U.S. citizens like colonists

I

have already suggested the

inferior for constitutional purposes.

constitutional/territorial status

his

of citizenship

made

it

would undermine

the

territories are inherently

The very nature of the

impossible to escape a colonial status.

argument by defining the constitutional relationship between
the

“original territories’’ and the Territorial Clause. Accordingly,
the Territorial Clause

intended to “transfer to the

new Government power

to

apply

it

to the objects for

had been destined by mutual agreement among the States before
dissolved .”

331

their league

was

which

it

was

These “objects,” Taney argued, were land and other forms of property, and

not territories inhabited by U.S. citizens.
the

to

could be treated as mere colonies of the

territories

founding principles. However, as

Taney began

of the personal

the status of the territories. For Taney,
the recognition of the

American empire, and surely

anomalous and

territories in favor

power of Congress over

Federal government

at the

It

followed that the Territorial Clause limited

the territories to the “uninhabited” land that belonged to the

time of the founding of the Union. However, those

territories

acquired after the adoption of the Constitution were to be governed by a form of popular
sovereignty. This interpretation not only departed with the Court’s interpretation in

Gratiot but also with the Northwest Ordinance and virtually every organic act up to date,
,

as well as with

When

all

previous rulings on the matter.

confronted with the Canter precedent, the Chief justice sought to reconcile

his position with Marshall’s

by claiming a more accurate reading of this precedent. To be

108

sure,

Taney contended

that there

given and the one referred

and separating

it

and

it

from the context,

Taney suggested
initial

to;

was “not
is

the slightest conflict

between the opinion now

only by taking a single sentence out
of the

latter

even an appearance of conflict can be
shown .” 332

that

that Marshall’s interpretation

of the Territorial Clause was limited

to the

organization or establishment of the Florida territory,
after which time the U.S.

citizens residing in the

until the territory

temtones would have complete sovereignty over the

was admitted

as a State.

Of course, Taney neglected

further criteria for establishing or determining

how and when

local affairs

to provide

a territory

would be

any
eligible

for statehood.

Taney argued

In addition,

open

to future interpretation.

that Marshall

He found

had

left

the question of local governance

evidence of this line of reasoning in a remark

made by Marshall which recognized Congress’ power to govern

the territories, but

provided for the possibility of a source of power other than the Territorial
Clause, or
Marshall’s words, “Whichever

possession of it

only

fails to

is

may be

unquestioned .”

333

the source

Again, as

acknowledge prior precedents,

I

whence

the

power

is

in

derived, the

suggested above, this interpretation not

like the

Sere and Loughborough opinions, but

also fails to recognize Marshall’s political argument.

By this I mean

to suggest that

Marshall could have been arguing for both a political power and a constitutional power

govern the

to

territories.

Justice Story, however, contended that while the Northwest Ordinance had in fact

been enacted

for the “original” western territories,

Territorial Clause.

It

To be

had also provided the basis

for the

sure, Justice Story noted that:

was doubtless with

constitution,

it

reference principally to this territory, that the article of the

now under consideration was

109

adopted.

.

..

Under

this provision

no

less than eleven states have, in
the space of little more than forty
years, been
admitted into the Union upon an equality
34
with

the original states /

It

followed that in order to understand the
“original intent” of the Territorial
Clause, the

judge need only

to

look

at the history

of the Northwest Ordinance and

its

subsequent

application to the acquisition of territories
after the enactment of the Constitution

Taney

argument, while consistent with Jefferson’s

s

Territorial

of the

Clause was inconsistent with both the practice and
construction of the clause.

Notwithstanding these inconsistencies,

Taney

initial interpretation

335
.

is

it

however possible

to argue that

argument was premised on a more “democratic” interpretation
of the

s

constitutional status of the territories to the extent
that

U.S. citizens residing in these.
interpretation of the

To be

sure,

enabled more local control to the

Taney contended

powers of Congress over the

despotic and unlimited

it

territories

that the alternative

conferred the Government “a

power over persons and property .” 336

Surely,

Taney wrote:

.it may be safely assumed that citizens of
the United States who migrate to a
Territory belonging to the people of the United States, cannot be ruled
as mere
colonists, dependent upon the will of the General Government, and to
be
.

.

governed by any laws it may think proper to impose. The principle upon which
our Governments rest, and upon which alone they continue to exist, is the Union

of States, sovereign and independent within their own limits in their internal and
domestic concerns, and bound together as one people by a General Government,
possessing certain enumerated and restricted powers, delegated to

of the several

it

by

the people

and exercising supreme authority within the scope of the
powers granted to it, throughout the dominion of the United States. A power,
therefore, in the General Government to obtain and hold colonies and dependent
territories,

States,

over which they might legislate without

inconsistent with

its

own

existence in

its

would be
present form. Whatever it acquires,
restriction,

acquires for the benefit of the people of the several States

who

created

it.

it

It is

and charged with the duty of promoting the interests
of the whole people of the Union in the exercise of the powers specifically
their trustee acting for them,

granted

It

337
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followed that the Bill of Rights not only tempered the power of the Federal government

in the territories, but also

superceded the Territorial Clause. Thus,

110

to

recognize Dred

Scott’s freedom as a result of his
temporary stay in a “free territory”

depriving Sandford of his right to property.

More

importantly,

Congress which deprives a citizen of the
United States of his

would

result in

Taney argued, “an

liberty or property,

act

of

merely

because he came himself or brought his
property into a particular Territory of the
United
States,

and

with the

who had committed no

name of due

offence against the laws, could hardly be
dignified

process of law .” 338 His interpretation, Taney
concluded, would

place the “citizens of a Temtory, so far as
these rights are concerned, on the same footing

with citizens of the States, and guards them
as firmly and plainly against any inroads

which the General Government might attempt, under the
plea of implied or
powers.

meant

incidental

Understood within the context of the popular sovereignty
doctrine,

that the territories

would operate

like States at a local level until they

admitted into the Union on an equal footing. However, as
noted, even the doctrine of popular sovereignty

were

Abraham Lincoln

was misleading because

this

clearly

the inhabitants of

the territories did not choose or consent to the initial
appointment of their Governors,

Secretaries and Judges

Constitution

Taney’s argument was also misleading because the

was supreme over any claims

This reasoning
part

340
.

is

further premised

of the United States and

because of their residence
territories

became

to popular sovereignty.

upon the belief that the

territories

became

a

that the Constitution could not treat U.S. citizens differently

in the territories

341
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According

to

Taney’s reasoning, the

a part of the nation after being acquired and once Congress enabled the

creation of governing institutions that were consistent with the Constitution. Thus,

Congress exercised power over the

territories at

two

stages,

namely during

and during the Statehood admission process. As Taney wrote:

111

their inception

The power

to expand the territory of the
United States by the admission of new
plainly given; and in the construction
of this power by all the
departments of the Government, it has been
held to authorize the acquisition
of
territory, not fit for admission
at the time, but to be admitted
as soon as

Mates

is

population and situation would entitle it to
admission.
State, and not to be held as a colony
and governed

its

acquired to become a
by Congress with absolute
It is

and as the propriety of admitting a new State
is committed to sound
discretion of Congress, the power to
acquire territory for that purpose, to be
held
by the United States until it is in a suitable
condition to become a State upon an
equal footing with other States, must rest
upon the same discretion. 342
authority;

During the period between the
State, the territory

territory’s acquisition

would be governed by

and

its

subsequent admission as a

the U.S. citizens settling in the territories
under

the doctrine of popular sovereignty.

In closing,

citizen

and the

it

settler to

Taney

citations that

should be noted that

s

Taney’s

I

have emphasized the centrality of the U.S.

territorial policy.

It

should be clear from the previous

conception of the territory was contingent on the racial composition

of the inhabitants of the

territories.

To be

sure,

it

is

not that

Taney would extend

Constitution to territories populated by non-U.S. citizens, like Puerto
Rico.
extent,

Taney

acquired

s anti-colonial

territories.

argument provide

territories in a colonial condition until its “population

mean

this

remarks were contingent on the racial character of the

In fact, Taney’s

admitted. This could

To

the

that

for the possibility

of holding

and situation” enables them

to

be

even Taney allowed for the acquisition of colonies so

long as non-U.S. citizens or non- White inhabitants populated them.
Leitensdorfer et

Taney Court.
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al. v.

Webb (1857) was

the last relevant opinion issued

In this case the Court addressed the relationship

by

the

between the

Constitution and the rights of non-citizens residing in the acquired territory of New

Mexico. Writing for the Court, Justice Daniel noted

112

that:

By this

substitution of a new supremacy,
although the former political relations
of
e inhabitants were dissolved, their
pnvate relations, their rights vested

under the
from contract or usage
remained in full force and unchanged, except
so far as they were in their nature
and character found to be in conflict with
the Constitution and the laws of the
United States, or with any regulations which
the conquering and occupying
5
authonty should ordain 344

Government of their former

allegiance, or those arising

.

Justice Daniel argued that the military

government

that

would administer

was given

mean

became

that its inhabitants

a part of the nation.

of a conquered

territories

to create a provisional

the territory until Congress intervened
either

legislation or through the territorial government. 345

not

power

the

It

direct

followed that the annexation did

were automatically naturalized, even

To be

by

after the territory

sure, this ruling further suggested that the
inhabitants

could remain in a state of subjection until Congress
admitted

the territory as a State of the Union. 346

The Gilded Age of the Supreme Court

4.3

The Court

s territorial

policy between 1864 and 1901 was generally informed by

an interpretation of both the Marshall and Taney doctrines. This meant that while
the

Court generally recognized the plenary powers of Congress over the governance of the
347

territories,

However,

as

I

also limited this

when

ruling.

power

in favor

of the personal rights of the

will suggest below, the Court’s policy

As noted above,

basis.

1901

it

was adopted on

citizens.

a case-by-case

the Court’s interpretation does not depart from precedent until

the justices repudiated the territorial principles established in the

The Court’s

interpretation of the Territorial Clause, however, needs to be

understood against the backdrop of the Civil

Morton Keller

Dred Scott

notes,

“American public

life

War and

the Reconstruction.

To be

sure, as

during the Civil War-Reconstruction years

113

was dominated by clashes over

constitutional issues of the

most basic

sort:

citizenship; federalism, State’s nghts,
and the Union; the

power of the

Congress, and the courts; and the bounds of
military and

civil authority.”

will discuss the Court’s territorial
policies under the

race and

President,
348

This section

Chase (1864-1873), and Waite’s

(1874-1888) administrations, and part of the Fuller
regime (1889-1901).

William M. Wiecek suggests

that the

Chief Justice “was one of the more turbulent

Wiecek argues

that the

Chase Court

“is

decade of Salmon
in the history

memorable

for

its

P.

Chase’s tenure as

of the Supreme Court.” 349

decisions in four areas:

Reconstruction, Federal power (in matters not directly
related to Reconstruction), State
regulatory and tax power, and the impact of the Fourteenth

came

to questions arising out

the principles established

of disputes

by Marshal

Amendment.” 350 When

in the territories, the

in the

Canter

ruling.

351

it

Court generally relied on

However, the Chase

Court’s clearest statement on the constitutional status of the territories
can best be

discerned from

its

ruling opinion in Clinton

v.

Englebrecht (1871).

352

Writing for the

Court, Chief Justice Chase noted that the “theory upon which the various
governments
for portions

of leaving

of the

territory

of the United States have been organized, has ever been

to the inhabitants all the

powers of self-government consistent with the

supremacy and supervision of National
established

by Congress.”

353

authority,

In other words,

governments held a limited sovereignty over
congressional policies and principles.

Congress possessed a plenary power
with

its

policies.

that

More

to

and with certain fundamental principles

Chase argued

that the territorial

their affairs so long as

it

was

consistent with

importantly, the Chase Court held that

annul any

354
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territorial

law that was inconsistent

Charles

W. McCurdy

‘resisted limitations

However, McCurdy

on

federal

much

power derived from

state sovereignty premises.” 355

also notes that the Court’s
constitutional nationalism did have

limits, to the extent that

as

suggests that the Waite Court
(1874-1888) generally

“Waite and

his colleagues resisted the idea

some

of centralization with

ardor as the concept of state sovereignty.” 356
The Court’s attempt to navigate

between these two sources of power resulted

in the reaffirmation

of a form of popular or

local sovereignty that could offset
the democratic impulses enabled

Amendments.

It

by

the Reconstruction

follows that the Waite Court’s territorial policy
can be interpreted as an

expression of this ideology. In fact the Court
reaffirmed a notion of Congressional

plenary power that was presumably limited by a
concern for the

of the citizens residing

in the territories.

Justice

remarked

Bank

v.

and personal rights

This policy was enabled by an interpretation of

precedent that sought to affirm both the Canter and
In National

civil

Dred Scott

County of Yankton (1879), writing

principles.

for the majority, the

Chief

that:

All territory within the jurisdiction of the United States not included
in any State
must necessarily be governed by or under the authority of Congress. The
Territories are but political subdivisions of the outlying dominion of
the United
States.
it

may

...

Congress

may not

only abrogate laws of the

itself legislate directly for the local legislatures.

territorial legislatures, but
It

may make

the territorial legislature valid, and a valid act void. In other words,

complete legislative authority over the people of the Territories and
departments of the territorial governments. 3 7

a void act of
it

has

all

full

and

the

'

This argument was reiterated in

Murphy

v.

Ramsey (1884) where

the Court noted that:

The people of the United States, as sovereign owners of the National Territories,
have supreme power over them and their inhabitants. In the exercise of this
sovereign dominion, they are represented by the government of the United States,

whom all powers of government over that subject have been delegated, subject
only to such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution, or are necessarily
implied in its terms, or in the purposes and objects of the power itself; for it may
to
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well be admitted in this respect to
this, as to every
8
that it is not absolute and
unlimited.'"

members,

Citing the Canter and
civil rights

by

Dred Scott

power of society over

its

rulings, the Court further noted
that the “personal

of the inhabitants of the Territories are
secured

the principles of constitutional liberty

which

them, as to other citizens,

to

restrain all the agencies

State and National; their political rights
are franchises

which they hold

the legislative discretion of the Congress.” 359
However, as

I

and

suggested

of government.

as privileges in

earlier, the

Dred

Scott interpretation of the relationship between
the Bill of Rights and the powers of

Congress

in the territories departed

Taney Court was willing

to declare

from the Canter precedent
an act of Congress

unconstitutional in the face of a “due process” claim

of his property.
possess

In other words, according to

to the extent that the

(e.g. the

made by

Missouri Compromise)

a slave

owner over

the loss

Taney’s interpretation, Congress did not

complete legislative authority” or “supreme power over the inhabitants”
of the

territories.

So how could Chief Justice Waite make such claims

in the latter rulings?

By

relying on a restrictive or narrow interpretation of the Bill of Rights
that did not conflict

with an act of Congress.
This argument can be discerned from the Court’s opinion in cases arising out of
disputes regarding the breath of the Reconstruction

Cruikshank{ 1875), writing

for the majority,

Amendments. For example,

Chief Justice Waite argued

in U.S.

v.

that:

The people of the United

States resident within any State are subject to two
governments: one State and the other National; but there need be no conflict

between the two. The powers which one possesses, the other does not. They are
established for different purposes, and have separate jurisdictions. Together they
make one whole, and furnish the people of the United States with a complete
government, ample for the protection of all their rights at home and abroad. ...

The

citizen cannot complain, because he has voluntarily submitted himself to such

a form of government.

360
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Waite further argued
citizenship.”

361

that “the right

Under

this

of suffrage

is

not a necessary attribute of national

premise, the cttizen could participate

protected from “state action”

at

at

a local level and be

a national level. The Court not only
“severed the link

between citizenship and suffrage,” but also
“interpreted the Fifteenth Amendment

as

prohibiting only the most flagrant and
intentional forms of discrimination.” 362
Thus, if
the Bill of Rights

“restrained”

by

was

sufficiently restricted the Court could argue
that

the Constitution.

Owen M.

Fiss contends that the “hallmarks” of the
Fuller Court (1888-1910) were

the “idea of limited

government and judicial supremacy.” 363 This meant

Court exercised judicial supremacy,

of the

Bill

Congress was

it

that while the

generally sought to limit the scope and extension

of Rights. The Fuller Court’s

territorial policy,

however, needs

understood in the context of two ideological moments. The

first

be

to

ideological

moment, and

the subject of the following discussion, spanned from 1888
until the Court’s ruling in the

Insular Cases in 1901

.

This

moment was

characterized

by

a concern with the

simultaneous affirmation of the Congress’ plenary powers over the
extension of the Bill of Rights to the U.S. citizens settling in the
like the

Waite Court, the Fuller Court’s interpretation of the

substantially limited in scope.

The second

ideological

Bill

territories

territories.

and the

Of course,

of Rights was

moment began

with the Court’s

rulings in the Insular Cases. These cases represented both a continuity with the past,

namely by reaffirming

the judicial

supremacy and plenary powers of the Federal

government, and a rupture with the tradition of extending the Constitution
territories.

Under

the tenets of the latter cases, Congress retained the

which constitutional

rights

would be extended

117

to the territories.

to the

power

In light

to decide

of the Fuller

Court’s interpretation of the Temtonal
Clause prior to the Insular Cases,

argue that the Court departed from precedent
significant

will

number of non- Anglo-Saxon

when

citizens

it

is

possible to

faced with the prospect of acquiring
a

by following precedent. However,

this

be the subject of the next chapter.

The cases dealing with

territorial

are pertinent to this project. During the

questions generally addressed three issues that
first

ideological

moment,

the Court reaffirmed

both the congressional plenary powers doctrine, as
well as Dred Scott

For example, writing for the Court

in

Mormon Church

Bradley remarked that the “power of congress over the

v.

territorial doctrine.

United States (1890), Justice

territories

of the United States

general and plenary, arising from and incidental to the
right to acquire territory

from the power given by the constitution

to

make

all

itself,

is

and

needful rules and regulations

364
respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States.”

It

should be

noted that Justice Bradley recognized both the political and constitutional
sources of

Congress’ power to govern the
that the status

of the

territories

territories.

In

some ways,

this interpretation

was determinative of its place within

suggested

the national

hierarchy. According to Justice Bradley, the “people of the United States” were

sovereign owners of the national territories,” and had “supreme power over them and
their inhabitants.”

365

This interpretation also suggested that the territories were

conceptualized more as land or property to be settled rather than small political

communities

that

were part of the nation.

This conception of the nation also heralded a

shift

away from

the

Dred

Scott

doctrine to the extent that the Bill of Rights, understood as a tempering force on

Congressional

acts,

no longer held a dispositive power over

118

acts

of Congress. This was

evident in Justice Bradley’s remarks
on the relationship of personal rights
to acts of

Congress where he stated

would be subject

that “Doubtless Congress, in
legislating for the territories,

to those

fundamental limitations

formulated in the constitution and

its

in favor

of personal rights which are

amendments; but these limitations would

exist

rather

by inference and

all its

powers, than by any express and direct application
of its provisions.” 366 In other

words, under

temper any

this

act

territories.

the general spirit of the constitution
from

theory the “general

of Congress

in favor

spirit

which Congress derives

of the Constitution” would presumably

of the personal rights of the inhabitants of the

The problem, of course, remained

that if Congress neglected to

develop an

organic act with basic civil rights and protections for the
inhabitants, then according to
this

reasoning the inhabitants of the territories had no “express”
legal recourse. Taney’s

ruling at least affirmed the

In

Boyd v.

supremacy of the

Bill

of Rights

in the territories.

State of Nebraska (1892), the Court reaffirmed the Canter precedent

through a discussion of the relationship between congressional power, citizenship,
and
the conception of territories as States in the making. 368 Writing for the
majority, Chief
Justice Fuller

remarked

that:

Congress having the power

to deal with the people of the territories in view of the
future states to be formed from them, there can be no doubt that in the admission
of a state a collective naturalization may be effected in accordance with the

intention of Congress and the people applying for admission.

equal footing with the original States, in

of constitutional

all

...

Admission on an

respects whatever, involves equality

and power, which cannot there afterwards be controlled,
and it also involves the adoption as citizens of the United States of those whom
congress makes members of the political community, and who are recognized as
such in the formation of the new State with the consent of Congress. 369
right

Yet, while statehood and eventual constitutional equality

territories, the inhabitants

were denied

was guaranteed

to the

political participation at a national level.

119

To be

sure, citing the Court’s position
in Cruikshank, the
political participation

they were

still

may have been

entitled to the

territorial status

same

was justified on

achieved through statehood

Court did not provide any

370
.

denied

to the

its

the very least until

sufficiently

it

territories,

other U.S. citizens. The

promise of eventual equality, which could
only be

The problem with

criteria for the

was convinced

Americanized or

that while

U.S. citizens residing in the

civil rights protections as

this reasoning,

admission of a new

Congress could potentially acquire and retain
at

Chief Justice argued

however,

State.

It

that the territory

120

was

settled

the

followed that

territories in a tutelary stage

that the inhabitants

is that

ad

infinitum or

of the territory were

by

sufficient U.S. citizens

371
.

CHAPTER
RACE, IMPERIALISM,

5

AND THE IVORY TOWERS

Constitutional historians, commentators
and scholars generally agree that legal

scholars debating the future constitutional
status of the Spanish colonies acquired
as a
result

of the

War of 1898

also evident that the

provided the ideological basis for the Insular
Cases

members of the Foraker Committee, and U.S. lawmakers

closely followed the debates occurring in
the legal

The

372

legal scholars contributing to these debates

It is

,

in general,

academy between 1898 and

1899.

were generally divided between the

imperialist and imperialist camps. In turn, legal
scholars adopted a

anti-

wide range of

constitutional interpretations to justify their political
positions. For example, while

some

anti-imperialists argued for the immediate or gradual
emancipation of the colonies, other
anti-imperialists countered that tradition required that the
U.S.
territories

and

The

states in the

annex the islands as

making.

constitutional debates centered

on the power of Congress

to

govern the

colonies acquired from Spain and their status within the nation. These debates
can be

divided into three interpretations of the constitutional authority of Congress to
govern

Puerto Rico. The imperialist

camp

generally subscribed to the theory that the

Constitution authorized Congress to govern the Spanish colonies without any limitations.

A second interpretation suggested that the colonies became territories upon acquisition,
and

that congressional

power

to

govern the

territories

was

limited

by

established in the governance of the previously acquired territories.

the precedent

It is

interesting to

note that anti-imperialists defended this position despite the consequences of the

121

argument, which would lead to the
annexation and subsequent admission
of a Puerto

Rican

The

State.

third view,

and

to a certain extent the prevailing
interpretation,

suggested that Congress possessed more
legislative powers to govern the
acquired
colonies than

Constitution

it

possessed previously, but that

373

this

power was

limited

by

the

This position was articulated as an attempt
to reconcile both camps by

.

recognizing the power of Congress to govern
the territories while simultaneously
limiting
the constitutional entitlements of the
inhabitants of the acquired possessions.
that Puerto

Rico would acquire a temporary

status located

It

somewhere between

which required annexation, statehood and the extension
of the

territorial status,

Rights, and a colony, which

significant limitations

left

on the

followed

the

Bill

of

the possibility for eventual emancipation and
placed no

ability

of Congress to determine an alternative future

for

Puerto Rico.

The unifying thread between both
their patriarchal

and

racist

anti-imperialists,

and imperialists alike was

opinions of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. Both camps

adopted a view of American exceptionalism and considered the non- Anglo-Saxon
“races”
to

be inferior and

on

internal racial

island.

in

need of civilization.

paradigms

In addition, legal

to represent the racial character

For example, some scholars sought

to represent the future status

commentators generally

to

relied

and composition of the

use an interpretation of the Reconstruction

of the Puerto Ricans. In contrast, some anti-imperialists

generally held the position that the acquisition of Puerto Rico would threaten democracy
at

home because

it

would open the gates

to the

force, as well as to future undesirable citizens.

rejected Taney’s position

on the

immigration of a cheap and savage labor
In contrast, while imperialists generally

territorial doctrine,
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they readily embraced his arguments

on the infenority of the Puerto Rican
“race.” This generally meant

were too uncivilized and unfamiliar with
Anglo-Saxon

that Puerto

political institutions,

Ricans

and should

therefore be kept in a colonial condition.
In order to situate these

academic debates

in the relevant historical context,
this

chapter will begin with a discussion of the
Spanish- American

War of 1 898. These

remarks will be followed by some reflections
on the Paris Treaty of Peace of 1898. The
treaty is especially important because

it

was

the

first

legal text to

annex Puerto Rico and

provide the juridical basis for a definition of the
parameters of the constitutional status of
the island and

its

inhabitants within the nation.

It

also provided the foundations for the

Foraker Act. The third part of this chapter will concentrate
on a discussion of some
articles that are representative

of four ideological interpretations of the

as articulated within the anti-imperialist and the
imperialist positions.

territorial doctrine

The goal

is

to

provide the reader with an introduction to these debates while
simultaneously describing
the relevant constitutional arguments.

that race

was

However,

in

keeping with

a determinative factor in the invention of a

new

my main thesis, namely

“territorial” status for

Puerto Rico, this discussion will focus on the ways in which racial narratives informed
these constitutional interpretations.

5.1

The Splendid
Citing the

Little

374

By

1

work of Arturo Morales

United States established
in 181 5.

War of 898

1829

this

objective of the Consul

its first

“commercial agent”

agent had

was

to

Carrion, Gervasio Luis Garcia notes that the

become

in

Cuba

in

1781 and in Puerto Rico

the U.S. Consul in Puerto Rico.

promote economic
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relations

37

''

The

between Puerto Rico and the

U.S. while simultaneously searching
for

new

The Consulates

markets.

located on the major ports of the island,
such as San Juan, Ponce,

Mayaguez. 376 During
agrarian

the nineteenth century, the Puerto
Rican

commerce and

in turn

were

Guayama, and

economy was based on

the specific production of coffee, sugar,
and tobacco. 377 Blanca

G. Silvestnm and Maria Dolores Luque de
Sanchez argue that the island’s dependence on
these products resulted in the development
of a fragile insular

contingent on both environmental factors

market.

that

was

weather), and on the international

378

The
1898,

(e.g.

economy

relationship

was nurtured by

between the U.S. and Puerto Rico, a Spanish colony
prior

a mutual interest in the pursuit

to

of new markets for surplus

products. However, during the 1880’s, Spain’s concern
with the protection of its internal

production of sugar led the monarchy to erect a series of protective
forced Puerto Rico to rely on

U.S.

at the

commerce with

the U.S. and

its

tariffs that effectively

markets.

379

Because the

time had not developed an effective sugar industry, instead relying on
beets as

the source of sugar, this economic relationship had the potential for
significant profits for

various bourgeois producers both on the island and in the U.S. Walter LaFeber
notes that

both James G. Blaine (1881 and 1889), serving as Secretary of State under James A.
Garfield, and Frederick T. Frelinghuysen (1881-1889),

who

served under President

Chester A. Arthur, pursued special bilateral trade agreements with Puerto Rico. 380 Puerto
Rico, like other Latin American countries and Spanish colonies, was in large part an

appealing market due to

its

geographical proximity to the U.S. LaFeber, documenting

Frelinghuysen’s understanding of the strategic advantages of this economic strategy,
notes that:
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The Secretary of State enlarged upon

Amencan

his

economic

interpretation of

foreign policy in a notable letter
to the Senate Foreign
Relations
Committee. He explained that the signing
of the reciprocity pacts negotiated
with
Spain for Cuba and Puerto Rico brings
“the islands into close commercial
connectton with the United States [and]
confers upon us and upon them all
the
benefits which would result from
annexation were that possible.” This
would be
one of a series of international engagements.”
(including other reciprocity
treaties and the Frelmghuysen-Zavala
treaty providing for Amencan
control of an
Isthmian canal) which [by] bnnging
the most distant parts of our country
into
closer relations, opens the markets of
the west coast of South America
to our trade
and gives us at our doors a customer able to
absorb a large portion of those
articles which we produce in return
for products which we cannot
profitably
raise.
This reply is especially notable since the
Senate committee had asked
relinghuysen for the political, not economic,
reasons for the treaties.” 381
Silvestrini

and Luque de Sanchez further note

that

treaty of commercial bilateralism that
included

Domingo, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala,
However, because the
in the colonies,

tariffs

by 1891

Spam and

Brazil,

which

its

colonies, El Salvador, Santo

and the British Colonies. 382

benefited U.S. producers, which in turn harmed
local profits

Spain eventually repudiated the treaty

the Dingley Act,

the United States had signed a

further raised tariffs

in 1894.

on goods imported

In 1897 the U.S. passed

into the U.S.

383
effectively destabilized the sugar cane exports from Puerto
Rico.

wars” the U.S. sought

to consolidate

and other goods. More importantly,

its

it

grasp on Hawaii and

is

its

and

Amidst these “trade

local production of sugar

possible to argue that these commercial tensions

further set the basis of the U.S. involvement in the Spanish-CubanAmerican

War of

1898.

It is

not readily evident whether the U.S. had a distinct conception of a Puerto

Rican race, or whether Puerto Ricans were simply conceptualized as non- Anglo-Saxon
Spaniards/Creoles akin to the inhabitants of Louisiana, Florida, and the Mexican
territories

during the nineteenth century.

United States Consular representatives

in

A cursory glance at the Despatches

from the

Puerto Rico between 1821 and 1899, suggests
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that at least

pnor

to the Civil

owners.

To be

sure, these

War, these agents were predominately
Southern slaveDespatches contain various examples of
Consular Agents’

ledgers documenting the importation
of U.S. slaves into the island. 385

example worth noting dates

to

slave as a bilingual Creole from St. Croix,

who was

is

386

The

.

who

is

article

described the runaway

generally averted his eyes in the presence

also fluent in English

ngorous discussion of these documents
it

interesting

1834 when the Consul of San Juan advertised
the escape

of one of his “black” slaves from his hacienda

of white people and

An

and Spanish. 387 While a more

not within the scope of this project,

think that

I

possible to suggest that U.S. policy makers envisioned
Puerto Rico as an extension of

the South, populated

Eric

by

Hobsbawm

inferior semi-civilized Creoles.

suggests that with the Spanish- American

States entered “the era of a

Hobsbawm, while

the

new

economic supremacy of the

annexation, and administration had been
quarter of the nineteenth century.”

38

evident that the conquest of Hawaii

To be

the United

type of empire, the colonial.” 388 According to

beyond serious challenge “no systematic attempt

imperialism.

War of 1898

is

I

am

the only

sure, prior to the

to translate

made between

While

it

into formal conquest,

the end of the eighteenth and last

sympathetic to

example

War of

had long been

capitalist countries

that

this

would

argument,

fit

it is

this description

of

1898, the U.S. engaged in the conquest

and administration of Indian Territories and domestic dependent nations, but refused

to

annex any Indian space. The case of Oklahoma stands as a notable example. Likewise,
the

War of

1898 resulted

in the acquisition

Rico was conquered and administered,
of Hawaii was annexed during the

it

of Puerto Rico. However, whereas Puerto

has yet to be annexed. Ironically, the Republic

War of 1898,

126

five years after

it

was conquered.

The War of 1898 can
overseas markets.

also be understood as a continuation
of a search for

new

391

Notwithstanding the Dingley Tariff wars,
the war of 1898 can also

be understood as an attempt to consolidate
392
the new markets for U.S. surplus
products.
This

is

especially important because the
commercial policies that resulted from the

marked a

radical departure

from

all

previous precedents.

Court had recognized in Loughborough that
the

territories

nation for revenue purposes. In the Cross
ruling, the
territory

was

acquired,

Hawaii Republic,

it

was annexed

this territory

As noted

before, the Marshall

were considered

it

could

exported from the island be charged a

still

15%

as a

require that goods that

tariff.

To

that

Congress formally annexed

until

Congress passed the Foraker Act, recognizing Puerto Rico

possession of the United States,

of the

this extent,

once a

In the case of the

1898. In the case of Puerto Rico, the Dingley tariff
was modified in such a
after

part

Taney Court established

for international tariff purposes.

remained foreign

war

it

in

way that even

dependent

were imported

to or

Puerto Rico retained a

foreign status for domestic commercial purposes, and acquired
a domestic status for
international tariff purposes.

The War of 1 898

also represented both a continuation of, and a departure from the

Indian Territory wars. This war sought to conquer and acquire the Spanish
colonies

without any clear intent to integrate them into the United States on an equal footing. This

was an

imperialist war.

However, whereas Indians were generally massacred and

ultimately contained in special territorial arrangements or reservations, the U.S. did not

dismiss the future possibility of annexing Puerto Rico. While the island was placed
extra-constitutional legal limbo, similar to that created

contemplated the possibility of granting Puerto Rico

127

by the Marshall Trilogy,

full

Statehood.

To

in

an

the U.S.

this extent, the

case of Puerto Rico differed from that
of the indigenous people of what

we

presently call

the United States.

The War of 1898 should

also be understood as an expression
of a

dominant

ideology of Manifest Destiny. Horsman
captures the significance of this ideology

in the

following passage:

Many Americans

continued to reject a formal imperial system as
well as the
admission of inferior peoples into the union, but
practically all were
able to

support American world trade and the economic
penetration of distant lands. The
transformation of other areas by American enterprise
was generally defended as a
moral as well as commercial good; it was the means
by which the superior AngloSaxon race could bring Christian civilization and progress
to the world as well as
infinite prosperity to the United States. Without
taking on the dangerous burdens
of a formal empire, the United States could obtain the
raw materials its ever-

expanding economy needed. American world economic
growth, the triumph of
Western Christian civilization, and a stable world order could
be achieved by the
American economic penetration of underdeveloped areas. And as
Anglo-Saxons
sought out the most distant comers of the globe, they could
ultimately replace a
variety of inferior races. 393
Manifest Destiny represented a conflation of ideologies that were
premised on the belief
that the U.S.

impart

its

was

a superior Christian civilization of Anglo-Saxon heritage with a duty
to

wisdom throughout

imperialism.

the world through a “benign” or “progressive” form of

The Anglo-Saxon

race,

Horsman

also notes, constituted itself as a

conflation of race, language, culture, and nationality.

34

To be

sure, the

new

imperial

race of Anglo-Saxon heritage had a white phenotype, spoke English, embraced the

dominant mores of an “American”
evidenced

in the

of the conquered

culture,

and possessed a

patriotic spirit.

to

This also

yellow press’ representations of the Spanish enemy and the inhabitants
islands.

396

Amy Kaplan contends that the “Spanish- American War of 1898
understood

395

have continued the Civil War

in

128

can be

an imperial national discourse of the

United States

at the turn

of the century ” 3,>7 This argument
suggests that the war

reproduced U.S. color-line narratives

Leuchtenburg further suggests

that

were reminiscent of the Civil War. William

that:

of the Progressives toward the American
negro made them
receptive to American imperialism. They
readily accepted the notion
.

.

E.

.the attitude

brown brother was

little

more

that the

ward of the United States, not fit for self-government,
because they regarded the southern Negro as
a ward when they did not think of'
him as a corrupt politician attempting to sell his
a

Republican conventions.

While

it

is

also clear that a

the Civil War, and this

racialist ideologies,

Indian Wars.

By

I

this

number of officers

war occurred

am more
I

vote to the highest bidder

8

mean

at

that fought in the

at

war had been veterans of

the heels of the Reconstruction and the reigning

inclined to argue that

to suggest that the

it

was a modified extension of the

War of 1898 can be

understood as the

conquest of a new, “less civilized” frontier beyond the shores
of the continental U.S. In
other words, the conquest of Puerto Rico can be understood
as an attempt to expand U.S.
territorial

boundaries without assuming the responsibility of annexing

However, unlike the American
institutions,

still

Indian, Puerto Ricans

which although perceived

recognized as civilized.

to

be inferior

populations.

were governed by Continental

to

Anglo-Saxon

institutions,

legal

were

399

Theodore Roosevelt’s writings provide us with one of the
idea that the

new

War of 1898 was

conceived as a frontier war. In

clearest

fact,

examples of the

when deciding

organize the infamous Rough Riders Roosevelt specifically went to the western
,

territories to recruit veterans

of the Indian wars

experienced and capable soldiers.

4(10

In his

whom

he thought to be the most

memoir describing

membership of his gang of mercenaries, he wrote

129

that they

the character and

“came from

the Four

to

Territories

which yet remained within the boundartes
of the United

the lands that have been most
recently

won over to

white civilization, and

conditions of life are nearest those that
obtained on the frontier
frontier."

It is

also important to note that he did
not conceive the

Henry Cabot Lodge, Roosevelt

posse in the following words:
but

when

in

there

is,

from

which the

still

was

a

401

be a native of America, but rather a “savage”
friend

States; that

we have

a

“I

in

American Indian

need of civilization. 402

to

In a letter to his

further described the racial composition
of his

suppose about 95 per cent of the

men

are of native birth,

few from everywhere, including a score of
Indians, and about as many men

of Mexican origin from

New

403

Mexrco.”

Puerto Rrcans, like American Indians, became

a conquered population living in the frontier
of U.S. imperialism.

U.S. troops invaded Puerto Rico on July 25,
1898, soon after the Cuban hostilities

had been placated and the Spanish regime had been
subordinated. The Puerto Rican

campaign was

relatively bloodless, despite the military’s efforts
to

enemy. Rivero documents

that during the nineteen-day

engage the Spanish

campaign the United

forces sustained fifty-two casualties of which five resulted
in death,

Spanish

324

who had

soldiers

States

compared

to the

105 casualties, of which seventeen resulted in death and an additional

were made prisoners by the U.S.

forces.

404

For the most

part, the local

population appears to have supported and welcomed the U.S. presence in the island.
In
fact the

U.S. forces were generally perceived as liberators from the Spanish tyranny.

Richard Harding Davis, the

official

correspondent in charge of documenting the

invasion, generally described the Puerto Rican as a

reminiscent of the American underclass.

brown and downtrodden population

405
It is

possible to discern

which Davis represented the Puerto Rican race by looking

130

at his

some of the ways

description of Puerto

in

Rican women,

whom

he described as “dark of hue and

stout... fat,

brown

ladies.”

406

Davis representation of the “underclass
character” of the Puerto Rican can
further be
discerned from the following description
of a military march through the town of
Coamo,
in

which he

stated that: “(a)s the cavalcade passed,
the Porto Ricans

came

out lazily to

the roadside and peered at the officers
over the fences of cactus, and neglected, brown,

naked children

fell

out of the doors and

bumped down

the steps, howling dismally.” 407

This official representation of the subdued Puerto
Rican race contributed

to the

characterization of a race that did not speak the
Anglo-Saxon language, lacked the virtues

of the

latter culture,

had a brown complexion, was both lazy and poor, and
could only

benefit from the tutelary guidance of a superior

Anglo-American

civilization.

The Treaty of Paris of 1898

5.2

Lopez Baralt noted

that the

Spanish government began

of Puerto Rico on July 22, 1898 upon the recognition

to negotiate the possession

that they stood to lose the

remains

405
of their empire and because Puerto Ricans had not rebelled against the Spanish
regime.

'

By

accounts the hostilities between both parties had ceased on August 12, 1898.

all

October

1,

On

1898, the representatives of both governments met in Paris to discuss the

terms of a peace agreement and concluded negotiations on December 10 of the same
year.

Both the U.S. and Spain

ratified the treaty

Congress had developed an organic
island.

act for the establishment

The Foraker Act was implemented

25, 1898 and

May

1,

on April 11,1 899.

in

Puerto Rico on

of a

By April

civil

May

1,

12, 1900,

government

1900. Between July

1900, the island was governed by a succession of military

governors.

131

for the

This chronology

is

important because lawmakers relied on
various interpretations

of the transitional status of the island
status

in order to justify the legal
construction

of a

distinct

of the Puerto Rican space. The Treaty of
Paris of 1 898 formally ended the

hostilities

islands

between the U.S. and Spain. Under the tenets
of the

(Guam), the Philippines, and Puerto Rico were
ceded

between the time
in 1900,

that the treaty

was signed

in

treaty, the

to the U.S.

Ladrones
For two years,

1898 and the enactment of the Foraker Act

Puerto Rico became a part of the nation. Yet,
while Puerto Rico became an

integral part

of the U.S., the

treaty, unlike prior treaties

of this nature, did not provide

for

the annexation of the island or the naturalization
of its inhabitants. In fact, the open-

ended nature of this treaty enabled law and policy makers

to invent a

new

legal status

of

space that could be located somewhere in between a territory
and a possession.

On
Miles, the

July 28, 1898, speaking on behalf of the U.S. government,
General Nelson A.

same general

proclaimed

that led the Federal forces during the Indian Territory

Wars,

that:

The chief object of the American military forces will be to overthrow the
armed authority of Spain and to give to the people of your beautiful island the
largest measure of liberty consistent with this military occupation. We have
not
come to make war upon the people of a country that for centuries has been
oppressed, but on the contrary, to bring protection, not only to yourselves but to
your property, to promote your prosperity and bestow upon you the immunities
and blessings of liberal

institutions of our government. It is not our purpose to
any existing laws and customs that are wholesome and beneficial to
your people, so long as they conform to the rules of military administration of law
and justice.

interfere with

This

is

not a

war of devastation, but one

to give to all within control

of its

military and naval forces the advantages and blessings of enlightened
civilization.

409

The language of this

declaration

is

unclear.

It is

clearly patronizing to the extent that

it

implied that Puerto Rico was less civilized and in need of liberal institutions. However,

132

it

IS

not readily evident that Miles envisioned
the annexation of a

liberating a Spanish colony.

to

Read within

new

the context of the Treaty of Paris,

argue that Miles was concerned with
creating the

initial

much

territory so

it

is

as

possible

conditions that would enable

the development of an infrastructure
for the surplus products of the U.S.
Perhaps, Miles’

declaration can be read as a preamble to the
creation of a
colonial dependency.

It

new market

follows that this policy initiative would
have been consistent

with the United Fruit Company’s concerted
efforts to consolidate
Caribbean.

for U.S. goods, a

its

monopoly

in the

410

The

acquisition of Puerto Rico and the Philippines raised
a

regarding the future status of these islands within the
nation and
national identity.

Lopez Baralt argued

Before 1898

its

number of questions
resulting sense of

that:

the territory acquired, with the exception of Alaska
and the Minor
had been obtained with the idea of incorporating it finally into the
Union on an equal footing with other states. But this territory was
contiguous,
was sparsely settled and was rapidly peopled by Americans. The acquisitions
of
1898 were off the mainland, and were inhabited by people of different race,
language and culture. Indeed there were to be found in the Philippines many

Guano

all

Islands,

uncivilized tribes. There

was not any opportunity

Under those

conditions,

maintain

former policy of incorporation. 41

its

In addition to the obvious

political debates

it

to

American

settlement.

problem of racism, which tempered most of the

of the period

in question, the acquisition

further question of settlement. Unlike

was not open

for

could hardly be expected that the United States would

mass settlement from

any previous

was

Puerto Rico

crucial for U.S.

lawmakers

because part of the process of civilizing a place entailed populating

it

presumably would enable the

institutions.

efficient functioning

133

and

of Puerto Rico raised the

territorial acquisition,

the mainland. This

legal

of Anglo-Saxon

with citizens

who

This

mability to transplant settlers could
potentially result in the possibility
of a non-Anglo-

Saxon

state,

something for which there was no prior
precedent.

Much

has been

made of the Charter of Autonomy of 897 4u and
1

the

power of the

U.S. to acquire Puerto Rico in violation of
413
this Spanish law.
Jose Julian Alvarez

Gonzalez suggests

that Puerto

Rico did not acquire a similar degree of autonomy

414
creation of the Puerto Rican constitution in
1952.
Torruella contends that

that Puerto

that

doubtful

Ricans can ever achieve the degree of autonomy
and the entitlement to rights

were granted by the Charter of 1 897

Monge

is

it

until the

in the

American constitutional system

4,5

Trias

further adds that:

The Autonomic Charter went further than the demands of the
Autonomist
It was the most advanced document
of any Caribbean colony until
after the Second World War. Although it was
flawed in several respects, the
degree of self-government which it granted Puerto Rico was
much greater in
party

itself.

several aspects than what the United States has been willing
to concede up to the
present. The British dominion concept, well under development
by the end of the
nineteenth century, was evidently the chief model followed. 416

The language of the Charter of 1897
province of Spain granting

Monge summarizes

its

also recognized Puerto Rico as a full and equal

white male residents

full civil rights protections.

417

Trias

the provisions of the Charter in the following way:

The Autonomic Charter granted Puerto Rico a local parliament composed
of two chambers: the House of Representatives and the Council of
Administration. The entire house was elected by universal suffrage. The council
had fifteen members, eight of them elected and seven appointed by the Governor,
in the

name of the

king.

The king

the Insular Parliament or postpone

by

Governor through the
418
sponsor a bill on his own.
the

Moreover, the Charter extended a
local

government

in matters

could, however, disallow any law approved
its

consideration. Bills could only be initiated

local minister,

sort

by

of home

which meant neither had power

rule, ascribing bilateral

powers

to

to the

of international commerce. In other words, the language of

134

the text gave Puerto Ricans the

power

to

review

all

trade agreements that impacted
the

island.

Yet, despite

all

of these concessions the Spanish Commission
did not include a

single Puerto Rican in the negotiations
of the Treaty of Paris. 419

To

this extent, the

language of the text was nothing more than a
restatement of the provisions adopted

in a

host of prior constitutional initiatives such
as the Cadiz Constitution
of 1812 which

formally recognized Puerto Rico as a Spanish
province and
the Spanish nation

on equal terms

inhabitants as citizens of

its

for the first time during the 19 th century. 420

interesting to note that despite this history, Puerto
Rican legal

It is

commentators and

historians continue to suggest that the Charter of
1897 provided the basis for a

comparison with the Foraker Act and other subsequent organic

acts.

The

traditional

interpretation of the Charter can further be understood as an
expression of a form of
cultural nationalism that generally obscures the political implications
of law.

Two
resided on

new

of the central issues of concern over the cession of Puerto Rico

who would assume

responsibility over the accrued

U.S.

debts, and whether the

sovereign would recognize the ownership of private property of the Spanish subjects

residing in the island. With regards to the

that

war

to the

first issue,

the Spanish

Commission argued

on the basis of customary and international law, the new sovereign would be

responsible for the conquered territories’ debt.

noted

To be

sure, the

Spanish Commission

that:

There are publicists who maintain that the thirteen original States paid over their
mother country fifteen million pounds sterling (£15,000,000); and the facts are
official that the

United States paid

respectively considerable

to France, Spain, the Indian nations

sums of money

for Louisiana, Florida, the Indian States,

Texas, California and Alaska. This instance would be the first one

of the United States,

in

which

they, acting at

135

and Russia

variance with their

in the history

own

traditions,

should have gratuitously acquired a territory
that sooner or later will he
annexed
“
to the Union.
(Emphasis added)

The Amencan Commission responded by arguing
of the citation

in the

Spanish

however,

is

sooner or

later to the

that the

that

it

did not “perceive the relevancy

memorandum .” 422 What

is

interesting about this statement

Spanish Commission assumed that Puerto
Rico would be annexed

United States following the traditional precedents

The Treaty of Pans made

423
.

a clear distinction between the Spanish
subject, the

Puerto Rican national, and the U.S. citizen
despite the fact that President McKinley, and
later

Roosevelt, believed that Puerto Ricans should

distinction

was codified

in Article IX.

The

first

become U.S.

citizens

424
.

This

clause of the article read as follows:

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the
territory over
which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty,

may

remain

in

such territory or

may remove

there from, retaining in either event all
their rights of property, including the right to sell
or dispose of such property or of
its proceeds; and they shall also have
the right to carry their industry, commerce
and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
applicable to
other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may
preserve their

allegiance to the Crown of Spam by making, before the court of
record, within a
year from the date of exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration
of their
decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they
shall

held to have renounced

which they may reside

Making

it

and

to

have adopted the nationality of the

be

territory in

425
.

a distinction between the Spanish subject and the Puerto Rican national was

important because the U.S. did not want to

a territory populated

of another country

national

would enable U.S. lawmakers

.

It is

subjects of

at least until

it

also evident that the creation of a Puerto Rican

to

avoid the collective naturalization of the newly

sought that

it

would be convenient

Historically the distinction between Peninsular and Creoles,

distinction

by

426

citizens

acquired inhabitants,

own

between Easterners and Western

Settlers in the U.S.,

136

to

much

do so

427
.

like the

was informed by

a

conception of birthright racialism. In other
words, the individual’s birth

in a “less

civilized” place, a “savage land,” often
resulted in the ascription of an inferior
racial

However, by the turn of the century these

status.

distinctions, at least within the

Spanish nation, were being eroded through the
administrative unification of the peninsula

and

its

colonies

4-9
.

The provision recognizing

traditional jus soli recognition

bom

in the

distinction

a Spanish subject

the

of rights that recognized a distinction between
a subject

motherland” or peninsula, and the Creole
is

was premised on

important because

it

bom

in the colonies.

This

could allow U.S. lawmakers to recognize a birthright

citizenship outside of the scope of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

In other words, if Puerto

Rico was not considered a part of the U.S. then the State was
not bound

to naturalize the

inhabitants of the island. Federal lawmakers could justify the
creation of a distinct Puerto

Rican citizenship that would not place constitutional limits on the
government’s actions.

The Spanish Commission

interpreted the provision in the treaty creating a Puerto

Rican national as the American Commission’s refusal

to:

.acknowledge the right of the inhabitants of the countries ceded or relinquished
to choose the citizenship with which up to the present they have been
clothed. And nevertheless this right of choosing, which is one of the most sacred
rights of human beings, has been constantly respected since the day in which man
was emancipated from serfdom. This sacred right has been respected in treaties
of territorial cession concluded in modem times 430
.

.

by Spain

.

Of course,

the Spanish

determining their
for the

own

Commission did not provide Puerto Ricans with
future in these negotiations. In response, John B.

American Commission, responded

As

a choice in

to the natives, their status

laws to govern the ceded

of the governing power

and

Moore, speaking

that:

Congress, which will enact
no more than the assertion of the right

civil rights are left to

territory.

This

is

to control these important relations to the

new

government. The Congress of a country which never has enacted laws
or abridge the rights of residents within

137

its

to oppress

domain, and whose laws permit the

largest liberty consistent with the
preservation

property

may

of order and the protection of

safely be trusted not to depart from
431
dealing with the inhabitants of these
islands.

Both the Spanish and American Commissions
neglected

its

to

well settled practice in

acknowledge

their nations’

legacy of slavery, or their treatment of the
native inhabitants. The American

Commission’s argument

is

especially misleading

when

thinking about American Indians

within the national domain.

The second clause of Article IX

stated that the “civil rights

and

political status

of

the native inhabitants of the territories hereby
ceded to the United States shall be

determined by Congress.” 43 - This clause was interpreted
as a source of congressional
plenary power over Puerto Rico. This interpretation further
suggested that the
Constitution did not extend ex propio vigore to the island. This
clause further

represented a departure from earlier precedents to the extent that after
the Treaty of

Guadalupe Hidalgo, both Congress and the Supreme Court adopted the practice
of
extending the Constitution to the

on

territories

its

own

force.

433

Of course,

it

is

also

possible to argue that the clause could have been read as a reaffirmation of precedent
to
the extent that there

its

actions

this

5.3

by

was not

The

was

the “spirit

a prevailing assumption that Congress

was going

to

be limited

in

of the Constitution. However, as will become evident below,

the case.

Anti-Imperialists

Puerto Rican legal historians generally agree that the anti-imperialist legal
position advocated the doctrine of ex propio vigore that once a territory
,

Constitution

was extended on

its

own

434

force.
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was acquired

This argument was premised on the

the

assumption

once a

that

territory

was acquired

it

should be annexed and treated like a
part

of the nation for constitutional purposes,
or rather as a
that

while Congress was authorized to govern
the

state in the

territories, its

making.

power was

It

followed

limited

by

the

Constitution in favor of the rights of U.S.
citizens residing in said territory. The
danger

of following

this precedent, anti-imperialists argued,

not only admit a
a substantive

new non-contiguous

state,

number of non-Anglo-Saxon

but that

was

it

that the U.S.

would

would be bound

to

also be required to naturalize

people.

Despite this general agreement, anti-imperialists disagreed
on the future status of
the Spanish colonies.

imperialist

Paris.

It is

possible to discern at least four positions within the anti-

camp. However, these need

to

be understood

in reference to the

Prior to the signing of the treaty, and before Puerto Rico

legal scholars advocated the political emancipation

Treaty of

was ceded to

the U.S.,

of the islands. One position

suggested that the sovereignty of the colonies should be transferred to another
benign
empire. In contrast, other scholars advocated for the immediate liberation of the
islands.

The

anti-imperialists modified their positions to include other constitutional possibilities

after the islands

to

were ceded. One camp argued

that the Constitution should

be modified

maintain the newly acquired possessions in a perpetual territorial/tutelary stage,

governed by Congress and

entitled to the relevant constitutional protections.

hand, some anti-imperialists advocated for the annexation of Puerto Rico and

On

the other

its

eventual

admission as a State on an equal footing.

Carman
transfer

F.

Randolph’s brand of anti-imperialism advocated the immediate

of the colonies

to another empire.

43 '^

His constitutional argument was primarily

premised on a concern with the implications of extending a
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territorial status to the

new

possessions, and the resulting creation of
a temporary “subject” or second-class
citizen.

The problem
would lead

for

Randolph, however, was

to the eventual naturalization

that the acquisition

of the Spanish colonies

of undesirable non-European

The

races.

presence of Filipino citizens, according to Randolph,
would threaten the American polity

on a number of ways. Thus

the best alternative for the U.S.

was

to transfer the

sovereignty of these "less civilized” islands to
another empire for administration

in

accordance with superior civilized principles.

Randolph’s

article

was

representative of an anti-imperialist position that

interpreted the authority to govern the territories within
the limits

imposed by the

Constitution and prior precedent. Randolph recognized that
“according to the
Constitution, the subjection of annexed territory to exclusive
federal control

is

spirit

of the

an

abnormal and temporary stage necessarily preceding the normal and
permanent condition
of statehood .”

436

This argument was premised on an interpretation of Marshall’s ruling

Loughborough which conceptualized

manhood .”

4 7

Of course,

like

the territories as a “state of infancy advancing to

most advocates of this position, Randolph neglected

provide any clear criteria to determine

Randolph proceeded

to argue that

over the people of the

territories

how

a territory

Congress had

and

in

all

“full

would mature
and complete

to

into adulthood.

legislative authority

the departments of the territorial

government .”

438

However, congressional power was tempered by the Constitution, which presumably
afforded the same personal, and property rights to the citizens residing in the

It is

ironic that

Randolph was willing

to criticize the constitutional status

colonies but not the territorial status. While there

status that

territories.

is

of

a clear distinction between a colonial

does not enjoy the benefits, protections, and privileges of the Constitution,

140

it

is

also evident the citizens or
persons residing in the territories
rights to participate in political
deliberation enjoyed

This political double standard was also
evident

in

by

were not

entitled to the

same

citizens residing within the
States.

Randolph’s acceptance of the

subordinated and segregated status of
American Indians. This

is

evidenced

in the

following passage where Randolph
reflects on the relevance of the
American Indian to
the acquisition of the Spanish colonies:
If we should

annex the Philippines, it may be assumed that
we would classify as
islanders as possible under the head of
“wards,” “dependent nations ”
or “tribal Indians.” But this classification
could not be made arbitrarily, for the
constitutionality of our discrimination against
Indians is based on the fact that he
owes allegiance to a political organization other than
though inferior to the United

many of the

States.

Hence we could apply our Indian policy

in the Philippines only to persons
not been in fact within the jurisdiction of
Spain, but have been
governed by their tribal organizations 439

who have

.

It

followed, that the Filipinos could be relegated to a
condition “of undesirable,

troublesome, and expensive ‘wards.’”

Randolph
racial

s

argument, another form of American exceptionalism, recognized
a

and cultural hierarchy between non-Europeans and Europeans

Anglo-Saxon

institutions or rather an

imagined conception of race,

which

to

measure the

culture,

civilization.

inhabitants of Spanish heritage

It

followed that

Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism, modeled

after

an

and manifest destiny, served as the basis from

However,

(i.e.

440
.

this

standard had racial limits. Whereas the

European) could be “civilized,” presumably through

a process of Americanization, the “indigenous” and non-European populations could
not.

This meant, according to Randolph’s argument, that some segments of the population

would be maintained
the island’s status

in a

“ward

like” or tutelary condition. In the case

would be determined by

In the event that these inhabitants

of Puerto Rico,

the quantity of inhabitants of Spanish heritage.

outnumbered the non-European
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inhabitants, the island

could become a territory and presumably
an eventual State of the Union. This
position

was

consistent with prior precedent on procedural
grounds. However, Randolph’s

argument did not address the
parts

fact that

more than two-thirds of the United

States had been

of the Spanish and Mexican empires, and had
been populated by non- Anglo-Saxon

inhabitants of Spanish and French heritage.

Randolph

s

territories

and Americanizing them.

conception of the

Randolph concluded

territories

his article

One

possible explanation could be that

was premised on

by proposing

the other Spanish colonies, be transferred to
another

administration. While he

was

silent

on the

status

the possibility of settling the

that the Philippines,

European empire

of Puerto Rico,

it

is

and presumably

for their

readily evident that

people of Spanish heritage, notwithstanding their European lineage,
were not Anglo-

Saxons and were therefore
however,

economic

is that

inferior

and

less desirable.

What

is

important to note,

Randolph’s argument was also premised on the protection of U.S.

interests in the islands.

To be

sure, a transfer

of sovereignty would guarantee

the continuation and protection of economic interests in the islands without requiring
that
the U.S.

assume any responsibility over the

affairs

and governance of these places or

its

populations. Randolph’s brand of anti-imperialism provided U.S. policy makers with a
narrative that justified the

economic exploitation of “inferior,” non-Anglo-Saxon

inhabitants residing outside of the constitutional borders of the nation.

Simeon

E. Baldwin’s constitutional

argument was premised on the idea

the U.S. emancipated the islands from Spanish rule and Congress decided to

territories, the nation

nation

441
.

was bound

Baldwin went so

to

that

once

make them

annex them and make them an integral part of the

far as to

dismiss the problem of non-contiguousness and
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claimed that the geographic location of
these islands was immaterial to his
argument. To
be sure, the problem for Baldwin was not
that these acquisitions were “islands,”
but
rather that they

were “not appurtenant

was followed by an important

to the

American continent .” 442 This discussion

interpretation of the Fourteenth

and Fifteenth Amendments

and the implications of naturalizing the inhabitants
of the acquired colonies. Presumably,
the sexually active Latin races

create an

abundance of foreign

deliberations. Baldwin, like

the

anomalous

status

would “out produce” the Anglo-Saxon

citizens with legal rights to participate in
public

most

legal scholars reflecting

Baldwin also concluded

issues, also addressed

to follow this

that the inhabitants

spoils of war,

it

of the islands would present a threat

that while the U.S. could acquire

was not “bound”

to

that

precedent in the case of Puerto Rico.

of the nation because of their criminal and uncivilized

Baldwin argued
the

on these

of American Indians within constitutional history and
suggested

Congress could potentially choose

internal stability

child-bearers and

keep these

443

new

racial character.

territories as the results

He contended

.

to the

of

that the Spanish

colonies were unlike any previously acquired territory because they were “appurtenant”
to other continents,

the U.S.

presumably the South American and Asian continents, and therefore

was not obligated

to retain

them

as territories.

To be

sure,

Baldwin noted

that:

This question cuts deeper than the one propounded to the Supreme Court of the
in the Dred Scott case. The opinion given there was that we could
not acquire any American territory to hold permanently as a dependent province.

United States

If that position be unsound,

it

would not follow

that the islands appertaining to

another continent would be so acquired and held

He concluded

444
.

that in the event that the U.S. decided to retain Puerto Rico,

follow the Alaska and

New Mexico

“stamp out” the “character and

precedents of administration until

traditions

and laws of a Latin race .”

143

445

it

it

was

should

able to

He immediately

noted that “no fixed limit of time
can be assigned for the duration of
such regime ” 446

Moreover,
part

if the

U.S. decided to keep Puerto Rico

of the nation

until

it

was ready

it

was required

to

annex the island as a

for admission as a state 447
.

As

I

suggested before, the Ordinance tradition
was generally premised on a

settler

system where the

territories

could petition for admission once they
had attain a sufficient

number of citizen

residents.

Aside from maintaining a republican system
of government

consistent with U.S. constitutional principles,
there

measure the admission of a

Baldwin neglected

territory.

Perhaps continuing

to give the reader a

progress of Puerto Rico in

its

was no

potential

list

of the

clear standard established to

this

criteria that

ambiguous

tradition,

could be used to assess the

development toward statehood. He neglected

to

provide constitutional criteria that could be used to
decide what was the right conception

of appurtenant

land, or

what should be the

should belong to the nation.

quandary from

It is

criteria for

determining which

territories

possible to discern two possible answers to this

his overall argument.

The

legal institutions are consistent with those

first is that

a territory

of the Anglo-Saxon

is

appurtenant

tradition.

when

its

Thus only those

places that have been colonized by the empires of British heritage would
be eligible to

belong

to the U.S.

This reasoning

is

consistent with his concluding statement which

premised on a theory of original intent or rather the belief that
the Constitution to decide

which places should be

it

was up

to the

was

framers of

part of the nation. Presumably, the

framers had only envisioned a nation composed of territories populated by people and

governed by

institutions

a territory

appurtenant to the U.S. nation

citizens,

is

of British heritage. The second possible argument could be
if

it

and subsequently Americanized.
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can be settled by a majority of U.S.

that

Baldwin’s discussion of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments centered
on
the question of whether “settled
inhabitants of civilized or semi-civilized
races

owing

allegiance to the United States alone”
could be regarded “as subjects and
not citizens .” 448

He argued

bom

that the Fourteenth

any of our new

in

of parents

who

are

Amendment would “make every

territorial

among

its

possessions after they

become

child,

of whatever

race,

part of the United States,

inhabitants and subject to our jurisdiction,
a citizen of the

United States from the moment of birth ” 449

Of course Congress

could adopt the Indian

precedent and treat the inhabitants of Hawaii and
Puerto Rico as subjects in a “dependent
condition,

however, Baldwin further noted,

naturalize the inhabitants of the islands.

extension of the same Fifteenth

men of civilized
One

He

it

was more

also

Amendment

warned

likely that the treaties

that this

right to suffrage

races” residing in a territory

450
.

To be

sure,

would

would

result in the

“conceded”

to “the white

he wrote:

generation of men

is soon replaced by another, and in the
tropics more
rapidly than with us. In fifty years, the bulk of the adult
population of Puerto
Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines, should these them form a part
of the United
4
States, will be claiming the benefits of the
Amendment

XV

1

.

In other

words, the American polity could potentially be threatened by an abundance
of

citizens

of foreign heritage making

Given the
their

inferior racial character

legal claims to participate in public deliberations.

of these

citizens,

Baldwin’s argument suggested

that

presence could potentially destroy the fabric of Anglo-Saxon democracy.

By now

it

should be evident that

of the Anglo-American legal and
that the Fourteenth

women,

argument relied on a dubious interpretation

political landscape.

Amendment was

particular “citizens.”

this

To be

sure,

it

was

readily evident

selectively extended to certain “persons” and

At the time of Baldwin’s writing, there was ample evidence

that

prisoners/criminals, and Indians were not entitled to the full protections and
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liberties

of the Fourteenth Amendment

452

Moreover, as

.

I

suggested in the

last chapter,

Baldwin’s argument was misleading given
the Court’s interpretation of the
Fifteenth

Amendment’s

right to suffrage in Cruikshank.

State, the Fifteenth

anomalous

status

Amendment would

of the

of the extension of the
if

territories.

status

In addition, unless Puerto

Rico became a

not be operative at a Federal level
given the

This was also evident

of Alaska and

New Mexico

when

considering his defense

to Puerto Rico.

In other words,

Puerto Rico could be maintained as a district
or a territory ad infinitum, then

U S-

how

could

citizens residing in the island exercise their
right to suffrage under the Constitution?

Let us not forget that the only citizens entitled
to participate in federal elections are those

who

reside in States.

distinct relationship

were not

Anglo-American democracy, then and now, has been mediated
by

between the individual and

a

his geographic residence. Territories

then, or at present, part of this democratic geography.

As

I

have already noted, Baldwin’s whole argument

racial character

of the inhabitants of the Spanish colonies and

embrace the Anglo-American

constitutional culture.

He

premised on the inferior

is

their inherent inability to

concluded his

article

with a

discussion of the following statement:

Our Constitution was made by

a civilized and educated people.

guaranties of personal security which
that prevail in

many parts of our new

seem

ill

It

provides

adapted to the conditions of society

possessions.

To

give the half-civilized

Moros of the

Philippines, or the ignorant and lawless brigands that infest Puerto
Rico, or even the ordinary Filipino of Manila, the benefit of such immunities from
the sharp and sudden justice
or injustice
which they have hitherto accustomed

—

to expect,

efficient

—

would, of course, be a serious obstacle to the maintenance there of an

government

453
.

Thus, the annexation of Puerto Rico would extend citizenship to the ignorant and lawless

brigands that infest the island. This representation of a pathologically criminal race
further enabled

Baldwin

to

make

a case against the annexation
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of Puerto Rico by

suggesting that the U.S. would acquire
dangerous citizens

if

it

kept the island. Perhaps

reminiscing Taney’s argument against
the extension of citizenship rights
to people of
African descent, Baldwin concluded that
the framers had not written the
Constitution

with these races

in

mind

454

Of Course, Baldwin

.

neglected to mention that the British

had once conceptualized the Americans as
“lawless brigands” and

Amendments had sought

to incorporate other

that the Reconstruction

non-Anglo-Saxon populations

into the

nation.

In an article relying

territorial

Shipman

questions resulting from the acquisition of the
Mexican Territories, Paul R.
offers an alternative anti-imperialist

compromise within

which he defined

camp

this

boundary between the

be an

on an interpretation of Daniel Webster’s position
on the

455
.

He began

argument

his

could be construed as a

that

argument by demarcating a clear

interpretation of the territorial question of the anti-imperialists,

as a constitutional position,
456

extra-constitutionalist’ position

.

and the imperialists, which he considered

to

After a thorough discussion of the idea that the

Constitution placed certain limits on the power of Congress over the
territories, Shipman

concluded

that:

In this republic, in fine, the aegis
territory

of the Constitution covers everything. No
can escape the Constitution; any
can outrun his shadow. Our government is purely a government

of the United

more than

a

man

States, near or remote,

of law. Extra-constitutionality

Shipman went on

to argue that

“infant” State

may

no choice but

to

territorial

even

is

unconstitutionality

in the

457
.

worst case scenario, where an annexed

“prove permanently incapable of self-government,” there “would be

keep

it

in

permanently

in a Territorial condition .”

458

However, even

this

condition would be preferable, and more consistent with the Constitution, than
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the holding of a colony.
Unfortunately,

burden .”

Shipman lamented,

this

was “the white man’s

459

This concern with the “white man’s
burden” was informed by a belief that
the

newly acquired

territories, inhabited

politically or commercially.”

impracticable to

manage our

the Constitution as

it

stands,

To be

by

barbarians, could prove to be “incorrigible,

sure

Shipman argued, “(s)hould we

Territorial incorrigibles,

and be willing

to alter the Constitution in the

mode

it

commercially or

to adapt barbarians to

prescribes .”

460

Constitution could be altered would be through
a constitutional
for the creation

of a special

these territories

would be

territorial status

treated as

ad

it

politically,

them,

One of the ways

find

we

in

under

are at liberty

which the

amendment

that allowed

infinitum. Presumably, the inhabitants of

wards of the Federal government,

entitled to

constitutional protections, but not necessarily political
rights. This argument

was

further

contingent on the non-Anglo-Saxon or rather “barbarian”
character of the inhabitants of
the

newly acquired

territories.

Barbarians were presumed incapable of readily

understanding Anglo-Saxon institutions. Given

this reasoning,

Congress and the Supreme Court adopted a

of reasoning

line

it

is

no wonder why both

that validated the imperialist

position.

Elmer B. Adams’ annexationist arguments provided another
imperialist ideology

461
.

Adams’

article

variant of the anti-

was predicated on two arguments reminiscent of

early versions of American exceptionalism. Like traditional proponents of American

exceptionalism,

Adams’ envisioned

the acquisition of the Spanish colonies as a form of

Christian duty and responsibility over the inferior and less civilized races.
the

Anglo-American

He

envisioned

as a savior and bearer of civilization for the less civilized and
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underdeveloped Puerto Rican. Moreover,
he conceptualized the United States
as the
culmination of civilization. Thus, by
becoming a part of the U.S., Puerto Rico
was

becoming

a part

of a unique nation, a promised land.

Adams’ began by arguing

that the acquisition

of Puerto Rico should be

understood as an expression of Christian
virtues and a responsibility to the

less civilized.

His constitutional argument relied on an
interpretation of the sub mode character
of the
Territorial

territories.

Clause and the subsequent responsibility

Adams’ use of racial

narratives

to grant statehood to the acquired

was premised on

the belief that the Puerto

Ricans of Spanish heritage, or rather European
heritage, could be civilized.

concluded his

article

He

with a defense of the annexation of Puerto Rico
and the

simultaneous emancipation of the Philippines.

Adams began

his article

war on two grounds. The

first

by justifying

the U.S. intervention in the Spanish-Cuban

ground was anchored on a Christian duty or sense of

responsibility towards the less civilized Spanish colonies.
According to

“impartial history will justify our

armed intervention

to suppress the

Adams,

Cuban war, on

broad ground that dictates of Christian civilization and humanity demanded

Adams second

claim was that every “nation of earth has the undoubted

sovereignty, to protect

itself.

464
.

of us .”

462

right, incident to

This claim was based on the threats to the property and

material possessions of the U.S. citizens residing in

colonies

it

the

Cuba and

the other Spanish

For Adams, the Christian nations, or rather the international empires had a

responsibility to civilize the rest of the world,

defeated empires.

It

namely the

liberated colonies

followed that property rights would be best protected
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of the

in a civilized

world.

To be

sure, according to

governments under which
It is

Adams,

civil liberties

the Christian nations possessed
the only

and individual freedoms could thrive

465
.

interesting to note that this conception
of American exceptionalism had
been

a pervasive characteristic of U.S.
foreign policy since the Puritans
began the conquest of

the U.S. Ironically,

Adams’ language was reminiscent of Bishop
James Madison and

Daniel Webster’s paternalism

of paternalism

that

466

Adams’

.

Christian anti-impenalism reproduced
a form

conceived of the colonies as children

presumably Uncle Sam’s hand. As

in the case

in

need of a guiding hand,

of other commentators, Adams never

provided any criteria to judge the development
of a less civilized
paternalistic rhetonc reproduced a

of the
is

less civilized” territories,

territory.

In fact, his

form of ideological colonialism based on the

and

their

liberation

subsequent annexation as a form of charity.

further interesting to note that this patronizing
exportation of U.S. constitutional

narratives has been a consistent feature of U.S. foreign
policy until this day.

Unlike the

latter anti-imperialists,

Adams wrote

his article at the cusp

of the

Treaty of Paris and before the enactment of the Foraker Act.
This

is

the Treaty of Paris had ceded the island to the U.S.

Adams’ argument

To

this extent,

important because

could be read as a continuation of the traditional anti-imperialist argument,
which
interpreted constitutional precedent as binding. In fact,

Adams

relied

on the

traditional

interpretation of the Canter ruling to explain his position:

From whatever source

the

power

to acquire territory is derived,

exists in the national government,

and

it

is

clear that

it

may be

exercised according to the wise
discretion of the executive and legislative departments. It is also perfectly clear
that the acquisition of new territory, for whatever reason, can have but one
legitimate object and purpose in view, and that

statehood.

And

is, to secure territory for ultimate
there can be one general character of government devised for

such territory, and that is, a government adapted to fit its inhabitants for
statehood. In other words, under the Constitution of the United States, as
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it

now

It

belong
It

^^
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followed that the Territorial Clause
empowered Congress to govern the

sub mode precondition for the admission
of a new
Clause, accordmg to

Adams, had

Clause. Thus, Congress

was preparing them

to

become

be sure,

it is

States.

not readily evident

In other words, the Territorial

to

govern the

territories

only to the extent that

Adams’ argument neglected

the “virtues” of democracy

how

territories as a

be interpreted as a precondition of the
Statehood

was empowered

would mature and acquire

citizen

to

State.

-«*

the citizen

principles of democratic self-governance

when

when

would receive a

how

to explain

it

a

treated as a child.

To

civic education in

she was denied any participation in her

self-governance.

Adams’ conception of the
primarily informed

by

“races” inhabiting the island of Puerto Rico

was

the reports of the military governors in the island.
Unlike other

commentators, however,

Adams

used two racial paradigms

Rican populations could be annexed

to the

United

States.

to explain

He

how

the Puerto

described the population of

Puerto Rico in the following words:

One-tenth of her population, at least, are independent, self-respecting
Spaniards.
The balance of her population (consisting mainly of creoles and mulattoes)
without doubt as intelligent a class of people as that which we, in our
reconstruction policy at the close of the War of Rebellion, deemed worthy of
elective franchise and capable of self government. It is true that her civilization
not of Anglo-Saxon, liberty loving-kind 468
.

Adams’

effort to equate the process

of Americanization

the South and to the colonization of the

to that

West was important because of its

these legal/racial paradigms. Unlike other commentators,
acquisition of Puerto Rico

of the Reconstruction

was contingent on

Adams

reliance on

believed that the

the possibility of “educating” and
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in

is

"civilizing” a population of European
and “hybrid” racial heritages.

Adams' suggested, was comparable
to

Adams, with time

civilization

5.4

power

The

imperialist

to

govern the

camp adopted two
territories.

past.

interpretations

of the constitutional power of

The most popular view defended Congress’ plenary

govern any acquisitions, including the

restrictions.

proposed

“Negro" population of the South. According

to the

would become remnants of the

Imperialists

to

race.

the Puerto Ricans could be
acculturated and the vestiges of a
“Latin”

The

Congress

The “hybrid"

territories,

without constitutional

This position was generally defended from two
perspectives.

that the Constitution

One of these

only extended to the States. This meant that the

congressional authority could only be limited in favor of
citizens inside the States or
other territories

(i.e.

Washington, D.C.)

the adoption of the Constitution.

An

that

part

of the original States

political question

time of

and not a constitutional one.

followed that Congress was not restricted by the Constitution in

territories

at the

alternative interpretation suggested that the

governance of the acquired colonies was a
It

were

its

governance of the

and/or the colonies.

Some compassionate

imperialists,

however, offered an alternative interpretation

of the Constitution that allowed for the acquisition of colonies as long as the inhabitants

of these places were afforded some basic or “fundamental”
“Third View” did not provide any

criteria for

rights.

The proponents of this

determining which constitutional rights

could be classified as fundamental and which were not. Proponents of this view
positioned themselves in between the imperialist and anti-imperialist “extremes.” This
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position further relied on an
interpretation of Article IX of the
Treaty of Paris, and
particularly the provision recognizing
Congress’

inhabitants of the

newly acquired

constitutional interpretation

presumed

intent,

namely

power over

the governance of the

colonies. In other words, the guiding
source of

was located

new

to acquire

in the

language of the Treaty of Paris and

colonies and give Congress plenary

govern these as

it

saw

them so long

it

treated the inhabitants in a compassionate
way. In

interpretation

there

was

as

was

It

power

to

followed that Congress could acquire
colonies and retain

consistent with the

Mormon Church

a presumption that Congress

in its organic acts.

territorial

fit.

its

some ways,

cases precedent to the extent that

would incorporate

the “spirit” of the Constitution

Congress not only became the interpreter of the Constitution,

purposes, but also was responsible for

its

this

own

self-regulation. This

for

view was

eventually adopted by the Foraker Act, and later institutionalized
by the Insular Cases.

Christopher Columbus Langdell, a leading legal scholar and Dean
of the Harvard

Law

School, provided the most notorious defense of the imperialist
position

469
.

Adopting

an argument reminiscent of a Hobbesian concern for definitions, Langdell
based his

argument on an interpretation of the constitutional meaning of the term “United
States .”

470

Akhil Reed

Amar has

defined this form of constitutional interpretation or

constitutionalism as intratextualism

of interpretation

471
.

Intratextualism,

that “tries to read a contested

Reed Amar

word or phrase

argues,

is

a technique

that appears in the

Constitution in light of another passage in the Constitution featuring the same (or a very
similar)

word

or phrase.”

47

United States excluded the

bound by

that text in its

^

Langdell argued that the constitutional meaning of the

territories

and the colonies; therefore, Congress was not

governance of the newly acquired colonies. This

153

literal

interpretation

of the Constitution, however, neglected

other forms of law making
Constitution, particularly

to

consider context, precedent, and

473
.

its

It

followed that the Court's interpretation
of the

interpretation of the term United
States,

was

irrelevant for

Langdell.

Langdell found three definitions of the term
“United States” in the Constitution.

The

first

definition read as follows: “It

united together

by and under

is

the collective

name of the

States

which

are

the Constitution of the United States;
and, prior to the

adoption of the Constitution, and subsequently
to the Declaration of Independence,
the collective

name of the

thirteen States

which made

the time of the adoption of the Constitution,

former .”

it

was

the Declaration, and which, from

were united together by and under the

474

In other words, the United States

collection of original

autonomous

States.

was

a term that defined the nation as a

This definition, however, did not account for

the acquisition of thirty-seven additional territories/States.
In fact,
legislative history

of the United States and

its territorial

it

disregarded the

formation. Langdell’s

imperialism reproduced a similar form of imperial/colonial relationship
between the U.S.

and Puerto Rico

that

had once fueled the revolutionary sentiments of the American

colonists towards the British Empire.

Langdell’s second definition represented the U.S. as a sovereign
legal person

body

politic

analogous

to

England.

“artificial

and

Accordingly, the Constitution created a sovereign

composed of an aggregate of States. More

importantly, the Constitution

provided the legal and political guidance for the relations among the States, and between
the

Union and other foreign nations

476
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Membership

into this

body

politic

could only be

achieved through statehood. In other words, according to Langdell, only States could
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become members of the body politic, and
only
could become U.S. citizens. Within

members of the term United

to the sovereign

were not part of the United States

Langdell
States as

s third

definition treated

mere colonial possessions.

designate

the

this context,

all

body

has, therefore,

no

in

politic,

It

followed that

territories

includtng domestic dependent

for constitutional purposes.

all territorial

spaces belonging to the United

In his words, “the use

temtory over which the United States

word ‘empire’

is

of the term ‘United

sovereign,

is,

States’ to

like the similar use

England and other European countries, purely
conventional; and

legal or constitutional significance .” 477
Accordingly, the

the territories and colonies

restraints.

only States could be constdered

States for constitutional purposes.

and other property belonging
nations,

the inhabitants res, ding within
these States

was

it

governance of

subject to political deliberation without any
constitutional

This position would enable the government to shape
particular laws, especially

revenue laws, that would not be regulated by precedent
or any demands for uniformity

Moreover,

of

this

governments

form of imperialism would also enable the U.S.

for the acquired colonies that

should be evident that Langdell

s

to

478
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develop special local

were profitable and malleable. By now

it

argument rested on an ahistorical interpretation of the

Constitution that gave inherent powers to the government to govern
the colonies in a
politically expedient

against other

manner. This interpretation would also allow the U.S. to “compete”

members of the

imperial club without any constitutional limitations or

hindrances.

Like virtually every other legal commentator of the period, Langdell’ s argument
addressed the question of race in a

of undesirable populations.

It is

way

that

would

protect the U.S. from the acquisition

interesting to note that Langdell’s discussion of the
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exclusion of “alien races” from the
political and legal membership
rested on the
ascription of a racial character to
the Constitution.

amendments had been designed
non-Anglo-Saxon
spirit

for the

He

argued that the

first

governance of English people, and not

Presumably, the Constitution was a
document

races.

and character of races of British

ten

for other

that captured the

heritage, and could not be extended
to other races.

Langdell concluded his argument with a
discussion of the acquisition of Hawaii and
the

Spanish islands.

He wrote

that

“(n)one of these islands have been acquired
with a view

to their being

admitted as States, and

admitted,

that they will never

i.e.,

and especially

to

be represented

it

is

to

be sincerely hoped that they never will be so

be permitted to share in the government of this
country,

in the

United States Senate .” 479

Like Langdell, James Bradley Thayer argued that the
Constitution did not place
limitations

territories

on the government and

and/or colonies

precedent. Thus,

480
.

its

authority to govern the acquired or conquered

However, unlike Langdell, Thayer’s argument rested on

by focusing on

historical

examples where Congress and the Supreme

Court had exercised plenary power over acquired

territories,

Thayer argued

Constitution did not place any limitations or restrictions on the

and permanently govern a

Whatever

territory.

restraints

He

noted

power

that the

to acquire, hold,

that:

may be imposed on

our congress and the executive by the

Constitution of the United States, they have not made impossible a firm and
vigorous administration of government in the territories. Witness especially the
case of the District of Columbia and the Territory of Utah. It is not anticipated
that they will

In addition,

have any such effect on our island dependencies

Thayer dismissed

all

prior

Rights to the territories as mere dicta.

Supreme Court

He argued
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that

481
.

rulings that extended the Bill of

“no judicial opinion yet made has

thoroughly dealt with the matter, or
can be regarded as
grave

at all final

on a question so very

.” 482

Thayer’s recollection was accurate but
misleading. The historical record

on the questions of congressional plenary
power over the
of the Constitution
acts precedent,

territories.

in the territories.

consistent in

of the
it

Bill

it

came

of Rights

interpretation

of the U.S. citizens residing

and the applicability

With the exception of the Kansas-Nebraska
organic

to “civic” rights,

in the territories.

Congress generally recognized the

The Supreme Court was

also fairly

of the relationship between the Constitution and the

in the territories.

Congress’ power to govern the
rights.

clear

Congress exercised plenary authority over the
“political” aspects of the

However, when

applicability

territories

is

territories,

To be

sure, the

rights

Court generally recognized

with certain limitations

in favor

of personal

Yet, notwithstanding this recognition, the Court
treated the territories as tutelary

spaces or States in the making, and placed certain limits
on what aspects of the
Constitution would be extended to the territories.
this

meant

territories.

that

only civic

Political rights,

rights

and

As

civil liberties

I

have already mentioned above,

would be recognized

however, were reserved for the

States.

tyrannical given that Thayer’s argument held that the “sound

department of the United States” was

governance of the acquired
Moreover,

it

is

to

in the

This was especially

judgment of the

be the source of policy

political

initiatives for the

483

territories

.

important to note that this conclusion was followed by a

discussion of the Indian precedent, which provided an alternative example of U.S.
imperialism. Thayer used the example of American Indians to further justify the
acquisition of populated territories without the responsibility of annexation. In other
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words, according to Thayer, the
American Indian example provided further
evidence
the U.S. did not have to

make

nation. His

best captured in the following
passage,

extenso for

argument
its

is

that

the acquired territories or lands
an integral part of the

which

I

will cite in

value:

Take, for

illustration, the case of our tribal
Indians. Always
lived within the territories of the
United States. Our

many of them have

government has mainly
followed the example of our English ancestors
of recognizing them as tribes
rather than individuals. Congress
and the treaty-making power have dealt
with

them

as a separate people,

who have their own rules, customs and laws, although
on our land. ... Yet, remember, we hold these
people, the Indians, in the
hollow of our hand; it is in our power, and has
been from the beginning, and not
in theirs, to say whether they
shall continue to hold this relation 484
living

.

It

followed, according to Thayer, that Puerto Rico
could be treated in like manner to the

Indian domestic dependent nation, namely a
possession of the empire, but not a part of
the nation.

It

should be noted, however, that Thayer’s representation
of a subjugated

people ignored recurrent challenges
Indians.

to state authority

While American Indians may have been contained,

their resistance to Federal oppression

it

is

not readily evident that

ended with the massacre

at

Wounded Knee.

John Kimberly Beach also defended the
and

treat

and power raised by American

it

like a

not shed any

new

colony belonging
light

to the

right

of the U.S.

Anglo-Saxon empire

to acquire Puerto

485
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Rico

Beach’s argument did

on the constitutional question of U.S. imperialism. However,

his

discussion of citizenship and his conclusions on the relevant precedents provide a clearer
picture of the imperialist ideology. This ideology of exceptionalism
superiority of the civilized

Anglo-Saxon

race/citizenship.

More

was hinged upon

importantly, Beach

argued that the U.S. could rely on the existing hierarchy of citizenship

to

provide some

guidance for the development of a new government for Puerto Rico. This hierarchy
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the

recognized a hierarchy of citizenship,
beginning with the citizens of the U.S.
and the
States; the U.S. citizens residing
in the territories; the U.S.
citizens residing in

unorgan, zed Indian

territories; the aliens;

and the Indians, whose position was
defined as

“wards of the nation .” 486

Beach argued

that

each of these citizenships was contingent
on a specific

residence and relationship with the government.
Thus, the “full” U.S. citizen lived in the
States

and enjoyed both

territories,

and civic

rights.

The second-class

who

but could not participate in the Federal Government
resided in unorganized territories inhabited

Beach assumed

were deprived of any
the alien subjects,

that

it

was an unorganized

political privileges.

who

district

territory,

of the place

in

which

a citizen, subject or

ward

resided,

United States

(e.g.

Alaska)

governed by the

in turn

the Court had recognized as persons entitled to

it

self-

and therefore the residents

These three classes were

and the Indian wards. This argument was important because
status

487
.

by Indians

comprised the third class of citizens. Because Alaska was a
President,

citizen, lived in the

and by “grace of Congress,” enjoyed "a certain
measure of local

government,
citizens

political

followed by

some

civil rights,

further established that the

would be determinative of

his citizenship or place in the hierarchy.

This hierarchy demonstrates the political inadequacy of a conception of national
citizenship

modeled

after the Civil

Fourteenth and Fifteenth
to recognize a

which a
This

is

War Amendments.

Amendments could have been

Despite the fact that the

uniform national citizenship,

citizen, subject, or

it

is

interpreted in a

way that

sought

evident that the status of the space in

ward resided would be determinative of one’s

citizenship.

especially important because lawmakers could manipulate the extension of the
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Constitution, and particularly the
applicability of the Bill of Rights,

of space. This

status

its

status

of space in turn was contingent on
the

by creating

a distinct

racial configuration

of

inhabitants and their potential, in light
of the Federal lawmakers’ views to rise
to the

of civilized

level

citizens.

I

use the term space in a broader and fluid
sense to capture the

possibilities within a hierarchy

of legal spaces

that

encompassed

States, territories,

property, occupied territories, domestic
dependent nations, and other legally constructed
spatial

arrangements

488

In the case of Puerto Rico, lawmakers,
both in Congress and the

.

Supreme Court, invented

a distinct status of space that has enabled
the U.S. to govern the

island as a legal colony, and to create a
citizenship contingent on this status of space,

namely the Puerto Rican

citizen.

Beach reached three relevant conclusions regarding
Rico within the U.S.
controlled only

purchase.

by

he concluded

First

that the U.S.

the potential future of Puerto

had “an unlimited power,

the discretion of Congress, to acquire territory

Second,

this

by conquest or

conclusion was followed by a corollary that denied the

extension of the Constitution to the acquired territories and gave
Congress the plenary

power

to

govern these subject only

to the “limitations existing

by inference from

the

principles underlying our ideas of government .” 490 Finally, and most
importantly,

Beach

concluded that U.S. policy/lawmakers should be guided by the legal hierarchy of spaces

when making

a decision about the status of Puerto Rico within the nation.

To be

sure,

he

argued, “(t)hat in point of fact, Congress, in dealing with the different problems presented

by the

many

state, the

organized

territory, the

unorganized

territory,

years exercised an assortment of powers which includes

and the Indian, has
all

government of Porto Rico and the Philippines, without exceeding
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for

those necessary to the

its

constitutional

authority .”

status

491

Ultimately, as

I

will demonstrate below, the

lawmakers invented a new

of space, which can be located somewhere
between the unorganized

(District/Alaska) and the Indian domestic
dependent nation,

temtory. Following this reasoning,

it

is

territory

namely the unincorporated

possible to argue that Beach’s imperialism

provided an alternative conception of space rooted
in a political interpretation of U.S.
legal history.

Legal commentators and scholars generally agree
that Abbot Lawrence Lowell’s
article

defending a Third View or alternative constitutional
arrangement for Puerto Rico,

and the Spanish colonies

in general,

provided the ideological basis for the legal status of

Puerto Rico resulting from the Foraker Act and the
Insular Cases
reconcile both the anti-imperialist and imperialist “extremes”
position or compromise. This

“territorial” status that

compromise allowed

by

492

Lowell sought

to

articulating a “middle”

for the creation

of an alternative

recognized the extension of some “fundamental” constitutional

protections. Presumably, once Puerto Rico had developed a “mature”
system of self-

governance, Congress could decided whether to enable the island to become a territory

and thus place

it

on a

tract

towards eventual Statehood, or to give the island

its

formal

independence. Following the other scholars already discussed, Lowell neglected
provide the criteria to judge

this process.

to

Moreover, Congress retained plenary power

over the governance and future of the island, despite the concession of some fundamental
rights.

Lowell began

his

argument by explaining the

limits

of both Randolph and

Baldwin’s anti-imperialist and Langdell’s imperialist interpretations of the relationship of
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the Constitution to the acquisition
of new territorial possessions.

Regarding the

anti-

imperialist position, Lowell argued
that:

This construction assumes that the
interpretation given by the courts
Constitution in the case of the older
Territories applies to
jurisdiction of the United States, an
assumption for

construction

is irrational,

because

it

places subject to the

all

which there

and which actually contradicts a couple of
decisions.

It

to the

may be

is

no judicial sanction,

urged also that

this

extends the Constitution to conditions where
they

cannot be applied without rendering the government
of our

new dependencies

well nigh

impossible, and surely no provision ought to be
given an interpretation which leads to an
irrational result, if the

In contrast,

language will bear equally well a different construction

Lowell argued

was too narrow and contradicted

that the imperialist interpretation

a greater

number of judicial
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of the Constitution

opinions.

More

importantly, Lowell noted that:

allows Congress to confiscate property in the District of
Columbia or in any
territory without compensation, or to take it arbitrarily
form the owner and
It

bestow

upon another person. It suffers the government to pass a bill of attainder against
a resident of Washington or Arizona, and order him hung without
trial.
According to this view, moreover, a person bom of alien parents in a territory is
it

not a citizen of the United States either

residence there

is

by Constitution or by

statute,

and

not residence within the United States for the purpose of

subsequent qualification for a seat in Congress. The results are certainly opposed
494
have prevailed hitherto

to the ideas that

The

solution to these problems

.

was

governed by Congress, and limited

to

have an unincorporated

in favor

territory or

dependency,

of the protection of the personal or

fundamental rights afforded by the Constitution.
In order to legitimate this

anomalous and ambiguous

Lowell invoked the Fleming precedent and a

territorial

literal interpretation

162

or spatial status,

of the second clause of

Article

IX of the Treaty of Pans. As can
be

recalled from

my earlier discussion,

the

Court ruled in Fleming that the
military could occupy a temtory
indefinitely and

that the

occupied temtory would remain foreign
for domestic constitutional
purposes and
domestic for foreign relations. More
importantly, Taney established that
only Congress
could extend temtorial status to the
occupied territory
ceased to be foreign for constitutional
purposes.

It

at

which time the occupied space

should be noted, however, that

Taney’s reasoning rested on the exceptional
nature of the military occupation of
a port

when

the U.S.

was

at

war with Mexico. Presumably

the military

would cease

occupation and governance as soon as the war
was over and order restored,
the Congress

would provide

Rico could be held

was ready

to

in a

for a local civil government.

modified

of occupation

determine the island’s future

Lowell further argued
not

state

command Congress

that the

According

indefinitely, or at least until the U.S.

495
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language of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris did

to incorporate or

annex Puerto Rico

into the U.S.

of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. Lowell rightly argued,

language of the treaty departed from

which time

to Lowell, Puerto

while simultaneously granting Congress plenary power to
determine the
political status

at

its

all

body

civil

that

politic,

and

because the

previous treaties, there was no binding precedent

requiring the incorporation of Puerto Rico into the Union. These
arguments were

problematic for several reasons.

First,

of all Fleming was a war ruling for a “territory”

under military occupation during the war with Mexico. As

I

suggested above, the Court’s

reasoning was informed by the exceptional nature of the conditions created by a military
occupation. In the case of Puerto Rico, the island had been ceded to the United States as
a condition of the peace protocols.

The “cession” of the
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island suggested that Puerto

Rico became a part of the United States
and
island should be informed

by

Once Puerto Rico became

a possession

that

Secondly, given President McKinley’s

it

to

govern the

the tenets of a territorial policy, not
a military occupation.

of the U.S., and once

no constitutional or jurisprudential justification

inhabitants of Puerto Rico,

any legislation enacted

is

hostilities ceased, there

for the continuation

initial interest in

of an occupied

was

status.

extending U.S. citizenship to the

evident that Article IX of the Treaty of Paris
had not been

designed to create a colonial condition. Although,
McKinley would eventually change
his

mind on

the island

the question of extending U.S. citizenship to
Puerto Ricans, at the time that

was acquired he had argued

United States and another thing
perhaps most importantly, the
that the

word

territory

Not even Taney

in his

that the treaty did “not

in Porto

territories

was attached
infamous

otherwise would be inconsistent with

were deemed States

in the

making. The moment

became

Dred Scott, questioned

all

thing in the

Rico and the Philippines .” 496 Thirdly, and

to Puerto Rico, the island

ruling,

mean one

this principle.

prior territorial precedents.
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a part of the U.S.

To do

CHAPTER 6
THE FORAKER ACT OF

1900

The Foraker Act of 1900 became
foreign country.

Up

I

the

first

organic act to treat a ceded territory as a

to this point, all the organic acts

territories treated these places as part

In this chapter

AND THE COLONIAL DEPENDENCY

want

to explore

developed for the governance of the

of the nation and destined for eventual statehood.

some of the ways

in

which notions of American

exceptionalism, informed by racist ideologies of Anglo-Saxon
superiority, participated in
defining the contours of this organic
inferior Puerto

its

act.

My contention is that representations of an

Rican race played a central role

in the creation

of the Foraker Act and

ideological departure from the established territorial precedent.
This

race

was

is

not to say that

the only ideological force shaping the contours of this policy shift, for

evident that U.S. economic interests were also

important because

I

at

the heart of this

new

in

it

law. This

is

is

will argue that while the traditional organic acts sought to establish a

structure of governance for a territory, the Foraker

Act sought

arrangement for a colonial dependency. The key distinction
conceived as a part of the nation, a State

in the

to

develop a governmental

lies in that a territory

was

making, whereas Puerto Rico was treated

as a possession with an uncertain future.

The Foraker Act was developed
providing a

civil structure

to replace a

of governance for the

two-year military government by

island.

However,

this

Act cannot be

understood independently of the military government’s ideology because

regime provided most of the

social,

economic, and

political information

this

two-year

about the

conditions of the island from which lawmakers drew to design the local institutions of
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government. In some ways, as

I

have suggested before, the Foraker Act
represented the

institutionalization of a military ideology
will begin with a discussion

government
in

in an

occupied

of conquest and imperialism. Thus,

this chapter

of the constitutional basis for the establishment
of a military
territory,

and a general discussion of the military
government

Puerto Rico between 1898 and 1900. This section,
however, will focus on Brigadier-

General George V. Davis’ reports and description of
Puerto Rico. His reports not only

became

the

main source of information

for U.S.

blueprints for a local governing structure.

lawmakers, but also provided the

The second

more systematic discussion of the Foraker Act paying
features of this Act,

namely

part of this chapter will focus

particular attention to four

economic provisions, the establishment of a

its

Puerto Rican citizenship, the governmental structure for the

of provisions regarding the extension of the

Bill

civil

on a

key

distinct

government, and

its

lack

of Rights and some parts of the

Constitution.

6.

1

Law and
The

August

the Military

Regime

military hostilities between Spain and the U.S. ceased in Puerto Rico on

12, 1898.

From

that point

on the

role

of the military regime was redefined

to that

of a transitional government. The military was charged with the task of keeping order,
protecting the

life

and property of the local inhabitants, and generally preparing the island

for the establishment

Executive,

known

it

of a

civil

was authorized

it

497

Acting as a direct representative of the

to carry out these tasks

as General Orders 101.

Foraker Act replaced

government.

498

The

under a series of Executive mandates

military regime lasted for

in 1900.
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two years or

until the

During these two years, between the cessation
of hostilities

in

1898 and the

enactment of the Foraker Act of 1900, four
military governors governed Puerto
Rico.

These included General Nelson A. Miles (July
25, 1898- August
General John R. Brooke (October
V. Henry (December

(May

9,

1898-

May

6,

1898-May

18,

9,

1899). Trias

1,

1898-December

6,

14, 1898); followed

1898), Brigadier-General

1899); and Brigadier-General George

Monge

by

Guy

W. Davis

argues that the military occupation of the

499
island can be understood as comprising three
legal periods.

The

first

began with the

military invasion and lasted until the signing of the
peace protocols. During this period,
the military governors acted on direct orders from the
President.

from August
ratified.

The

12,

1898

until April 11, 1899, the date in

third period,

The second period

which the Treaty of Paris was

and the main subject of this section, spanned from the

date until the enactment of the Foraker Act of 1900.

dates

The

last

latter

of these military governors,

Brigadier-General Davis, developed the most enduring legal and institutional structures

of government.

The unifying thread of these
virtually unrestricted

important, however,

after the hostilities

is

and unlimited power
is that

the military

to rule the island.

was authorized

to

500

What

is

was

their

especially

govern the island for two years

had ceased, namely during a period of peace. Moreover, the

narratives described

policy. This

military governors and legal periods

by

the island govemor/generals generally informed the U.S. colonial

important because the military status of the island

made

it

possible to

conceptualize the island as colonial possession without the constitutional protections and

guarantees afforded to the

territories.
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611

Th e

Constitutional Basis for the Military

The Constitution

is silent

the cessation of hostilities. 501

on the authority of the military

However,

the direct supervision of the President,

occupied territory

until

Government

it

to

was generally accepted

would be responsible

govern a

territory after

that the military, under

for the

governance of an

Congress developed an alternative governing

structure.

The case

of California provides us with the clearest example
of this practice. The Supreme Court’s
interpretations of the constitutionality of other
precedents provide a

more comprehensive

picture of the legal authority of the military regimes in
the territories after the cessation of
hostilities.

level

It is

interesting to note that the Court granted the military
an unprecedented

of discretion and power over the governance of the

This power was

territories.

generally premised on the principle that an acquired territory remained
a foreign country
for constitutional purposes until

Perhaps the

earliest discussion

can be situated

territory

Congress legislated for

in

Marshall

s

it.

of the military ’s power
discussion of this

to

power

govern an acquired

in the

Canter

ruling.

As

already noted in chapter four, Marshall argued that the Constitution conferred absolute

power

to the

“

treaties.'

of the

Union

.

.if

of the power

However, Marshall established an important

territories,

.

to acquire territories as a result

to

wage war and make

test for the military

governance

namely:

a nation be not entirely subdued, to consider the holding of conquered

territory as a

mere

treaty

of peace.

ceded

territory

If

military occupation, until
it

be ceded by the

becomes

a part

its

fate shall

treaty, the acquisition is

of the nation

to

which

terms stipulated in the treaty of cession, or on such as

impose.

be determined

503
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is

confirmed, and the

annexed, either

its

at the

new master

in the

shall

Accordingly the military, acting under
the direct authority of the
Commander-, n-Chief,
could be charged with the responsibility
to govern a territory between
the moment that

occupied the

territory, until “its

new master” determined

its fate

within the nation.

it

It is

important to note that the President was
presumably charged with negotiating and
establishing the terms of a treaty of peace.
This passage suggested that a treaty eould
create a special occupied status in the
absence of an act of Congress legislating
otherwise.

The new master, presumably Congress, could
governance of the
the territory.

assumed

that

territory into a treaty

However, because the

thus incorporate special terms for the

of peace, or

territory

it

could develop an organic act for

became “a

part

of the nation”

it

can be

Marshall recognized that the Constitution limited the
discretion of Congress

in its authority

over the

In Fleming,

territories.

Chief Justice Taney further

clarified the constitutional

power of the

military over acquired territories as well as their status during
occupation. Regarding the
military,

Taney argued

that the military, acting

under the

“harass and conquer and subdue the enemy,” but
the nation. This

power was reserved

it

command of the

President could

could not enlarge the boundaries of

to the legislature.

During the period of occupation,

the territory remained a foreign country for constitutional purposes until Congress

changed

that status.

In the

Chief Justice’s words, “(w)hile

it

was occupied by our

they were in an enemy’s country, and not in their own; the inhabitants were
foreigners and enemies and

owed

to the

to a force

still

United States nothing more than the submission

and obedience, sometimes called temporary allegiance, which

enemy, when he surrenders

troops,

which he
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is

unable to

is

due from a conquered

resist .”

504

This status could

change only when Congress detemiined
through a particular legislative

The

that the acquired territory

505

act.

clearest expression of the military’s

declaration of peace
that a military

was

became domestic

established

by

in the

power

Cross

to

govern a

ruling.

government had plenary authority over the

territory after a

The Taney Court

civil affairs

of a

established

territory

because:

It had been instituted
during the war by the command of the
President of the
United States. It was the government when
the territory was ceded as a conquest,
and it did not cease, as a matter of course, or
as a necessary consequence of the
restoration of peace. The President might
have dissolved it by withdrawing the
army and navy officers who administered it, but he
did not do so. Congress could
ave put an end to it, but that was not done. The
right inference from the inaction
of both is, that it was meant to be continued
until it had been legislatively
changed. No presumption of a contrary intention
can be made. Whatever may
have been the causes of delay, it must be presumed
that the delay was consistent
with the true policy of the government. And the more
so as it was continued until
the people of the territory met in convention to
form a state government, which
was subsequently recognized by congress under its power to
admit new States
506
into the Union.

In other

words, according

to this ruling,

which

is

not necessarily inconsistent with

Marshall’s argument in Canter, the military could govern a territory
between the time of
acquisition and

its

admission as a State of the Union.

Of course, one

has to wonder

how

a population could “develop” civic and democratic virtues under the
governance of a

military regime!

In 1857, a year after the Court had ruled that Congress did not possess the

constitutional authority to prohibit slavery in the territories through
Scott, the

Court reaffirmed

this principle in Leitensdorfer et al.

The executive

v.

its

ruling in

Webb by

Dred

noting

that:

authority of the United States properly established a provisional
Government, which ordained laws and instituted a judicial system; all of which
continued in force after the termination of the war, and until modified by the
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8

aZority

More

^

011

° f C ° ngreSS or
’

importantly, however,

citizens

was

the recognition that while the
political relations

and between the citizen and the

inhabitants

found to be

would remain
in conflict

^ lhe Temtorial Government established by

were

in their nature

and character

with the Constitution and the laws of the
United States ” 508

other words, the military government’s
authority was constrained

While the military regime could exercise plenary
power

in the

among

had changed, the private relations of the

state

intact "except so far as they

was prohibited from exceeding

its

In

by

the Constitution.

in its task to

conquer a place,

it

constitutional limitations that limited institutional
action

U.S.

After the Civil War, however, the Court departed
from these principles and

granted the military regime plenary and “unlimited”
power to govern a conquered
territory.

To be

sure, in City

Swayne, writing

of New Orleans

v.

New

York Mail

S.S.

Co. (1874) Justice

for the majority, declared that:

Although the city of New Orleans was conquered and taken possession
of in a
civil war waged on the part of the United States to
put down an insurrection

and

supremacy of the National government in the Confederate States, that
government had the same power and rights in territory held by conquest as if the
territory had belonged to a foreign country and had been subjugated
in a foreign
restore the

war. In such cases the conquering power has a right to displace the pre-existing

and

assume to such extent as it may deem proper the exercise by
powers and functions of government. It may appoint all the
necessary officers and clothe them with designated powers, larger or smaller,
authority,

to

itself of all the

may prescribe the revenues to be paid, and apply them
It may do anything necessary to strengthen itself and
enemy. There is no limit to the powers that may be exerted in such

according to
to its

own

weaken

its

pleasure.

use or otherwise.

the

cases, save those

Yet, while Justice

It

which

are found in the laws and usages

Swayne defended

that the precedents that

this

argument

in light

of war.

509

of prior case law,

it

is

clear

he relied upon, namely those cited above, unambiguously

171

recognize limitations in the authority
of the military regime.
his dissenting opinion, this

In the case

and unhindered

government
hostilities

was

until

upon the cessation of hostilities. 510

Congress enacted the Foraker Act. Lopez
Baralt has noted

instituted in the island

Once

Justice Field protested in

of Puerto Rico, the military regime’s
power was virtually unlimited

was almost absolute

extent.

especially evident

As

hostilities

by General Miles “up

in its

to the

that the

time of the cessation of

powers, the necessities of war dictating their

ceased in the island,

it

was presumed

that the

“scope and

powers of a military government” would be greatly
reduced and contingent on
necessity.

2

However,

in

Ochoa

v.

Hernandez

( 1

9 1 3), a case arising out of a property

dispute under the General Henry’s regime,
namely after the cessation of hostilities and

before the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, the
Court neglected to interpret these
limitations as constitutional constraints. 513

These powers continued

to

be plenary, and

apparently outside of the scope of constitutional constraints
even after the ratification of
the Treaty of Paris.

6.1.2

514

Davis’ Colonial Dependency

The

military reports of Brigadier-General

George W. Davis provided the

empirical and ideological basis for the development of the U.S. territorial policy
towards

Puerto Rico, as well as for the local governmental institutions. Virtually every key
policy

maker

that participated in the

in the invention

political,

of a

economic,

civil

legal,

development of a

territorial

policy for the island, as well as

government, credited Davis for his insights on the

and social conditions of the

island.

civil,

The Secretary of War

Elihu Root’s reports were generally verbatim reproductions of Davis’ annual reports. 515
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Moreover, according

to Senator

charged with drafting the
that

Joseph B. Foraker, the chair of the
Senate committee

bill that

would provide

for the island's civil
government, noted

Davis’ reports provided “a true
picture as the committee found

516
it.”

Delgado

Cintron suggests that Davis' reorganization
of the island’s legal system effectively
ended
the presence of the Spanish legal
system in the island and installed the
basis for the

penetration or rather transplantation of
the U.S. legal system. 517 In addition,
Trias

Monge

contends that the judicial structure developed
by Davis during his regime continued

in

existence even after the establishment of
the Puerto Rican Constitution in 1952. 518

Davis’ arguments were premised on the
representation of an inferior Puerto Rican
racial identity

American

and

racial

civilization,

understood in reference to a conception of an Anglo-

exceptionahsm. Davis’ project was anchored on a
conceptualization of

Puerto Rico as an mfenor civilization, governed
by inferior institutions, which in turn

were inhabited by

inferior

non-Anglo-Saxon

races.

519

Thus,

when Davis’ proposed

the

”
creation of a territorial policy that treated Puerto Rico
as a “ dependency rather than a
territory, his

local

argument was based on the incapacity of the Puerto Rican people

autonomy over themselves and

their

government. This

is

to exercise

not to say that once

Puerto Ricans became Americanized, presumably by shedding their
Spanish heritage,
they could not aspire to a

territorial status

and eventual integration. In

fact,

Davis did

provide for this alternative.

Relying on an argument reminiscent of Domingo
exceptionahsm,
identities,

“

F.

Sarmiento’s notion of

Davis described the Puerto Rican as an amalgamation of four

namely the white immigrant,

the

Negro and

racial

the Mulatto, the peon, and the elite

Caucasian of Spanish heritage. Accordingly, the Puerto Rican race could be understood
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as a national identity

composed of four

racial characters.

Caucasian race possessed the most
desirable

embodied

qualities,

the worst traits of the Puerto Rican.
Thus,

it

It

followed that the white or

whereas the black or Mulatto race
is

possible to argue that

by

whitening the island, Puerto Rico could
be made more amenable for annexation.
To
extent Davis’ reports suggest that he

was engaged

in an effort to provide a racialist

narrative that demonstrated the
possibility for Puerto Rico to eventually
nation. This

was evident

in

this

become a white

Davis’ distinct interpretation of several
census data to both

construct a local racial hierarchy and
simultaneously “whitening” the island.
In the third revised edition

of his classic text The Strange Career
ofJim Crow

eminent histonan C. Vann Woodward described of the
period the imperial campaign of

1898

in the following

manner:

These adventures

in the Pacific

and the Caribbean suddenly brought under the
some eight million people of the colored races, ‘a
varied assortment of inferior races, as the Nation
described them, ‘which, of
course, could not be allowed to vote.’ As America shouldered
the White Man’s
burden, she took up at the same time many Southern attitudes
on the subject of
race. ‘If the stronger and cleverer race’, said the editor
of the Atlantic Monthly,
is free to impose its will upon “new caught,
and sullen peoples” on the other side
of the globe, why not in South Carolina and Mississippi?’ The doctrines
of

jurisdiction of the United States

Anglo-Saxon superiority by which Professor John W. Burgess of Columbia
Mahan of the United States Navy, and Senator
Albert Beveridge of Indiana justified and rationalized American imperialism
in
the Philippines, Hawaii, and Cuba differed in no essentials from race
theories by
which Senator Benjamin R. Tillman of South Carolina and Senator James K.
Vardaman of Mississippi justified white supremacy in the South. 521
University, Captain Alfred T.

Like his contemporaries, Davis sought

by Reconstruction

to use a U.S. racialist

paradigm, mostly informed

era ideologies, to interpret the ethnographic landscape of the island.

This Reconstruction paradigm suggested that Puerto Ricans, like southern Negroes could

be “educated” and

to

some degree

eventually recognized as inferior citizens.

522

This was

another case of fitting the Puerto Rican “reality” into a U.S./Anglo-Saxon “model.”
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At present

it

is

unclear to

me why Davis

the Puerto Rican in his narrattve.

hand, Davis sought to
situating

it

make

chose

to describe this racial
hierarchy

Two possible explanations come to

On

mind.

of

one

the

sense of the distinct Puerto Rican
social/ethnic landscape by

within his vision of the world, a vision
informed by a view of the world where

an Anglo-Saxon civilization reigned.
This form of Manifest Destiny would
have
legitimated, at least in his mind, the
is

possible to argue that Davis

Rico into the Union or

was paving

at least the

policy makers would be

more

supremacy of U.S. exceptionalism.

extension of a territorial status. At the very

receptive to holding on to an island that

citizens.

to Davis’ narrative, the island’s

between 1765 and 1810 showed

that

it

the road for the eventual admission
of Puerto

be populated with “white,” “less civilized,”

According

Alternatively,

U.S.

least,

would eventually

523

immigration census for the period

most immigrants arrived from the Spanish

peninsula, the Canary and Balearic Islands (Spain),
England and her dependencies,
524
France, Corsica, Germany, the Danish islands and
Venezuela.
This census report

is

then counterposed with the 1897 census, which:

.showed

that the pure-blood negroes here

numbered but 73, 824 out of a total of
899, 394, while of the same total there were 242, 000 mulattoes. Combining
the
full and mixed bloods, and designating them as colored
(the term by which they
.

.

are known in the States), it would appear that the pure white
are in a considerable
majority; and comparing both totals with the statistics of the year 1887
it would
seem that in that decennial period the numbers of these denominated above as

colored are not increasing in numbers, but instead have actually decreased. 525
It

should further be noted, that Davis’ conception of the black Puerto Rican

by

his perception

of the American Negro. While Davis was unclear

of the character of the Negro and the mulatto,

it

he embraced mainland stereotypes that depicted
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informed

in his representation

would not be implausible
this

is

to

assume

“race” as a criminal class. In

that

fact,

Davis
the

cites the

work of James Anthony Fronde on

West Indies

to

the English treatment

While Davis claims

that

right

and wrong. 526

between "the negro and the peon there

difference” he emphasized the Spanish
heritage of the peon. 527
that

it

in

suggests that both the non-white
Puerto Rican lacked proper
morals

and could not differentiate between

complained

of the Negro

was hard

to believe “that the pale, sallow,

are the descendants of the
conquistadores

South America, and

to one-third

who

To be

is

no

sure,

vis,ble

he

and often emaciated beings

carried the flag of Spain to nearly

all

of

of North America ” 528 More importantly,
the Puerto

Rican peon was representative of the Puerto
Rican masses. Consistent with his general
depiction of the island as a barren and
destitute place, he described the peon
in the

following way:

So great is their poverty that they are always in debt
to the proprietors or
merchants. They live in huts made of sticks and
poles covered with thatches of
palm leaves. A family of a dozen may be huddled
together in one room, often
with only a dirt floor. They have little food worthy
of the name and only the most
scanty clothing, while children of less than 7 or
8 years of age are often entirely
naked. A few may own a machete or a hoe, but more
have no worldly
possessions whatever. Their food is fruit, and if they are
wage earners, a little rice
and codfish in addition... .They are without ambition and
see no incentive to labor

beyond the
It is

least that will

provide the barest sustenance. 529

further possible to suggest that the

peon acquired the

status

of the poor white

American. The peon became the representative Puerto Rican underclass

in Davis’

narrative.

Davis described the Caucasian Puerto Rican

elite as the

only capable minority

able to participate in the governance of the island. Presumably, this Puerto Rican

was

a

descendant of the European immigrant as well as a remnant of the true conquistador. Not
surprisingly, this

was

the class/race that

commanded
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the island’s financial and

commercial resources. Davis also
described the white Puerto Rican
through a
comparison of the island with other South
American countries. He suggested
of the States which have been
formed from what

Amenca,’ and some of the

rule,

Rico

probable there

it is

which had so

now

has ."

5

'

0

are

accustomed

some

to call ‘Spanish-

islands discovered, settled, and
populated under Spanish,

English, and French domination,
have

although

we

that

is

many

points of resemblance to Puerto
Rico,

none of these save Chile,

large a proportion of

its

at

date of revolt from Spanish

inhabitants of the Caucasian race as
Puerto

However, while Puerto Rico possessed

a substantial Caucasian

population with the necessary attributes for
self-govemance, this

Spanish heritage continued to be minority

in the island.

elite

population of

That crucial difference justified

the creation of a colonial dependency, which
could be supervised

by the Great White

Father of the North.
Davis’ also relied on the racialization of governmental
institutions to describe the
conditions in Puerto Rico.

He

attributed

common

racial character,

which

contrast, Puerto

Rico had been governed by an

To

this extent,

in the

child or

that others

however, was

ward

was

representative of a superior standard of civilization. In

in

European,

civil

law system.

had justified the oppression of the American Indians. The

to subordinate the island to a

dependent condition akin of a

need of paternal supervision. This tension

the legal system used in Puerto Rico, which

and his efforts

inferior, albeit

Davis’ was unable to legitimate the complete subjugation of
Puerto Rico

same way

alternative,

in turn

law institutions with an Anglo-Saxon

to describe the possibility

was based on

is

a Spanish civil law tradition,

of transplanting U.S.
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evident in his description of

common

law institutions

and principles

to the island.

Presumably,

common

law institutions would both
be

representative of a civilizational
advance, as well as Americanizing
agents.

Davis described Puerto Rico as a
strange and un-American

Much

island.

like

Cristobal Colon did not understand
the language of the inhabitants
of Boriken, Davis did
not understand the language of
law used in Puerto Rico

complaint that upon his

arrival to the island

531
.

This becomes evident

in the

he had been unable to study and
understand

the local legal codes because they
had not been translated into the English
language

Davis further wrote

that the

“codes of law and regulations

in force

532
.

were numerous and

voluminous, and the whole system was
un-American and strange .” 533 Thus, Davis
claimed

to

have formulated his opinions on Puerto Rico
as a

result

of a

sort

of inductive

reasoning and his study of similar historical
events that he had read throughout his
career."

As

a result Davis tells the reader that he

was attempting

to formulate

some

universal generalizations about Puerto Rico based
on the facts that he observed in his

day-to-day activities and their relationship to the historical
events that were familiar to
him. Needless to say, his representations of Puerto Rico
were generally informed by his

own

attempts

at

making sense of an unfamiliar world,

a

new world

that

could not be

reconciled with any of his previous experiences. In the process,
Davis sought to

dismantle the un-familiar Puerto Rico and re-conceptualize

it

as a dependent island in

need of paternal supervision.
Davis narrative introduced the Puerto Rican native as a mass of “illiterate and
irresponsible

from

their

people.

He

Spanish masters

inhabitants “matured.”

argued that as a people they had inherited too

536
.

Once

many vices

Puerto Rico should remain in a tutelary condition until

the island

was deemed
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to

have attained an Anglo-Saxon

its

level

that

of civilization Congress should
consider the possibility of enacting
an enabling

would give

the res, dents of the island local

autonomy over

their affairs.

act

Davis

described this tutelary process in the
following manner:
In all my intercourse with the
inhabitants I have endeavored, on
every appropriate
occasion, to impress upon them the fact
that the time when
territorial

autonomy

could be instituted and the civil power
take its proper place as the superior
of the
mi itary is dependent solely upon their
capacity for the most important and
sacred
duties of citizenship by furnishing
examples of towns well governed public
moneys properly expended and full protection
in the enjoyment of natural and
awfully acquired nghts extended alike-to
the rich and the poor, the learned and
e ignorant the strong and the weak.
They are assured that not until the people
of the United States could see that
this had been done would they
probably feel
that there should be supplied for
Puerto Rico a Territorial government, which
in
due time could be raised to the highest dignity
of membership

American commonwealth;

as a State in the

that until the

achievement of that

result, Puerto Ricans
should not expect to be vested with those higher
responsibilities and privileges. 537

In other words,

dependency

Davis recommended

until

departed from

all

it

that the island

was Americanized.

It is

be maintained as a colonial

interesting to note that this

argument

prior territorial precedents with the possible
exception of Hawaii. In

the case of Hawaii, Congress had annexed the
islands in 1898, five years after

deposed the

local

government.

It is

it

had

also noteworthy to point out that at the time in

which

Davis was writing, Congress had been debating the annexation of New
Mexico and the
repercussions of naturalizing a population of a Spanish/Mexican heritage.

Davis suggested

that the progress

Americanization of legal

institutions,

of the island could be measured through the

which could

further

be evaluated by the embrace of

an Anglo-Saxon system of law and administration. 538 According
citizen

would be shaped by

responsibility.

the external institutions, rather than

to this

by

his internal sense of

For Davis the law was the “fabric of society.” 539 Legal
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argument, the

institutions

provided the necessary stability and
continuity for a society
civilized.

He began

to describe the

to

be prosperous and

problem in the following manner:

s might be expected, the Puerto
Ricans hold very tenaciously to their
local
manners, customs, and laws, with which
they are familiar. To carry out a
reform
or to institute an innovation is
attended with many difficulties; not
so much
because the public are wedded to all the
old customs, for some of these
they
readily concede to be vicious, but
because they cannot understand the
measures
proposed as substitutes. They prefer to retain
the old institutions and laws, even
nCW
^
"
Unfamiliar codes Procedure, and
45

In addition, until Puerto

Saxon peoples,”

there

^

^

admfnlt^on^

^

Rican judges learned

to

understand “the

would be no progress towards a

problem could be corrected by Americanizing
the
with Anglo-American legal

institutions.

>

civilized condition

legal

The high-bar

common

law of Anglo541

This

.

system and by harmonizing

for this transition,

it

however, was

not the training of Puerto Rican legal
profession, but rather that of the Anglo-American

Thus, Davis contended that “(u)nder the

bar.

and

many

requirements and rules strange

these will disappear, and ultimately a

to

new

order of things there are

still

crudities,

American lawyers and judges, but one by one

much more complete harmony of the

Puerto Rican

with the American system of procedure will come into being .” 542

Davis ascribed a
distinguishing

Civil

it

Code was

racial character to the Puerto

from the Anglo-Saxon heritage and

less efficient

and

fair

Rican legal tradition by

tradition.

For Davis, the Spanish

than the Anglo-American system of Anglo-Saxon

heritage. His distrust of the Puerto Rican legal system

was

also informed

the Spanish legal tradition allowed corrupt lawmakers and judges to both

and interpret them.
officially

He

by a belief that

make

statutes

claimed that while “any code of laws drafted by Americans and

approved would be respected, yet

be applied by lawyers and judges

who do

it

would not be understood;

not understand, and
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who

it

would have

will not

be able

to

to

understand for some time, the

common

law of Anglo-Saxon peoples .” 543

It

followed that

an inferior legal system could not
provide appropriate checks and
balances to compensate
for the inferior character

of the Puerto Rican judge of Spanish

Davis noted, the Anglo-Saxon

legal

heritage.

In contrast,

system was based on a doctrine of
stare

decisis.

which presumably constrained the
discretionary power of a judge by
holding him
accountable to precedent. The

latter legal

system, according to Davis, upheld
the

principles of liberty and democracy,
and presumably a

Davis, almost painstakingly, argued
that the
applicable to the Puerto Rican case.
civil

government

for the island

by

To be

sure,

government

I

am

which we can

to

that should

be

set

up .”

545

civilized society.

territorial

precedents should not be

he began the discussion of his proposed

stating that the “annals of

closely analogous precedents that could aid

American precedent

more

me .” 544

my country

Elsewhere he wrote, “(w)e have no

refer as an aid to decide the

On

this issue

furnished no

he concluded

form of civil
that:

satisfied the island is not ready for full
Territorial

desire

it,

and

I

autonomy. Only a few
mass of the people feel no interest in the
beyond the notion they had and have that with

fear that the great

question of government at all,
American sovereignty would come

free trade

produce, bringing general prosperity
In fact, citing the

Hawaii example, Davis argued

not remain indefinitely as now,” a colony

Davis turned

to a discussion

and high prices

for labor

and

546
.

that there

was no reason “why

it

could

547
.

of the Spanish and British experiences with

their

colonies in the Caribbean as models for describing the potential dangers
of a civil

government

for Puerto

Rico

548
.

He

focused on a discussion of Trinidad (British) and

Dominican Republic (Spanish) “because most of the
were, more nearly the same as in Puerto Rico .” 549
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natural and social conditions are or

Of course

the concept of the “social”

was another way of describing
“Statistics

the racial character of the island,
or in Davis’

^ow that the negro blood is not very much more in

evidence

in

words

Dominica

than in Puerto Rico, and the
persons of white blood are of the same
race and have been
controlled

the

by

the

same codes and

institutions that

Dominican model, which according

typical

to

have prevailed here .” 550 Presumably,

Davis had “been cited

example of the incapacity of Spamsh-Americans

abandoned

in favor

of the Trinidadian colonial model

reasoning was that his reasoning applied

to all

to

551
.

all

over the world as a

govern themselves” had

to

be

The problem with Davis’

non- White Anglo-Saxons. Even

case of British colony, Davis argued, “if
left uncontrolled and

free,

in the

Trinidad would

probably have supplied another example of
chaotic government .” 552 Thus, Davis
concluded, the temporary

civil

Dependency and placed under

government of Puerto Rico needed “to be styled a
the executive control of the President, through
the

Secretary of State of the United States .” 553
It is

both interesting and ironic to note that

description of the early American experience.

this

To be

Tocqueville had remarked that “democracy has been

up

like those children

streets

deprived of parental care

and know nothing of society but

its

who

argument echoed de Tocqueville’s

sure, in

Democracy

left to its

in

America de

wild instincts;

,

it

has grown

school themselves in our town

wretchedness .”

554

Clearly Davis’ standards

lacked historical grounding. However, what was also intriguing about his
reasoning was
the fact that the U.S. had adopted a Constitution and a particular form of
government that

was premised on

a rejection of British colonialism.

By

alluding to a British example of

imperialism, Davis construed the United States as an imperial power of the same rank as
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Great Britain, while simultaneously
neglecting to consider over one
hundred years of
prior history.

Davis’ proposed governmental structure
consisted “of a governor, an executive
council, a judiciary, and later

governor and

official

on a

legislative assembly.” 555

members of the executive

Court and those of the Federal court,
States, with confirmation

elected

by “popular”

taxes and/or

who

by

all to

the Senate.”

suffrage,

More

importantly, the

council, the officers of the

Supreme

be appointed by the President of the
United

556

However, the

legislative

assembly would be

which meant males over the age of twenty-one
who paid

could read and write. Moreover, while the
governor and the executive

council would have been in charge of the
governance of the island, which included

approving and vetoing laws, the legislature did have
the power

by a two-thirds

vote.

According

rule” than the British colonies.' 57

institutions

more than
In

to Davis, this provision

It is

to overrule the

governor

gave Puerto Rico more “home

important to note that this proposal created

of governance for Puerto Rico and replaced those

that

new

had been operating

for

three centuries.

some ways, Davis proposal incorporated some of the

principles present in the

concept of settlement that had been the basis of the Ordinance of 1787

to the extent that

it

sought to re-organize the islands governing institutions. Yet unlike the Northwest
Ordinance, Davis’ proposal contained no provisions for the re-settlement of U.S. citizens
or the eventual “development” of the island and

This

is

its

eventual maturing into statehood.

especially important given that under Davis’ project, the

residing on the island

was

not relevant.

It

number of inhabitants

followed that Puerto Ricans could have
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remained

in

a dependent conditton

change the island’s

ad infinitum

or at least until Congress decided
to

status.

Davis’ concluded his discussion of
the proposed

civil

government with a

discussion of the economic relations
between the island and the U.S. In his
report on the
Industrial

and Economic Conditions of Puerto Rico Davis
had depicted Puerto Rico

poverty-stricken and destitute island inhospitable
558
for trade.
to the

As an immediate

as a

solution

problem, he proposed the establishment of a
free trade agreement between the
U.S.

and the island

that

“would

set the

wheels of industry

in

motion.”

559

Presumably, the

increased influx of money and goods would help
the Puerto Rican native to destabilize
the Spanish merchants

who

generally controlled the export houses and were
the most

powerful local creditors.' 60 As soon as the island’s
economy was stabilized, presumably

when

the Spanish

interests, then the

economy was replaced with

a local

economy

U.S. should consider other economic

consistent with U.S.

initiatives.

However,

subsequent report on the Civil Affairs of Puerto Rico Davis
admitted

American sovereignty
for

it

in his

that:

for Puerto

Rico has so far been disastrous to its commerce,
has deprived the island of markets where were sold nearly one half
of its

total output.

true that

some

slight commercial benefit has resulted from the
change of nationality, considering that import duties have lowered and export
duties abolished, but no matter what the rate of taxation on imports,
the
concession is of little value while the power of purchase is taken away. 561
It is

In addition, the Hurricane of August

significant possibility for

8,

1899 had devastated the island and disrupted any

economic progress.

In order to increase the possibility of revenue, policy

improve the economic conditions of the

lawmakers could enact

island.

makers would have

Davis proposed a compromise

a special tariff on imports and exports that in turn

to

in

would be

administered by the President. The President would be expected to allocate these
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which

revenues to the local government.
resources to improve the local

It

followed that the government would
then use these

economy and

alternative enabled the U.S. to
create a

thus create a

new market under

new market
the

for the U.S. This

domain of the

nation, but

without having to assume a financial
responsibility over the welfare and
social conditions

of the

island.

Davis’ reasoning was eventually
incorporated into the Foraker Act as
a

modified version of the Dingley Tariff, which
importantly, because this Puerto Rico

I

discussed in the previous chapter.

was conceived

More

as a dependency, the requirements

of the Uniformity Clause could be circumvented.
The

civilization

of Puerto Rico was

reduced to the creation of a sustainable economy
that could become a new market for
U.S. businessmen and simultaneously generate
enough income for

sum, the Davis’ plan not only treated the island as
a colony
also for

6.

1

.3

its

sustenance. In

for political purposes, but

economic reasons.

The

Military’s Colonial Policy

The Secretary of War acted

as a voice for the President and ultimately determined

the military’s official stance during this period. Perhaps the

Secretaries of

War were

two most instrumental

Russell A. Alger (1897-1899) and Elihu Root (1899-1902).

Root, however, provided the most substantial arguments and plans for a
colonial policy in

Puerto Rico. In

fact,

it

is

unclear to

me

at

present that R.A. Alger had a significant role in

the development of a colonial policy. Alger’s writings suggest that he

was

at best

a

proponent of a Manifest Destiny ideology, and that he was simply carrying out orders
President McKinley. If one relies on Alger’s discussion of the

understand his perception of Puerto Rico,

it

is

185

Cuban campaign

to

possible to argue that he imagined the

for

inhabitants of the island to be
semi-civilized people, living in abject
562
barbarity.

Presumably, the U.S. colonial policy
would bring civilization to the island,
and would
eventually emancipate the Puerto
Ricans from their abject conditions.
In contrast Alger’s successor
provides us with a clear picture

of the military’s

colonial policy for Puerto Rico.
Root’s arguments are particularly interesting
because

they highlight the nexus between law,
U.S. exeeptionalism, and imperialism.
In

Root was selected because he was a prominent
lawyer who could bring a

distinct level

legitimacy to the imperialist endeavor. In
1915 Root told the audience of the

County Lawyer’s association

fact,

of

New York

that:

“Sixteen years ago”, he said, “in the month of
July, having just finished the labors
of the year and gone to my country home,
I was called to the telephone
and told
by one speaking for President McKinley, ‘the
President directs me to say to you

that he wishes you to take the position
of Secretary of War.’ I answered, “Thank
the President for me, but say that is quite
absurd, I know nothing about war. I
know nothing about the army.’ I was told to hold the wire, and
in a moment there
came back the reply, ‘President McKinley directs me to say
that he is not looking
for any one who knows anything about
the army; he has got to have a lawyer to
direct the government of these Spanish islands,
and you are the lawyer he wants.’
Of course I had then, on the instant, to determine what kind of lawyer I
wished
to

and there was but one answer to make, and so I went to perform
a lawyer’s
duty upon the call of the greatest of all our clients, the
Government
of
our
563
Country.”
be,

Implicit in this argument

upon a

was

the belief that the colonial policy should be constructed

solid legal foundation that

was

consistent with U.S. legal principles and precedent.

However, given Root’s argument, one has

to

wonder how knowledgeable he was of the

relevant precedents.

In his discussion

of the principles of colonial policy, Root argued

that the U.S.

had plenary authority over the governance of Puerto Rico. His interpretation of the
Treaty of Paris of 1898 read as follows:
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between the people of the ceded
islands and the United States
the former
complete sovereignty of the latter,
controlled by no legal
imitations except those which
may be found in the treaty of cession- that
the
people of the islands have no right
to have them treated as states,
or to have them
reated as the territories previously
held by the United States have
been treated- or
8ht Under tHe Pr ° ViSi0nS ° f the
Const tuti
which was
n people
establ ished for the
of the United States themselves and
to meet the
condmons existing upon this continent; or to
assert against the United States
any
y
legal nght whatever not found
564
in the treaty .”
.

.

that as

re subject to the

'

Root located

this

power

for that matter the U.S.

in the Territorial Clause,

™

’

and he further argued

that

Congress, or

government’s policies toward Puerto Rico
would always be

consistent with the spirit of the
Constitution

565
.

This interpretation of the law was informed
by the belief that the Puerto Rican

people were inferior and

much

like the

less civilized.

Native American “ward,”

Thus, they needed to be placed
until

in

a tutelary

state,

they were able to mature into adulthood.
In

Root’s words:

.before the people of Porto Rico can be fully
instructed with self-government
first learn the lesson of self-control
and respect for the principles of
constitutional government, which require acceptance
of its peaceful decisions.
This lesson will necessarily be slowly learned, because
it is a matter not of
intellectual apprehension, but of character and
of acquired habits of thought and
.

.

they must

It would be of no use to present
to the people of Porto Rico now a written
constitution of frame of laws, however, perfect, and tell
them to live under it.
They would inevitably fail without a course of tuition under a strong
guiding

feeling.

hand. With that tuition for a time their natural capacity will,
a self-governing people 566

them

it

is

hoped,

make

.

Yet, like most of his ideological predecessors, Root also
neglected to provide any clear
criteria that

could serve to measure the “progress” of the Puerto Rican people. Assuming

that like his

contemporaries Root equated the concept of race with that of national

character and heritage, the Puerto Rican could only acquire self-government
once he

became Americanized and abandoned
American exceptionalism sustained

his Spanish

customs and heritage. This view of

that until the Puerto

187

Rican became an American, he

was incapable of participating
that this political solution

own

in his

continued

to

self-government. The problem,
however, was

reproduce the political conditions
that enabled

U.S. policy makers to conceptualized
the Puerto Rican people as inept
wards in need of
paternal supervision.

This becomes readily evident

government

for the island.

The

when one

structure of the

considers Root’s proposal for a civil

government would have been comprised

of a governor, an executive council, and
a judiciary appointed by the
President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. 567
Unlike the Davis’ project, Root’s rejected
the
establishment of a local legislature. Root argued
that “in view of their present

inexperience

I

think that

it

would be

better to postpone such a provision until
the people

can have had an opportunity for exercise

in

municipal government and until the

formative period of adapting the laws and procedure
of the island to the
shall

their

new

first

conditions

have passed under the direction of a council composed
of Porto Ricans selected

known

capacity and wisdom, and Americans from the States
competent and

experienced in dealing with legislative and administrative problems.” 568
to note that

for

Root ignored the

It is

interesting

island’s historical experience with governmental, albeit
not

democratic, institutions. This was a history that was almost four times
as old as that of
the United States.

Even

More

importantly, there

the Northwest Ordinance

population

it

was

was no

territorial

precedent for this project.

clear that once the territory acquired sufficient

could begin to assume self-governing institutions and practices. In the case

of Puerto Rico, by

all

accounts, there were

at least

1

million inhabitants,

times the established number of inhabitants needed to form a
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territorial

more than

ten

government.

More

importantly however.

Roofs

projeet prevented Puerto
Ricans from engaging in a

process of "civic education” through
political participation in their
I

will

Davis’ and

concede

that despite the paternalist,
patriarchal,

Roofs arguments, they did

status to the island. Perhaps their

possibility

and

own

racist implications

made

view of Anglo-American exceptionalism
permitted the

the Puerto Rican case different
from the

is

an important

American Indian

Unlike the American Indian experience,
Puerto Ricans could potentially aspire
territorial status,

and possibly

to eventual statehood.

Foraker Act and the Insular Cases

of

accept the possibility of extending
a territorial

of Americanizing populations of European
heritage. This

distinction that

self-government,

this

More

case.

to a

importantly, unlike the

path was incorporated into the plan for Puerto

Rico.

6.2

Race and

the Foraker Act of

Lyman

Gould suggests

J.

Rico can be understood as a

shift

1

900

that the policies surrounding the acquisition

from

territorial

expansionism

of Puerto

to colonialism.

569

U.S.

expansionism, Gould contends, entailed the acquisition of territory
for the purpose of

expanding the national boundaries and settlement of citizens of a

State.

Thus,

territories

acquired by the Federal government would be placed in an intermediate
legal state of
transition

between annexation and incorporation

became ready

for admission as States.

to the

latter

promises.

until

they were settled and

570

In contrast, colonialism, for Gould,

the governance or subordination of a colonized place

any of the

Union

571
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presumed

by a metropolitan regime, without

Clearly as noted before, the United
States had engaged in earlier
acts of
imperialism.

territorial

The Foraker Aet represented

the first time that the Congress
had enacted a

organic act for the governance of a
colony. This Act was especially
important

both because of its departure from
prior precedent, and for the future
implications of a
territorial

policy that defined the contours of a
U.S. national identity.

of the acquired “territories” had been
annexed

to the

Up

to this point all

U.S. and Congress had expressly

guaranteed eventual admission as a State.
Puerto Rico became the

first

territory that

was

acquired and not annexed or guaranteed
eventual Statehood. In 1905 William F.

Willoughby argued

that the study

of the U.S. colonial dependencies should begin
with

an account of what has been done in respect
to the island of Porto Rico. 572 Willoughby

contended

that:

It is

in this island that the

United States has made

its first

essay in the field of the

government of a dependency partaking of the essential
character of a colony. The
policies that have there been adopted and methods
that have there been followed
have, therefore necessarily exerted, and will continue
to exert, a great influence
upon the management of affairs elsewhere. 575

With

this

Act the U.S. re-defined

international imperialist power.

of new

its territorial

identity

and by extension

The Foraker Act provided

territorial acquisitions that

would be

a

roadmap

treated as colonies.

itself as

for the

an

governance

574

Everett Walters, one of Senator Foraker’s biographers, argued that:

.Foraker represented the administration’s determination not to extend territorial
status to the island. Territorial status implied future statehood, a
prospect which
was undesirable for certain senators because of the racial background of the
.

.

Puerto Ricans. The Republicans contended that Puerto Rico was a “possession”
acquired by treaty-making and therefore could be incorporated into the states only

by an

act

of congress; they also contended

territorial status at the time.

575
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that congress

was not

willing to confer

The Foraker Act codified

a

new

imperialist position. In fact, in
his

memoirs Senator

Foraker noted that his committee
“had a general duty to govern that
people

with the

spirit

limitations

of our

accordance

in

institutions, although outside
constitutional restrictions

and

” 576

Senator Foraker described the organic
act for Puerto Rico

in the

following manner:

On

account of this assignment the duty fell
to my committee, and especially
to
as its chairman, to draft what
proved to be the first organic law ever
enacted
far the government of territory belonging to the United
States, and yet not par,
of
the United States -a distinction and
honor I have always appreciated; especially
Y
in view of the successful result of
my efforts 577 (Emphasis mine)

me

;

.

Accordingly, this Act legitimated overseas
imperialist policies.
In the

remainder of this section

Foraker Act that made

it

distinct

I

want

from prior

to take a closer look at four aspects

territorial legislation.

I

of the

will begin with a

discussion of the codification of the Dingley
Act in the trade, duties and revenue
provisions of the Act.

The imposition of a

fifteen percent tariff on

goods imported and

exported between the mainland and Puerto Rico represented
a key constitutional
departure in U.S. territorial policy. This discussion will
be followed by

on a provision of the Act

that invented a distinct Puerto

some

Rican citizenship as an

alternative to the collective naturalization of Puerto Ricans.
This discussion

important because
established

by

it

is

especially

represented a departure from the principles of a national citizenship

the Fourteenth

Amendment. From

the structure of governance created for the island.

review of some of the
to

reflections

there

I

will

move

The chapter

to a brief critique

will conclude with a

literature addressing the Act’s failure to include a bill

extend the Constitution to the inhabitants of the acquired colony.
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of

of rights and

6.2.1

Tariffs

and the Uniformity Clause

In his patronizing

and propagandist book Harvest
of Empire, Juan Gonzalez

argues that that one of the implications
of U.S. colonialism has been that
“the island has

always been subject

same commercial

to the

The Foraker Act

states.

treaties

and import

belies this claim. Sections

tariffs as the fifty

two through

six

of the Foraker

Act focused on the imposition of tariffs
and duties on goods imported and
exported

between the United States and Puerto Rico

for

revenue purposes. More importantly,
the

Insular Cases rehed on a political
interpretation of these provisions to
legitimate the
institutionalization

territorial status.

of the island’s colonial condition under the
guise of an unincorporated

In other words, part

of the

legal reasoning for the island’s
colonial

status can be traced to these provisions.

The two

relevant provisions for this discussion were
established in Sections 3 and

4 of the Act. To be sure, §3 of the Act reads as follows,
“That on and
this

Act

all

merchandise coming

into the

at several ports

of fifteen per centum of the duties which are required
like articles

collected

passage of

United States from Porto Rico and coming into

Porto Rico from the United States shall be entered

upon

after the

to

of entry upon payment

be levied, collected, and paid

of merchandise imported from foreign countries.” 579 The revenues

would then be “placed

at the

government and benefit of Porto Rico
for shall be organized.”

580

By

disposal of the President to be used for the
until the

government of Porto Rico herein provided

1902, once a local system of taxation and collection of

revenues was established, however,

this

arrangement would cease.

This tariff and duties arrangement can be read as compromise between advocates

of “free trade”

who

rejected

any form of tariff or duties

192

collections,

and the “protectionist

fraternity"

who

sought to extend the Dingley Tariff
(25%)

to the island.

581

To be

sure,

Walters noted that "Spokesmen for
the cane sugar produces of
Louisiana, the beet sugar

growers of California, and the tobacco
growers of Connecticut asserted

would

injure their respective constituents.” 582

Lloyd provided a

clearest explanation

However,

I

that free trade

think that Representative

of the issues surrounding the extension
of free

trade to the island in the following
passage;
In

my opinion

the sugar trust and tobacco trust.

Why is it that we admit
duty on Puerto Rico sugar? There is four
times as much sugar produced in Hawaii as
in Puerto Rico. The evident and
significant difference is this; Hawaiian
sugar is owned and controlled by the suear
trust, represented by Mr. Spreckles.
The sugar plantations in Puerto Rico are not
it is

Hawaiian sugar

yet

In

owned by

some ways,

this

free

and seek

this giant

to place a

monopoly.

583

argument can be understood as an

effort

on behalf of the sugar and

tobacco bourgeoisie to use the state as a political
instrument to protect

When
that the

its interests.

584

Davis’ proposed extending the Dingley Tariff on
Puerto Rico, he argued

money

raised

by these

Clearly the Foraker Act’s

duties should be used to reconstruct the island’s
economy.

tariffs

were temporary.

It

would follow

that

an alternative

interpretation of this provision could be understood as an
effort to buttress the island’s

economy during

a period of transition. Senator Foraker did in fact adopt this position

throughout the Senate debates. 585 These interpretations are not necessarily
mutually
exclusive. Establishing a discriminatory tariff on goods proceeding from
Puerto Rico to
the U.S. also provided

enough time

for

mainland monopolies

to “penetrate” the local

markets and to purchase the island’s most productive lands. Moreover, by creating a
discriminatory

tariff,

U.S. lawmakers were able to create better conditions for U.S. firms

to destabilize the local competitors.
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What should be

however,

clear,

is

that the imposition

of a

fifteen percent tariff

marked a departure from both the language
of the Constitution and established
precedent.

The relevant provision of the Constitution
reads
The Congress

shall

have power

as follows:

and collect taxes, duties, imposts and
common defense and general welfare of
and excises shall be uniform throughout

to lay

excises to pay debts and provide for the
he United States; but all duties, imposts
the United States. 5 * 6 (Emphasis mine)

According

Corwin,

to

five percent in

New

this

York,

can also be recalled that

meant
it

that if “a certain article

must be taxed

in the Court’s

at

the

same

imported from abroad

rate at

San Francisco,

is

etc.”

taxed
587
It

reasoning in Loughborough Marshall was clear
,

that for the

purposes of this clause, the meaning of the “American
empire” included both

“States and territories ” 588

albeit temporarily,

was

To

treat

to give

Rico became a foreign country

Puerto Rico as a foreign country for trade purposes,

Congress a power beyond the Constitution. Thus, Puerto
for constitutional purposes in the area

enactment of the Foraker Act, two years
accords of the Treaty of Paris, and after
generals.

6.2.2

As

I

after

it

it

had been ceded

Frank Juarbe,

Supreme Court

under the

was only

part

of the whole

picture.

Citizen

In an obscure, but important ruling titled

rel.

to the U.S.

had been governed by a succession of military

will demonstrate below, this provision

The Puerto Rican

of trade upon the

Relator,

v.

The People of the State of New York ex

The Board of Inspectors,

etc.

(1900), the

New York

established that the Treaty of Paris of 1898 did not extend U.S.

citizenship to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, nor did

naturalization in absence of congressional action.
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589

it

provide for their eventual

The Court

asserted that until

Congress naturalized the inhabitants
of the
citizens.

island, the Puerto

Relying on an argument reminiscent
on Elk

v.

Ricans were not U.S.

Wilkins, the Court also noted
that:

h ' S affldavit is that he did not after
the ratification of
Ihe
tre'^ of peace
the treaty
between Spain and the United States,
or any other time declare
his intention of retaining
allegiance to the king of Spain, but
that on the contrary
he adopted the nationality of the
United States and served with the
United States
P rt0 RlC dUn " g tHe War With Spai "
in various capacities.
Ut the
fi,e validity of his claim
i°
n°
in these
respects does not depend solely upon
the
question whether he adopted the nationality
of the United Sates. He must also
S how that the United States
adopted him as a full-fledged citizen, ad
this could
11 thS reSUh ° f a C ° lleCtive
naturalization of the Spanish subjects of
’

v^TTh'"

Bm

Porto^co^

In other words, Juarbe’s patriotic
act

citizenship in a U.S. territory, nor
citizen enough.
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More

was

of his

birth,

to earn

him U.S.

his intent to declare his intention to

importantly, Juarbe, like

“catch 22.” Because he had not been
territory at the time

of loyalty was not enough

bom

all

become

a

Puerto Ricans, was caught in a

in U.S. soil, Puerto

Rico was a Spanish

and because he could not renounce his national

status,

given that Puerto Rico was not a recognized nation, he
was unable to become a U.S.
citizen until

Congress decided

that all Puerto

The Foraker Act invented

Ricans could acquire

this privilege.

a Puerto Rican citizenship and refused to naturalize the

inhabitants of Puerto Rico. Section 7 of the Foraker Act established
that:
.all inhabitants continuing to reside therein who
were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided
in Porto
Rico, and their children bom subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held
to be
citizens of Porto Rico, and as such entitled to the protection of the United
States.
and they, together with such citizens of the United States as may reside
.

.

.

.

in Porto Rico, shall constitute a

body politic under the name of The People of
Porto Rico, with governmental powers as hereinafter conferred and, and with
power to sue and be sued as such. 592
Eventually Senator Foraker would write

.

.

.when the

first

that:

Porto Rican legislation was enacted

Ricans citizens of the United States.

It
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was not

my

we

failed to

fault that

we

make

the Porto

did not do

this,

for

so reported the bill and did
everything I could to have it so
enacted but a
majority of the Senate thought it
was premature, and provided instead
that thev
“
S
cm
0rt0 RiC0 and aS SUCh " nt '" ed
*«
protectimfof
ed S
I
r
a
P 356 &
substitu,ed when 1 found could
do no
I

"Z

r1

^

better

According

to Walters, Foraker’s bill

“would not go through while

conferring American citizenship”™
Suffice
available evidence

on the

intent

it

to say that the

it

contained the clause

language of the text and the

and meaning of Section 7 are clear on the
issue

Puerto Rican citizenship was not a
“second-class” U.S. citizenship. In fact the

passages suggest the Puerto Rican citizenship
was developed in opposition

that the

latter

to the

extension of U.S. citizenship to the Puerto
Ricans for both racist and political reasons.
Clearly, citizenship represented a recognition
of the Puerto Rican as both a part of the

United States, and as a bearer of constitutional

rights.

More

importantly, as Bothwell

keenly notes, under existing naturalization laws

at the

their national citizenship in order for

eligible for U.S. citizenship.

them

to

be

time Puerto Ricans had to renounce

However,

Puerto Ricans could not renounce a non-existent national
595
citizenship!

Notwithstanding
that the Puerto

Ricans

contemporary scholars

like

Rogers Smith suggest

Rican citizenship was a “second-class” citizenship ascribed

in order to situate

The

this evidence,

them

in a citizenship hierarchy.

Smith contends

to Puerto

that:

citizenship contemplated for Puerto Ricans had, in any case, been
decidedly
...
In the end the Organic Act for Puerto Rico, or the Foraker Act,

second-class.

merely labeled Puerto Ricans “citizens of Puerto Rico,”
596
States, but not full members of it.

entitled to the Protection

of the United

Elsewhere, Smith expands his argument and notes that the Puerto Rican citizenship was
the result of racist policy making.

.

.

To be

sure,

he argues that Congress

.created that category expressly as another subordinate status, inferior to U.S.
and inferior explicitly because America’s political and intellectual

citizenship,
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a separate but as yet anoth

It

appears to

me

that

Smith’s interpretation

is

-

partially correct to the extent
that race

was

a central factor in the invention of
a Puerto Rican citizenship.
However, the Puerto Rican

was not

citizenship

There

is

a second-class U.S. citizenship.

no doubt,

as

Smith clearly notes,

that the majority

of U.S. lawmakers

believed that Puerto Ricans, understood
as an undesirable racial group, were
incapable of

assuming the responsibilities of U.S.

citizenship.

However, while racism was

issue in the debates over the extension
of U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans,

evident that

naturalizing

some lawmakers were concerned with
1

million or

more

individuals

the potential

who would be

able to

pool.

To

in relation to the potential

this extent race, labor,

ideologies of this period.

To be

general attitude that prevailed
the debates

it is

also

economic

threat of

work and

travel

throughout the nation without “restrictions.” In other
words, racism needs

understood

a central

to

be

economic impact of naturalizing a substantive labor

and capital were part and parcel of the imperialist
sure, the following

among

passage was representative of the

the majority of U.S. lawmakers in the

House during

on the Foraker Act:

am opposed

to increasing the opportunities for millions of negroes in
Puerto
Rico and the 10,000,000 Asiatics in the Philippines of becoming American
citizens and swarming into this country and coming in competition with
our
farmers and mechanics and laborers. We are trying to keep out the Chinese with
one hand, and now you are proposing to make the Territories of the United States
out of Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands, and thereby open wide the door by
I

which these negroes and Asiatics can pour like locusts of Egypt into this country.
I say keep them all out. We can not even civilize the
Chinese within our
borders and who have been here for fifty years. These Chinese will wear pigtails,
worship Confucius, and die steeped in dreams of the elder ages
the churches and schools that are around and about them.

eat rats,
all
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in spite

of

am °PP° sed

d

^by

^

even nsking that heritage of liberty for
us and our
throwing away the Constitution and trampling
under our feet the
practice and precedents of more than one
hundred years. [Loud applause .] 598
...

!

children

It is

important to note, however, that naturalizing
Puerto Ricans did not necessarily mean

that U.S.

Guam

lawmakers would

for that matter.

I

am

feel

bound

to naturalize the Filipinos or the
inhabitants

of

In fact as Mr. Lindsay noted in the Senate
floor:

not afraid to be just and liberal and generous
with the people of this

American

island

against us

when we come to determine the civil rights and political status
of the
We need not make citizens of the Puerto Ricans unless we deem it

Filipinos.

on the ground

we may

that

establish a precedent to be used

expedient, but

making them citizens will place us under no obligations,
constitutional or otherwise, to follow that course when
we come to legislate
concerning the Tagals, Malays,
599
Archipelago

etc.,

who

inhabit the islands of the Philippine

.

The proceedings

in

the claim that U.S.

both the House and the Senate provide ample evidence to
substantiate

lawmakers viewed Puerto Ricans as

inhabited by inferior races. Moreover, there
relied

on

either a Reconstruction or an

and make sense of the

racial character

is

and or Puerto Rico as

inferior

ample evidence

to suggest that

American Indian paradigm

to attempt to represent

of the newly acquired population. In the case of

the Reconstruction paradigm, however, Puerto Ricans like blacks
citizens of the nation, albeit segregated

and subject

were envisioned

to a second-class status.

lawmakers were also conscious of the existence of a four centuries old
system of governance. To
distinct

that

de jure alternative

would shape

this extent, the

that

lawmakers

would take

as

Yet,

institutional

Puerto Rican citizenship could provide a
into account the legal

and

political conditions

the relationship between Puerto Ricans and the empire.

The second problem with Smith’s argument
that is in direct relationship to the nation.

is

In a sense,

that

he conceptualizes a citizenship

Smith measures a second-class

citizenship in reference to a national citizenship, presumably a Fourteenth
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Amendment

citizenship, without taking into
account that the constitutional status
of Puerto Rico

mediated the relationship between the
Puerto Rican citizen and her
relationship with the
U.S. If we read the tariff provisions
as an affirmation that Puerto
Rico was a foreign
country, then the Puerto Rican
citizenship
In other

words,

this

becomes an affirmation of the foreign

status.

reading suggests that the Puerto Rican
citizenship needs to be read

with reference to the Foraker Act and

its

provisions, before

it

can be read within the

context of a larger social and racial landscape
of ascriptive citizenship.
implications of this argument

is

that the Fourteenth

Amendment was

One of the

not applicable to

Puerto Rico because the island was not
considered a part of the nation.

To

this extent,

Puerto Rican citizens were neither citizens nor
persons while residing in Puerto Rico for
the purposes of U.S. citizenship provisions.

6.2.3

The

Civilized

Government?

The Northwest Ordinance provided
developed by Congress. However,

this

the blueprints for virtually every organic act

Ordinance was developed for the settlement and

colonization of territories. In the case of Puerto Rico,
the provisions of the Ordinance

much

like in the case

would have been inapplicable

of Hawaii,

to the extent that Puerto

Rico would qualify for immediate admission given the number of inhabitants residing

in

the island, as well as the existence of stable governmental institutions. However,

Congress decided

to

modify the Ordinance and develop an organic

act that treated Puerto

Rico as a colonial dependency without any of the guarantees included
1787, including the “incorporation” of the territory and

on an equal footing. One possible explanation could be
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its

in the

Ordinance of

eventual admission as a State

that

lawmakers did not believe

that they could transplant

enough U.S.

citizen-settlers to the island to
offset the

“power” of the naturalization of one million
plus
Congress adopted the

traditional policy

The Foraker Act provided

cittzens

of Puerto Rican

heritage. Yet.

of appointing the island’s governing
body.

for the Presidential

appointment of a governor, and

executive council, and a judiciary with
the advice and consent of the Senate.
created a legislative assembly

numencal

It

also

composed of a lower house of thirty-five popularly

delegates and an upper house comprised
of the executive council.

The

elected

Presidential

appointment of the governor and the executive
council was consistent with the belief that
Puerto Ricans were incapable of exercising
an element of self-determination and lacked
the necessary character to elect their
public servants.

It is

important to note that these

appointment provisions were not drafted as temporary
measures, but rather as permanent

mechanisms

for the

governance of the

island.

This was yet another example of the

contradictory and hypocritical rhetoric of U.S. exceptionalism.

lawmakers came

to Puerto

On

the one hand, U.S.

Rico to civilize the inhabitants of the “stricken land,” yet

in

order to achieve this lawmakers created a situation of perpetual
disenfranchisement.

Perhaps by denying Puerto Ricans a republican form of government,
U.S. lawmakers
sought to perpetuate a colonial condition. In any event,

system represented a departure from

all

previous

this perpetual

territorial

appointment

precedents, including the

district precedents.

Brigadier-General Davis had argued that extending local suffrage to
municipalities

would be

a

first

step towards self-government. Perhaps the provisions

allowing for the popular election of the members of the House of Delegates represented a

compromise with

the local elites to the extent that
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it

allowed some Puerto Ricans

to

exercise a certain level of control
over local affairs. However, this
local autonomy was
far

from a form of popular sovereignty.
To be

sure,

under the provisions of Section 31

Congress retained absolute authority over
the Puerto Rican

power

to annul

any

act

of this legislative body. This

is to

legislature,

and reserved the

say that the Foraker Act

provided a level of continuity with the
practice of recognizing Congress’
plenary power
over an acquired

6.2.4

territory.

Did the Constitution Follow the Flag?

The Northwest Ordinance,

as well as virtually every other organic
act anteceding

the Foraker Act recognized the applicability
of the Constitution to the citizens residing in

the territories.

The Foraker Act did not contain

a Bill of Rights, nor did

it

extend the

Constitution to the island. In fact lawmakers in
Congress were clear that the Constitution
did not extend to Puerto Rico. For example, take
Representative Payne’s following

statement in the House floor:

we are not hampered by treaty stipulations or by act of
Congress. There has been no law extending the Constitution over
the island. In
In respect to Puerto Rico,

this

it

differs

from the

absolute power.

In

any event, the

status

of every formerly acquired
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tariff, duties,

We have

and revenue provisions, as well as the Puerto Rican

citizenship provided evidence that the Constitution

action.

territory.

was used

at

best to temper state

In other words, the Constitution extended to Puerto Rico only to the extent
that

the spirit of the Constitution governed Federal institutions like the military governors and

Congress. In

fact, the

Supreme Court eventually

institutionalized the principle

established by the Foraker Act that Congress determined the extent to which the

Constitution

would apply

to the territories in the Insular Cases.
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However, prior

to these

rulings, the Puerto

Rican was

left in

a

vacuum. To be

sure,

because they were citizens of

Puerto Rico they were not necessarily
guaranteed the protections of the

Bill

of Rights.

Simultaneously, because they were no longer
a part of Spain they were not
entitled to the
protections of the Spanish Constitution.
After the Court’s rulings on the Insular
Cases

Congress determined which parts of the Constitution
would extend
Herein

lies

the basis for the present U.S. territorial
policy.
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to Puerto Rico.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The

constitutional story

building history

is

of Puerto Rico’s relationship

to the

United States nation-

incomplete without a discussion of the
Insular Cases. While Foraker

Act codified U.S. colonialism the Insular
Cases
importantly, as Rivera

Ramos

institutionalized this ideology.

More

argues:

The

centrality of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the resolution of
important public matters invested its adjudication
of the issues with a special
significance. It finally put to rest the
allegations that the American colonial
venture was unconstitutional and, for all
practical purposes, closed the debate
within the American intellectual and governing
601
elites.

This remark suggests that the Court reaffirmed
the plenary powers of Congress with
respect to the acquisition of new territories. In
doing so, the U.S.

embarked

in a

new

construction of the constitutional status of acquired
territories abandoning the prior
practice of annexing the acquired possessions. In
fact the

new

constitutional construction

permitted the acquisition of colonies and their holding in
a legal limbo without a
timetable and without a promise of eventual admission as a
State on an equal footing.

This resulted in the creation of a
but not a part of the nation.

it

did not require a

new

new

What

is

territorial status that

important about this

made Puerto Rico

new

a possession

constitutional status

is that

interpretation of the Territorial Clause because Puerto Rico

was

not considered a territory within the meaning of this clause.

I

will begin this concluding chapter

relevant aspects of the Insular Cases as a

by providing

way

to

understand

institutionalized the principles of the Foraker Act. 602
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a brief introduction to the

I

how

the

Supreme Court

will limit these

comments

to

two

questions.

The

first

Territorial Clause.

will address the

I

ways

in

which the Insular Cases interpreted
the

will suggest that while there

is

a certain degree of continuity
in the

Court’s interpretation of the Territorial
Clause, there

a

is

marked departure

in its

construction of the constitutional status
of acquired territories. These reflections
will also

suggest

some of the ways

these cases.

The chapter

in

which narratives of race informed the Court’s
reasoning

will conclude with a brief discussion

in

of the relationship between

constitutional interpretation, nation building,
and race. In this final section

I

will

highlight the historical and political relevance
of my project.

Notes for Further Research, The Insular Cases: 1901-1922

7.1

Rivera

Ramos

argues that the

territorial doctrine

developed

should be discussed in three phases beginning with the
Court’s
culminating in 1922. During the
territorial doctrine in a series

constitutional

meaning

to the

first

603

initial rulings in

phase, the Court provided the basis for

of cases rendered

in 1901

where

it

The second phase began

way

in

it

1901 and

new

also introduced

to describe the constitutional status

1903 and spanned

its

Cases

not only gave

Treaty of Paris and the Foraker Act, but

the concept of unincorporation as a

Rico.

in the Insular

until 1914.

604

of Puerto

During

this period

fhc Court rendered a series of decisions that shaped the legal contours
of its reasoning in

the earlier cases.

meaning

to the

reference to the

It is

new
new

important to note that the Court sought to give constitutional

territorial status

territorial status

by

interpreting other parts of the Constitution with

of the acquired possessions. This chapter

the discussion to one particular case, Gonzalez

v.

Williams (1904).

605

will limit

In this case the

Court reaffirmed the Foraker Act’s provision validating the Puerto Rican citizenship and
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reaffirming the idea that Puerto
Ricans had not
polity.

become members of the Anglo-American

In the third phase, the Court’s
position in Balzac

v.

People of Porto Rico (1922)

finalized the process of institutionalizing
the doctrine of unmeorporation

Court’s earlier interpretations as a
basis for
relied

its

on a vision of American exceptionalism

reasoning.

606

More

to legitimate the

by using

the

importantly, the Court

new

territorial status.

Seven out of nine opinions comprising the
Insular Cases of 1901 arose out of
disputes involving Puerto Rico. All of
the opinions were decided on
this extent, in order to

subject,

it

is

May 27,

1901.

To

understand the impact and reasoning of the
Court on the present

crucial to read these opinions as part
of a

other words, for reasons that will

whole constitutional

become evident below

my contention is

narrative.

In

that the

relationship between the Insular Cases and
the Foraker Act can only be understood
if

these cases are read collectively. In the
the firm D. A.

De Lima

illegally exacted

& Co.

first

of these cases,

De Lima

v.

Bidwell (1901),

sought “to recover back duties alleged to have been

and paid under the protest upon certain importations of
sugar from San

Juan, in the island of Puerto Rico, during the autumn
of 1899, and subsequent to the

cession of the island to the United States.” 607 The duties in
question had been collected
after the signing

Wnting

of the Treaty of Paris but before the enactment of the Foraker Act.

for the majority, Justice

Brown argued

was whether Puerto Rico remained

that the

main question

a foreign country within the

raised

by

this case

meaning of U.S.

tariff

laws.

Writing for the majority, Justice
treaty

of Paris the island became a

Brown concluded

territory

of the United

that

“by the

ratification

of the

States, although not an

organized territory in the technical sense of the word.” 608 In other words, the cession of
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Puerto R,co to the United States
under the tenets of the Treaty of
Paris

made

Puerto Rtco

a part of the United States for
tariff purposes. However,
because Congress had not
established a territorial government
in 1899, Puerto Rico
remained an unorganized
territory.

Presumably, the territory would be
organized once Congress enacted an
organic

or territorial act.

Justice

Brown immediately moved

to a discussion

source of constitutional authority.
Although

interpretation as argued in

held in Scott

v.

Sanford

Dred Scott. To be

intended to be confined, to the territory which
the United States, and

was within

and was not intended

to

the Territorial Clause

was not

territories.

It

extent that

it

appears to

In

questions,

Rico.

‘

in

Dooley

however

of Florida, a

Brown

wrote, “It

is

true

Mr. Taney

of the Constitution was confined, and

at the

time belonged to or was claimed by

by

the treaty with Great Britain,

Brown

v.

power over

the

a necessary reading of the Constitution to the

political

leeway

to

do govern the

territories as

it

further argued that “whatever be the source of this

to acquire

and govern the

United States and Grossman

United States (Dooley

it

sure,

their boundaries settled

me that this was

Goetze

v.

to the case

the constitutional source of Congress’

Congress had plenary authority

was reaffirmed

Marshall’s

apply to the territory subsequently acquired.” 609
Accordingly,

would give Congress

pleased. In fact Justice

was applied

it

Clause as a

founding of the nation, he decided to affirm
Taney’s

that the territorial clause

,

Territorial

Brown acknowledged

interpretation of this clause in the Canter
ruling as
territory acquired well after the

of the

I)

territories.

v.

610

power”

This argument

United States (1901).

(1901), the Court addressed the

611

same

considered the legality of goods exported from the U.S. into Puerto

The Court concluded

that the tariffs established prior to the ratification
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of the

Treaty of Paris were

legal, but those collected
after the

enactment of the treaty were not

because Puerto Rico had become a
part of the U.S. as a result of
the
important to note that Justice

country for

tariff purposes

island” because

it

Brown

it

in

It is

further noted that to treat Puerto
Rico as a foreign

would “be disastrous

would place

treaty.

to the business

and finances of the

a position of “practical isolation.” 613
In other words,

Puerto Rico would be a foreign country
to both Spain and the U.S.
Ironically,

what the Foraker Act established! This
argument was reaffirmed
(1901).

Armstrong

v.

U.S.

614

In

duties

in

this is

Downes

v.

Bidwell ( 1901), the Court addressed the legality
of the collection of

on goods imported from Puerto Rico

after the

Foraker Act had been enacted. 615

This case institutionalized U.S. imperialism by
extending constitutional legitimacy

Foraker Act and the ideological principles informing

Court introduced a
departed from

to

all

new

this law.

More

importantly, the

interpretation of the constitutional status of the
territories,

prior precedent.

understanding the problems that

While
I

am

I

to the

which

recognize the crucial importance of this case

discussing in this project,

at

present

focus on a brief examination of passages that substantiate
the claims that

I

I

will only

make

in this

project.

In this opinion, the Court concluded that “the island of
Porto Rico

is

a territory

appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United
States within
the revenue clauses of the Constitution; that the Foraker act

imposes duties on imports from such
duties.

island,

and

is

constitutional so far as

that the plaintiff cannot recover

back

In other words, the Court argued that the U.S. could acquire territorial

possessions that were distinct from territories to the extent that they belonged to the
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it

United States, but were not a part
of the nation. In addition. Congress
had the ultimate
authority to enact laws for the
governance of these possessions. In
turn, this authority

enabled Congress to decide what
provisions of the Constitution could
be extended to the
island,

and what provisions could be denied.
Under

this

reasoning the Constitution did

not extend expropio vigore to the
newly acquired territorial possessions, and
Congress

would be

the final arbiter of what provisions
could be extended to the island.

Justice

to the

Brown’s

newly acquired

strict

constructionist argument that the Constitution
did not apply

territories

was premised on

at least three interpretations

constitutional status of the territories. First,
Justice

was
not.

silent

to

look

Constitution

at the

answer

to this

to the territories or

problem, Justice Brown asserted, the Court

works of commentators during the period of the when

was wntten, “the

practical construction put

decisions of this Court .” 617 Second,
to

contended, the Constitution

on the question of whether the revenue clauses
extended

In order to discern an

needed

Brown

of the

Brown maintained

upon

it

the

by Congress, and

that the Constitution

in the

was meant

apply only to “states, their people, and their representatives .” 618
Thirdly, relying on an

argument reminiscent of Jefferson

Taney

s

reasoning in

apply to the
Justice

s initial

Deed Scott, he

declared that the Territorial Clause was not meant to

territories acquired after the

Brown noted

that the

“power

posture on the Louisiana Purchase, and later

to

adoption of the Constitution

make

619
.

To be

sure,

needful rules and regulations would

certainly not authorize anything inconsistent with the Constitution if it applied
to the
territories.”

not

bound

“

to

The implication of these arguments was

that

while the United States was

extend the Constitution to Puerto Rico, namely because the island was

foreign for constitutional purposes, Congress could choose to treat the island as a
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domestic territory in some aspects.
If Congress deeded to
domestic

territory,

suggest that

then the Constitution would guide

Brown sought

much

to give as

its

treat

Puerto Rico as a

actions.

political flexibility to

These arguments
Congress on

this issue

as necessary to govern the nation
as an imperial power.

Throughout

this project

actors such as Congress, the

relationship

clear.

I

have endeavored

Supreme Court, and

between the Constitution and the

First, virtually all

of the

to

demonstrate the ways that legal

legal scholars interpreted the

territories.

latter legal actors

By now

several issues should be

agreed that once a territory was

acquired, either through discovery, purchase,
conquest, or annexation, the territory

became

a part of the United States.

the Court’s ruling in Fleming,

the case of Puerto Rico

that

ceded the island

is

a domestic territory

namely

is

Rico had in

upon the

a bit

of an “occupied

can be discerned from

territory.’’

had signed

However,

a treaty with Spain

conquering nation, the United States. Following the Court’s
fact

ratification

The question of whether
acquired territory

in the case

to this rule

not comparable because the U.S.

to the

earlier reasoning, Puerto

The only exception

ceased to be a colony and had actually become

of the Treaty of Paris.

the Constitution extended ex propio vigore to an

more complicated

to

answer. There

is

no doubt

that virtually

every legal actor during the nineteenth century agreed that some provisions of
the
Constitution should apply to the acquired territories. Certainly there was no reason

why

the Bill of Rights should not extend to the territories, especially given that U.S. citizens

were

settling them.

However,

this issue generally raised

two problems.

First, the

extension of the Constitution could have created some serious political problems for the

governance of the

territories.

For example,

in Marshall’s case, treating territorial
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judges

like federal

judges would have limited their
power

in the territories

junsdictions to federal questions only.
Thus, by inventing a
Justice Marshall

was able

to create a judiciary

new

by constraining

their

kind of territorial judge.

with both Federal and State
powers.

From

a political standpoint, these judges
were Federal judges and thus within
thejurisdiction of
the Federal government.

As

agents of the Federal government they
further helped to

consolidate the national domain.

A second problem was that there were certain constitutional
the right to participate in national
elections,

argument even applied

supreme over

acts

to

were

Chief Justice Taney

of Congress. To

specifically limited to the States. This

who

this extent

it

provisions, such as

is

argued that the Bill of Rights was
possible to argue that the Constitution

could not be read as a unitary national text that
extended to the nation, but rather as a
political text with a spatial hierarchy that
placed the territories

States.

The

Constitution, as

it

was

applicable to the territories, and

written,

was

some denied

to

on a lower rung than the

a fragmented text with

some provisions

them. This has been one of the problems

present in this Federalist system of government where
States and territories mediate the
relationship between the citizen and the nation.

Notwithstanding these arguments Justice White’s concurring opinion
provided the
prevailing interpretation of the constitutional status of Puerto Rico.
Rather than giving

Congress extra-constitutional powers, Justice White argued
territorial

that Puerto

Rico was simply a

possession that occupied a legal status located in between a foreign country and

a domestic territory.

To be

sure, Justice

White wrote:

The result of what has been said is that while in an international sense Porto Rico
was not a foreign country, since it was subject to the sovereignty of and was
owned by the United States, it was foreign to the United States in a domestic
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sense, because the island had
not been incorporated into the
United States but
was merely appurtenant thereto as a
621
possession
.

This argument would enable the
Court to maintain a certain degree of
continuity with
precedent while justifying a distinct
treatment of the island. Yet, this
status,

in the

namely one measured by

to treat

extent, the adoption

territorial

a status of incorporation, represented
a radical departure

conception of the temtones. To be sure,
even in the case of the

were willing

new

Alaska and the Louisiana as parts of the
United

District, the

States.

of the concept of incorporation introduced
a new

To

Courts

this

territorial status,

dressed in constitutional language that could
justify treating an acquired possession
like a

colony without having
In Twilight

To

trace

to challenge precedent.

of the

Idols, Friedrich Nietzsche suggested that:

something unknown back to something known is alleviating,
soothing,
moreover a feeling of power. Danger, disquiet, anxiety

gratifying and gives

attend the

unknown - the

first instinct is to

eliminate these distressing states.

Thus there is sought not only some kind of explanation as
cause, but a selected
and preferred kind of explanation, the kind by means of
which the feeling of the
strange, the new, unexperienced [sic] is mostly
speedily and most frequently
abolished - the most common explanations 622
.

Perhaps the Court
territory could

s

readiness to adopt Justice White’s conception of the
unincorporated

be construed as an effort

to “eliminate these distressing states”

a colony with a familiar garb and erasing the difference. In other
words,
the colonial possession or

dependency

in constitutional terms,

namely

by dressing

by rethinking

as an

unincorporated territory, the Court was able to allay disquieting critiques of imperialism

while exerting a therapeutic degree of power.
In addition,

citizens of a

it

is

also evident that racism, or rather the fear of acquiring

non-Anglo-Saxon

interpretations.

To be

race,

sure. Justice

became

a justification for the adoption

Brown had
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stated that:

new

of these

We are a

so of the opinion that the

P°W

United S
q f?

r t0

ii

power

to acquire territory

§0Vem SUCh temtor y’

eC 1Ve

by treaty implies
but t0 Prescribe what terms the

inhabitants and wba
rSnJustice u
u
Marshall
termed the ‘American empire.’
ltS

t

’

,?

i

lef

middle ground between

their status shall

be

in

There seems

to

be no

what

this position and the doctnne
that if their inhabitants do
ed iately u P° n ^xation, citizens
of the United States, their
ebild
hei after u
bom wbether savages or civilized, are such, and
entitled to all
T
the riaht
nghts and privileges and immunities of
citizens. If such be their status
the
consequences will be extremely serious.
Indeed, it is doubtful if Congress
would
ever assent to the annexation of territory
eC<

T’

T

lr

’

upon the condition

that its inhabitants

however, foreign they may be to our habits,
traditions, and modes of life
become at once citizens of the United States. 623
Elsewhere,

Brown

suggested that

further

“(i)t is

expanded

obvious that

his

shall

view of Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism and

in the

annexation of outlying and distant possessions

grave questions will anse from differences of
race, habits, laws, and customs of the
people, and from differences of soil climate,
and production, which
the part of Congress that

territory inhabited

Indians.

624

would be

may require

action on

quite unnecessary in the annexation of contiguous

only by people of the same race, or by scattered
bodies of native

Brown concluded

his imperialist opinion

of Puerto Rico as a foreign country

until

it

was

by

further legitimating the treatment

sufficiently Americanized. Perhaps

echoing Bngadier-General Davis’ suggestions Justice Brown
concluded his opinion with
the following argument:

If those possessions are inhabited by alien races, differing from
us in religion,
customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of thought, the administration
of
government and justice, according to Anglo-Saxon principles, may for a time be
impossible; and the question at once arises whether large concessions ought not to

be made for a time, that ultimately our own theories may be carried out, and the
blessings of a free government under the Constitution extended to them. We
decline to hold that there is anything in the Constitution to forbid such action. 625
Yet,

how

could Puerto Ricans acquire the civic virtues of Anglo-Saxon Americans

were unable
left in

to

engage

in a practice

if

they

of local self-government? Puerto Ricans were again

a “catch 22.”
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As noted

above, the second set of Insular
Cases addressed other aspects of the

Foraker Act and expanded the scope of
the unincorporation theory
beyond the revenue,
tariffs,

of the

and duties provisions. During the Foraker
Act Senate hearings the main sponsor

bill,

Senator Foraker, declared:

...it

did not at

necessarily follow that they should not
be citizens of the United
my bill, but every Democratic Senator almost
without exception, was saying that if we
made them citizens of
States, as

and

if

I

all

originally proposed in

we made them

the United States

a part

of the United States

that provision

of the Constitution
with respect to uniform taxation would
probably apply, and we could not raise
revenue in the way proposed in this bill. 626

The case

titled

Gonzales

Williams (1904) institutionalized Foraker’s
argument. The

v.

Court’s reasoning in this case further reified the
constitutionality of the Foraker Act and
the

new temtonal

citizenship.

5

“7

status

The

facts

of Puerto Rico by recognizing the legitimacy of this
anomalous
of the case are as follows:

Isabella Gonzales, an unmarried

was an

woman, was bom and

resided in Porto Rico, and
1899, the date of the proclamation of the
the Port of New York from Porto Rico on August

inhabitant thereof on April

Treaty of Paris. She arrived

at

1

1,

when

she was prevented from landing, and detained by the Immigration
Commissioner at that port as an ‘alien immigrant,’ in order that she might be
returned to Porto Rico if it appeared that she was likely to become a
24, 1902,

charge.

public
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Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Fuller noted that the key question raised by

was whether Ms. Gonzales was an
immigration act of 1891.
citizen of the U.S. she

virtue

629

was

‘alien’

under the relevant provisions of the

The Court concluded

also not an alien.

citizen.

that although

Ms. Gonzales was not

Ms. Gonzales, a Puerto Rican

of Section 7 of the Foraker Act, occupied a

between an “alien” and a U.S.

this case

legal status located

a

citizen in

somewhere

in

She embodied the ambiguity of the Puerto Rican

status.
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The doctrine of the Insular Cases was
ruling in Balzac

v.

finally institutionalized with the
Court’s

People of Porto Rico (1922) when the
Supreme Court ruled

citizens residing in the island

provisions of the Sixth

were not

entitled to a right to trial

Amendment. 630 What makes

this

by jury under

that U.S.

the

case especially important was

the fact that Puerto Ricans had been
naturalized in 1917 under the tenets of the
Jones

Act.

This case arose out of an appeal to the Supreme
Court by Jesus M. Balzac over

his libel conviction

governor’s despotic

and sentences
rule.

case, under the Sixth

libels

was only

fair

Amendment.” 632
that Puerto

for publishing several articles criticizing
the local

Balzac “contended that he was entitled to a jury

Amendment of the

comment, and

trial in

such

Constitution, and that the language of the alleged

their publication

was protected by

the First

Citing the Court’s earlier reasoning in Downes, Chief
Justice Taft ruled

Ricans were not entitled

to a trial

by jury because Puerto Rico was not an

633
incorporated territory and Congress had not extended that right to
the island.

The Chief Justice contended

that “(i)t is locality that is determinative

of the

application of the Constitution, in such matters as judicial procedure, and not
the status of
the people

who

become U.S.

live in it.”

634

In other words, despite the fact that Puerto Ricans

citizens, Taft reasoned,

because Puerto Rico was not an incorporated

territory the Constitution did not apply ex propio vigore.

to

had

If Puerto

Ricans should desire

enjoy the protections of the Constitution, Taft concluded, they should “move into the

United States proper, and there without naturalization” could enjoy

“all political

and

other rights.,” including this “institution of Anglo-Saxon origin.” 635 This form of

American exceptionalism was informed by a

imbued the body with

distinct

belief that residence in the United States

Anglo-Saxon principles of law and behavior.
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In a sense

the presence of the

that

in the

U.S. soil helped Americanize the
Puerto Rican in ways

countered the Spanish heritage.

The
status.

part

body

effect

of this ruling was

to place Puerto

Rico in an inescapable constitutional

Before, racism and the belief that Puerto
Ricans were incapable of becoming a

of the U.S., and thus enjoy the benefits of
constitutional membership, had led

creation of the unincorporated territory.

Now the unincorporated territory had

determined that Puerto Ricans were incapable
of enjoying the protections of the
Rights.

It

to the

Bill

followed that U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico
could not participate

of

in the

U.S. polity, nor claim equal rights under the
Constitution, unless Congress decided to
incorporate the Puerto Rican territory. Simultaneously
Puerto Ricans were also excluded

from congressional participation because of the island’s
constitutional

status,

which was

the result of the Court’s interpretation of the Foraker
Act’s provisions temporarily
treating the island as a foreign country for the purposes

of revenue,

tariffs,

and duties

collections.

7.2

Territories, Colonial Dependencies,

Rivera

Ramos

and Unincorporated Territories

has argued that the vision of democracy applied to the case of

Puerto Rico entailed both a discontinuity and a continuity with past precedents.

contends

It

He

that:

departed from the standard policy regarding territories acquired in the past and
legal trend toward formal inclusion established by the post-Civil War

from the

amendments

to the Constitution.

At the same time,

it

practices of exclusion- both formal and material- that

American

political, social,

and economic
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life at

was
were

consistent with the
still

prevalent in

the turn of the century.

636

In this project

status

I

have been arguing

of the temtories

in general.

that the

fundamental problem

Both the

status

lies in

the constitutional

of the territory and the Territorial

Clause are incompatible with a national
conception of participatory democracy
strict constructionist interpretation
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.

of the Constitution limited the extension
of the

A
text to

the States only. Stated differently, the
Constitution only applied to the United
States, and
the

word

territory

was

not equivalent to that of the territory. In
contrast, a loose

interpretation only extended parts of the
Constitution to the territories. Again, the

concept of the territory as a political unit was not
equivalent to that of a

The case of Puerto Rico, however,
First,

it

is

interesting for at least

for the purposes

territories.

of the

Territorial Clause,

and certainly

in

comparison with

In fact, as the Insular Cases suggest, the Foraker

possession of the United States, but not a part of the nation.

to

namely something other than a

judge whether the

Rico

that departed

Territorial

territory.

to

govern the

It

became an unincorporated

in the case

Rico departed from

key anomaly of the Puerto Rican

territories

it

did not

become

was upheld. However,

all

To

the United

this extent, the

prior territorial precedents. Herein

status: unlike

any of the previously acquired

a part of the United States, nor

was

it

admission as a State on an equal footing. Puerto Rico became the
territorial

of Puerto

theory that this clause extended

fact, the

States chose to treat Puerto Rico like a colony rather than a territory.

legal status ascribed to Puerto

previous

follows that there would be no basis

It

territories

all

Act made Puerto Rico a

Clause was given an interpretation

from prior precedent. In

plenary powers to Congress

lies the

different reasons.

not readily evident that the Foraker Act granted
Puerto Rico a territorial status

is

territory,

two

State.

promised eventual
first

occupied

space that remained foreign for constitutional purposes, yet domestic for
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political interests.

In the case

whole Constitution

of Puerto Rico, Congress was not
required

to the territories,

only those fundamental rights that

it

to

extend the

deemed

necessary.

My contention has been that racist conceptions and
Rican were partly determinative of the
constitutional
is

intriguing,

shared a

however,

common

that the island

is that

representations of the Puerto

status afforded to the island.

other acquired territories were inhabited

by populations

Spanish heritage yet they were eventually annexed.
Perhaps the

provided

little

room

for U.S. re-settlement

What
that

fact

and colonization would explain

the reluctance of annexing the island.
Regardless of the reason behind the failure to

annex Puerto Rico,

it is

evident that narratives of an inferior Puerto Rican
race provided

the underpinnings for the creation of an

conception of a racialized and inferior

anomalous

territorial status

subsequent reification of the unincorporated

where nation building, the

legal status.

constitution,

status.

Ironically, this initial

provided the basis for the

The Foraker Act provided

and race could shape the Puerto Rican
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a nexus

status.
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